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UNIX Administrator Information Security Policy Compliance: The
Influence of a Focused SETA Workshop and Interactive Security Challenges
on Heuristics and Biases
Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance is crucial to the success of healthcare
organizations due to security threats and the potential for security breaches. UNIX
Administrators (UXAs) in healthcare Information Technology (IT) maintain critical
servers that house Protected Health Information (PHI). Their compliance with ISP is
crucial to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI data housed or accessed by
their servers. The use of cognitive heuristics and biases may negatively influence threat
appraisal, coping appraisal, and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. These failures may
result in insufficiently protected servers and put organizations at greater risk of data
breaches and financial loss. The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused
Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) workshop, an Interactive Security
Challenge (ISC), and periodic security update emails on UXAs knowledge sharing, use of
cognitive heuristics and biases, and ISP compliance behavior. This quantitative study
employed a pretest and posttest experimental design to evaluate the effectiveness of a
SETA workshop and an ISC on the ISP compliance of UXAs. The survey instrument was
developed based on prior validated instrument questions and augmented with newly
designed questions related to the use of cognitive heuristics and biases. Forty-two
participants completed the survey prior to and following the SETA, ISC, and security
update emails. Actual compliance (AC) behavior was assessed by comparing the results
of security scans on administrator’s servers prior to and 90 days following the SETA
workshop and ISC. SmartPLS was used to analyze the pre-workshop data, post-workshop
data, and combined data to evaluate the proposed structural and measurement models.
The results indicated that Confirmation Bias (CB) and the Availability Heuristic (AH)
were significantly influenced by the Information Security Knowledge Sharing (ISKS).
Optimism Bias (OB) did not reach statistically significant levels relating to ISKS. OB
did, however, significantly influence on perceived severity (TA-PS), perceived
vulnerability (TA-PV), response-efficacy (CA-RE), and self-efficacy (CA-SE). Also, it
was noted that all five security implementation data points collected to assess pre- and
post-workshop compliance showed statistically significant change. A total of eight
hypotheses were accepted and nine hypotheses were rejected.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
The healthcare industry is a complicated network of hospitals, providers,
independent laboratories, payers, pharmacies, imaging centers, and public health
departments centered on patients and their health (Dixon, 2016). The ability to safely and
efficiently store, process, and exchange information about patient care between the
healthcare industry participants is key to improving patient medical outcomes and
lowering the cost of healthcare (Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, n.d.; Steinbrook, 2009; Thieme, 2016). The United States
federal government has encouraged the implementation of IT. The United States Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 provided incentives to organizations
to apply technology to the healthcare system. Additionally, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 allocated $145B for health care spending which
included $30 billion to modernize the IT infrastructure of health care organizations
(Ajami & Bagheri-Tadi, 2013). Federal laws contain provisions defining the privacy and
security requirements necessary to protect PHI (Steinbrook, 2009; Thieme, 2016). The
goal of these laws was to encourage the use of technology to reduce healthcare costs by
improving efficiency, reducing medical errors, reducing care duplication, and improving
coordination of care among medical providers (Amarasingham et al., 2009; Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, n.d.). The move from paperbased health records to electronic health records (EHRs) that are shared among diverse
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organizations, however, has resulted in substantially greater risk of data breaches and
violations of PHI and personally identifiable information (PII) (McFarland, 2012).
While many organizations’ servers are Windows based, a significant number of
larger, back-end systems are UNIX based to capitalize on increased server processing
power, reliability, security, and clustering technology (Bajgoric, 2006; Beuchelt, 2017a;
Hussain et al., 2015). Epic and Cerner, the two leading EHR applications, represent 61%
of the market for implementations in inpatient hospitals in the United States (Newman,
2019; Shrivastava, 2018). The Epic EHR application, an industry leader for hospital EHR
systems, only supports UNIX based operating systems for its database and processing
servers (Epic, 2018; Newman, 2019). Larger Cerner EHR customers use high-end UNIX
and Linux servers for the back-end databases while many smaller hospitals may use the
Windows server based version of the Cerner EHR product (Shrivastava, 2018). As of
October 2020, Linux/UNIX servers represent 71.2% of all active Web servers worldwide
(W3Techs, 2020). In the Amazon cloud, Linux/UNIX images represent 94% of the
servers and Windows servers represent 6% of the servers out of a total of 1,368,288
images (Cloud Market, 2020). In Microsoft’s Azure cloud the number of Linux virtual
machines (VMs) exceeded the number of Windows VMs in 2018 (Vaughan-Nichols,
2018). When considering the total distinct known vulnerabilities from 1999 to 2020, the
top six operating systems are Linux-based and Linux variants (CVE Details, 2020). As of
October 2020, the top six Linux variants have 13,862 known vulnerabilities and the top
four Windows operating systems have 4,865 vulnerabilities (CVE Details, 2020). Clearly,
there are significant vulnerabilities with Linux and UNIX systems that need to be
addressed to protect the servers that house HIPAA protected data (Caballero, 2013;
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Santara, 2013).
Problem Statement
The research problem was that some UXAs fail to completely implement
organizational ISP due to the use of cognitive heuristics and biases that cause them to
perceive the threat of server breaches to be primarily a problem for Windows
administrators (Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). This failure may leave UNIX
servers open to potential systems disruption and loss of proprietary or confidential data
leading to harm to organizational reputation, potential loss of revenue, or financial loss
due to litigation or fines (Donaldson et al., 2015; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). The use of
OB, CB, or the AH can lead to a fundamental underestimation of risk and result in
reduced ISP compliance (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). It is vital to understand how SETA
programs, developed to address the unique job functions of UXA, influence their use of
cognitive heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, and coping appraisal (Pfleeger & Caputo,
2012; Vance et al., 2012).
Most research in ISP compliance has focused on the end-user compliance
intention (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Dang-Pham et al., 2017; Hanus & Wu, 2016;
Ifinedo, 2012; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). While endusers are critical to organizations reducing the threat of Information Security (IS)
breaches, server systems administrators have the highest privilege levels and access to the
vast amount of confidential PHI and PII stored on their servers (Beuchelt, 2017a;
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Systems administrators are super users and are responsible
for operating system installation, configuration, patching, user management, monitoring,
data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster recovery, and testing of their

4
servers (Beuchelt, 2017a; Inshanally, 2018; Santara, 2013). Common IS threat vectors for
servers include network, security, operating system misconfiguration, unpatched
operating systems or device firmware, privileged account escalation, and unsecured data
or backups (Caballero, 2013; Donaldson et al., 2015).
Human factors have gained prominence as a significant risk factor for information
systems security (Bauer & Bernroider, 2017; Colwill, 2009; Ifinedo, 2014; Ki-Aries &
Faily, 2017; Safa et al., 2015). To strengthen the human aspect of IS, ISPs are developed
by organizations, which enhance security, decrease vulnerability to security breaches, and
ensure legal compliance (Bauer & Bernroider, 2017; Bélanger et al., 2017; D’Arcy &
Lowry, 2019; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). Unfortunately,
researchers have found that employees frequently circumvented information systems
policies when workload increased (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Guo et al., 2011;
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007) or when they felt the information systems policies were a
nuisance or perceived to be irrelevant to them (Renaud, 2012; Sedighi et al., 2016).
Siponen et al. (2014) identified employee failure to follow ISPs as a key threat to the
security of an organization. An additional risk is that employees can make errors due to
cognitive limitations, task demands, as well as organizational, social, or environmental
factors (Dismukes et al., 2007; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Most
of these studies have evaluated end-user ISP compliance intention. Behavioral
compliance of UXA, however, can be even more crucial as the data housed on the backend UNIX servers frequently contains PHI, PII, financial data, or intellectual property
(Beuchelt, 2017a; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007).
IS knowledge is frequently scattered throughout organizations and many
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organizations have not developed an effective ISKSprogram (Belsis et al., 2005; Flores et
al., 2014; Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Additionally, organizational silos, where there is a
rigid functional division between teams, can negatively impact social interaction and
knowledge sharing (Oparaocha, 2016). The most effective way of increasing security
knowledge sharing, and cyber skills is through effective SETA programs (Oltsik, 2017).
Wash and Cooper (2018) found SETA programs to be the most effective means of
changing the security behaviors of end-users. Bauer and Bernroider (2017), in assessing
the impact of IS awareness on end-user compliance behavior, found that security
awareness significantly positively influenced attitude toward compliance and provided a
weak negative relationship to neutralizing behaviors. These studies have been limited to
the effectiveness of SETA programs on ISP compliance of end-users. Although ISP
compliance of UXA is crucial to protecting the organization’s data, it appears very little
attention was provided in the literature review on the effectiveness of focused SETA
workshops that target UXA specific job functions and how the workshops influence ISP
compliance behavior.
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Figure 1

Research Model

The proposed research model, based on the literature review, can be found in
Figure 1. It integrates the security knowledge sharing portion of the Information Security
Organizational Knowledge Sharing Framework (Flores et al., 2014), cognitive heuristics
and biases (Kahneman, 2011; Rhee et al., 2012; Tsohou et al., 2015; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Albrechtsen & Hovden,
2010; Guo et al., 2011; Ifinedo, 2012; Posey et al., 2015).
Dissertation Goal
The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an
ISC, and periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive
heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior.
Research Question
The following research question guided the investigation:
How do a focused SETA workshop, ISC, and periodic security update emails designed for
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UXAs, influence their ISKS, use of cognitive heuristics and biases, and ISP compliance
behavior?
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were tested:
H1: Formal knowledge sharing arrangements, in the form of a focused SETA
workshop and ISC, will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ use of the
AH.
H2: Formal knowledge sharing arrangements, in the form of a focused SETA
workshop and ISC, will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ use of
OB.
H3: Formal knowledge sharing arrangements, in the form of a focused SETA
workshop and ISC, will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ use of
CB.
H4a: The AH will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PS.
H4b: The AH will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PV.
H5a: OB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PS.
H5b: OB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PV.
H5c: OB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-SE.
H5d: OB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-RE.
H6a: CB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PS.
H6b: CB will have a significant negative influence on UXAs’ IS TA-PV.
H6c: CB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-SE.
H6d: CB will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’ IS CA-RE.
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H7a: UXAs security TA-PS will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’
ISP compliance behavior.
H7b: UXAs security TA-PV will have a significant positive influence on UXAs’
ISP compliance behavior.
H8a: UXAs’ security CA-RE will have a significant positive influence on their
ISP compliance behavior.
H8b: UXAs’ security CA-SE will have a significant positive influence on their
ISP compliance behavior.
Relevance and Significance
In 2019, in the United States the average cost of a single data breach was $8.19
million, which included the costs of detection, notification, response, fines, litigation, and
lost customer revenue (Ponemon Institute, 2019). In 2018, Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability (HIPAA) penalties and settlements levied on 18 healthcare systems
and insurance companies totaled $13,501,400 (HIPAA Journal, 2020). Given the potential
financial liabilities associated with data breaches and privacy violations it is imperative
that healthcare organizations secure their computing resources by following the HIPAA
and Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
guidelines.
From November 2017 to October 2020 66,707,070 patient records have been
breached in 50 states and the District of Columbia impacting physician practices, health
plans, and hospitals (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil
Rights, 2020). During the same period, server related incidents resulted in the loss of
50,270,087 individual’s PHI records (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
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Office for Civil Rights, 2020). Server related incidents were due to hacking and IT
incidents (89.7%), unauthorized access and disclosure (10.2%), and theft/loss/improper
disposal (<1%) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights,
2020). Server breaches were responsible for 75.4% of all healthcare PHI breaches from
November 2017 to October 2020 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office
for Civil Rights, 2020). These statistics demonstrate the importance for server
administrators to consistently follow organizational ISP to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of healthcare systems, and the PII, and PHI contained therein.
The complexity of the U.S. healthcare industry’s technology infrastructure, and
the push toward widespread electronic sharing of PII/PHI, make securing servers and
data crucial (Dixon, 2016; Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology, n.d.; Steinbrook, 2009; Thieme, 2016). The HIPAA Security Rule provided
specifications and standards that covered entities should implement to help ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI (Koch, 2017). Three categories of
safeguards including physical, administrative, and technological were defined to direct
organizations in how best to protect PHI (Avancha, Baxi, & Kotz, 2012). Administrative
safeguards include policies, procedures, and administrative actions related to security
management, vulnerability and risk assessment, workforce security training, incident
reporting, and contingency planning (Koch, 2017). Physical safeguards include facility
access controls, computer controls, and device and media security controls (Avancha et
al., 2012). Technical safeguards include access controls, audit controls, integrity
management, authentication, and transmission controls for PHI (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 2013). Both the Privacy and Security Rules also outline civil
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and criminal penalties for the privacy violations (McFarland, 2012). These policies and
guidelines, however, will not protect PII/PHI data if they are not properly implemented
within the technical infrastructure (Dixon, 2016; Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology, n.d.). Employees are frequently considered the weakest
link in the IS chain (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gardner & Thomas, 2014).
Cognitive heuristics are mental shortcuts that individuals use to quickly assess a
situation and determine an adequate, though frequently flawed, conclusion (Kahneman,
2011). Cognitive biases describe how information framing and context may influence
decision making, which departs from normal rational theory (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013).
The influence of heuristics and biases on decision making has been studied in many
contexts; however, their use in the IS research has been minimal. There are a number of
heuristics and biases that may negatively impact threat appraisal and coping appraisal
including the AH, OB, the representativeness heuristic, the affect heuristic, and CB
(Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook et al., 2013; Tsohou et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Use of these biases can result in inappropriately low judgment of risks and
vulnerabilities as well as over inflated estimation of coping skills (Kahneman, 2011;
Tsohou et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). With the proliferation of UNIX
servers, understanding and addressing the cognitive heuristics and biases used by UXA
may improve security awareness, enhance cyber skills, and increase compliance behavior
thereby reducing healthcare organizations’ potential for data breaches.
PMT was developed by Rogers (1975) to understand how fear appeals influenced
health behaviors of patients. Rogers (1975) theorized that environmental and
intrapersonal sources of information influenced the decisions people make regarding their

11
health. PMT is frequently used to understand compliance with ISPs and security
procedures (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Safa et al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2014). Coping appraisal
is an assessment of how the individual can cope with, adapt to, and change behavior to
avoid danger (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The factors related to coping appraisal
include an individual’s CA-SE and CA-RE (Posey et al., 2015). CA-RE is an evaluation
of the effectiveness of the proposed behavior to reduce the probability of the negative
event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). CA-SE is the belief that one is capable of the
adaptation necessary to mitigate the negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
Fear influences the evaluation of severity and vulnerability and indirectly influences
behavioral intention (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Siponen et al. (2014) found
perceived threat severity and TA-PV to be positively correlated with ISP compliance
intention. Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1997) noted that there are numerous cognitive
heuristics and biases that can influence both appraisal processes in the PMT model. UXA
may perceive server threats as Windows problems leading to inappropriately low threat
appraisal and excessively high coping appraisal. These erroneous cognitive assessments
may lead UXA to resist ISP implementation on UNIX servers leaving their organizations
at considerable risk.
Posey et al. (2015) investigated the impact of SETA programs on PMT. SETA was
positively correlated with both perceived threat severity and perceived CA-RE indicating
that SETA programs are an effective way of encouraging secure behaviors (Posey et al.,
2015). Appropriately designed SETA programs can help reduce the human IS risk to
organizational assets (Van Vuuren, 2016; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Although
organizations spend considerable money on IS technology, users are still a major source
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of failures that result in IS breaches costing organizations substantial financial loss (Safa
et al., 2016). The human aspects of IS must be understood to reduce the risk of IS
breaches (Van Vuuren, 2016). Users’ ignorance, apathy, resistance, and mischievous
nature can result in human error and cause IS breaches (Bélanger et al., 2017; Safa et al.,
2016). Compliance with ISP can help to mitigate IS risk (Ifinedo, 2014). Unfortunately,
employee’s noncompliance with ISP is “the key threat” for organizational IS (Siponen et
al., 2014, p. 217). Given the vulnerability of organizational data and the significance of
human behavior in protecting data, developing an understanding of what factors
encourage and discourage ISP compliance behavior will help to protect organizations
(Bélanger et al., 2017; Carlton & Levy, 2015; Van Vuuren, 2016).
It can be challenging to evaluate actual ISP compliance given the risk of social
desirability bias that can occur in interviews and self-reported surveys (Redmiles et al.,
2017). There are techniques that can be used to remove the focus on the participant such
as scenarios, which may provide better insight into non-conforming behavior (Crossler et
al., 2013). When evaluating intention to perform security behaviors, researchers are
challenged to determine if participants have responded with over or under-reported
counts as compared to actual behaviors (Egleman & Peer, 2015). Given these risks, the
present research studied actual secure behaviors rather than relying on self-reported
intention to comply (Crossler et al., 2013). Developing a model that integrates SETA
knowledge sharing, cognitive heuristics, and biases, and PMT provided insight into the
effectiveness of a focused SETA workshop and ISC in improving UXA ISP compliance
behavior.
This research helped fill the gap on SETA program development and effectiveness
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with UXA. Additionally, the effectiveness of an ISC was assessed to evaluate the impact
on UXA ISP compliance behavior. Finally, this study investigated actual UXA ISP
compliance behavior by evaluating key server security changes made by the
administrators to their UNIX servers. These checks were done by running security checks
on the servers. Boss et al. (2015) also found that intention differed significantly from
actual implementation of security controls. Using security scans of security measures
implemented by UXA following the SETA workshop and ISC afforded unique insights
into the effectiveness of the training in terms of actual implementation of security
controls and ISP compliance behavior. This research was needed as implementing
mandated security and compliance with organization ISP is key to the successful
protection of healthcare organizational assets, including patient PHI and PII (Koch, 2017;
Ng et al., 2009).
Barriers and Issues
There are several barriers and issues that were addressed. First, establishing
access to the UNIX servers for the baseline security metrics was challenging due to the
limitations placed on root logins and accessing servers not owned by the researcher.
Ultimately, many data points were successfully collected using the tools made available
by the security team (i.e. Tenable, Splunk). For other metrics scripting was used to gather
evaluated data points for each administrator’s servers. Second, engaging participation of
the UXAs dispersed throughout the organization was challenging. Including the CISO,
however, may mitigated this risk. Additionally, contacting the UXAs managers to advise
them of the coming workshop and the potential benefits to their UXAs and the
organization was helpful. Third, care was needed to be taken to minimize the resource
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impact of scans and scripts run on servers. To minimize impact, scans and scripts were
performed after hours and only after sufficient testing was completed to establish the
server performance impact.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
The following were assumptions for the present research:
-

Study participants participated in the workshop, ISC, and read the periodic
security update emails.

-

Participants answered pre-experiment and post-experiment survey questions
honestly.

The following are the limitations for the present research:
-

The study was conducted in a single healthcare institution in the mid-Atlantic
region of the US.

-

Males represented the majority of participants (97.6%).

-

The population size of 60 UXA was very small. Only 42 individuals completed all
of the study protocols.

Definition of Terms
The following definitions are for terms used in the present research:
Cognitive biases–Cognitive processes that allow individuals to make seemingly flawed
decisions, which depart from normative rational theory of decision making (Gilovich &
Griffin, 2013).
Confidentiality–The property that ensures that information is not made available without
the explicit permission or authorization from the information owner (Committee on
National Standards, 2010).
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Coping appraisal–A self-assessment of how an individual can cope with, adapt to, and
change behavior to avoid some danger (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The factors
related to coping appraisal include an individual’s CA-SE and CA-RE (Posey et al.,
2015).
Cybersecurity–The ability to protect cyberspace from potential cyber threats and attacks
(Committee on National Standards, 2010).
Cyberspace–The total of the global computing infrastructure including computing
devices, the Internet, telecommunications devices, controllers, and embedded computing
mechanisms (Committee on National Standards, 2010).
Cognitive heuristics–Mental short cuts used to make inferences about situations
(Gilovich & Griffin, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). The use of heuristics reduces cognitive
load by eliminating the consideration of all causally relevant data (Kahneman, 2011;
Toplak et al., 2011).
Integrity–A property defining prevention of unauthorized medication of an entity
(Committee on National Standards, 2010).
Interactive Security Challenge–An online, interactive, security exercise running in a
Linux VM with the goal of developing specific cybersecurity skills.
Risk–A measure of the probability (likelihood) and impact (organizational functional,
reputation, mission, assets, individuals) of a potential event on an organizational asset
(Committee on National Standards, 2010; Meyers & Jernigan, 2018).
Security controls–The technical, operational, and management safeguards defined to
protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of an information system
(Committee on National Standards, 2010).
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Systems administrator–Users with the highest privilege levels on servers that are
responsible for operating system installation, configuration, patching, user management,
monitoring, data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster recovery, and
testing (Inshanally, 2018; Santara, 2013).
Threat–An action that can be taken by a threat actor against a vulnerability (Meyers &
Jernigan, 2018). Any event that can negatively impact an organization’s operation or
components in an organization (people or property) or nation by destruction,
modification, or unauthorized access (Committee on National Standards, 2010).
Threat appraisal–An assessment of risk which includes the positive factors of extrinsic
and intrinsic rewards offset by negative factors of the perceived severity and TA-PV to
potential threats (Posey et al., 2015; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
UNIX–An interactive, highly portable, multiuser operating system developed by AT&T
(Ritchie & Thompson, 1978).
Vulnerability–A weakness in a computing asset that can be acted upon by a threat
(Meyers & Jernigan, 2018). Weaknesses can occur in procedures, processes, controls,
information systems, or implementations (Committee on National Standards, 2010).
Acronyms
The following acronyms are used in the present research:
AC-Actual Compliance
ACA–Affordable Care Act
AH-Availability Heuristic
ARRA–American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
CA-RE-Coping Appraisal-Response Efficacy
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CA-SE-Coping Appraisal-Self-Efficacy
CB-Cognitive Bias
CET–Cognitive Evaluation Theory
CRT–Cognitive Reflection Test
CTF-Capture the Flag
CVE-Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CVSS-Common Vulnerability Scoring System
EHRs–Electronic Health Records
HIPAA–Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
HITECH–Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
HTMT-Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio
IS–Information Security
ISC–Interactive Security Challenge
ISKS-Information Security Knowledge Sharing
ISP–Information Security Policy
ISRMP–Information Security and Risk Management Plan
IT-Information Technology
NIST-National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVD-National Vulnerability Database
OB-Optimism Bias
PHI–Protected Health Information
PII–Personally Identifiable Information
PLS-SEM-Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling
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PMT–Protection Motivation Theory
PWC-Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
SETA–Security Education, Training, and Awareness
TA-PS-Threat Appraisal-Perceived Severity
TA-PV-Threat Appraisal-Perceived Vulnerability
TRA-Theory of Reasoned Action
UXA-UNIX Administrator
VIF-Variance Inflation Factor
VMs–Virtual Machines
Summary
UNIX servers, like their Windows counterparts, are vulnerable to IS breaches
(CVE Details, 2020). Organizations are at substantial risk of employees do not follow
ISPs and breaches occur (HIPAA Journal, 2020; Ponemon Institute, 2019; Yoo et al.,
2018). The use of cognitive heuristics and biases can negatively impact threat appraisal
and coping appraisals (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Being blind to
actual risks facing their servers can result in insufficiently protected UNIX servers due to
failure to comply with ISPs (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017;
Renaud, 2012). While generalized SETA programs are useful in organizations for staffwide training, developing a focused SETA program, ISC, and security update emails
aimed specifically for the job tasks of UXA, improved engagement and ISP compliance
(Chen et al., 2018; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Additionally, this research helped to develop
an understanding of how the SETA program, ISC, and security update emails influenced
UXA use of the AH, OB, and CB. Finally, by having performed security checks prior to
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and following the SETA program, ISC, and security update emails, a true indication of
ISP compliance behavior was evaluated.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Overview
Flores et al. (2014) as well as Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) emphasized the
importance of knowledge sharing processes in organizations. SETA workshops and
online training provide formal means of ISKS within organization (Safa & Von Solms,
2016). These processes provided a starting point for the present research’s cognitive
model of ISP compliance. Security knowledge sharing processes are theorized to directly
influence the three studied cognitive heuristics and biases used by the UXA (Kahneman,
2003; Pennycook et al., 2013). Heuristics and biases influence threat appraisal and coping
appraisal from PMT (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Rhee et al., 2012; Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Tsohou et al., 2015). The key components of PMT, threat appraisal
and coping appraisal, are significantly influenced by SETA programs and are therefore
critical to research into ISP compliance (Safa et al., 2016). Finally, threat appraisal and
coping appraisal influence UXA compliance behavior (Safa et al., 2016). The four key
areas of study for this research include: SETA; heuristics and biases; PMT; and ISP
compliance behavior. These four areas can help to develop a combined cognitive
behavioral theory that can help understand the factors that influence UXA ISP
compliance behavior.
Security Education, Training and Awareness
SETA programs are a means for organizations to minimize the risk of insider
caused security failures (Burns et al., 2015; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). SETA programs are
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an important antecedent and positively influence IS behavior, and appropriately designed
SETA programs can help reduce the human IS risk to organizational assets (D’Arcy et al.,
2009; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Users are the weakest link for IS and SETA programs
can help to reduce the potential attack surface of organizations by improving the ability
of users to identify and prevent IS breaches (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gardner & Thomas,
2014). Engaging and audience appropriate SETA programs positively influences IS CASE and ISP compliance (Chen et al., 2018; Ifinedo, 2014; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017).
Effective SETA programs should increase awareness of organizational ISP, individual
responsibilities, security risks, vulnerabilities as well as potential system monitoring and
sanctions (Chen et al., 2018; D’Arcy et al., 2009). Generalized SETA programs, while
helping to improve security conscience behavior, may not be as beneficial for highly
technical server systems administrators (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Additionally, general
SETA programs may not address specific security behaviors that are unique and crucial to
server administrators (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Schroeder (2017) found that customized
security training programs improved engagement and information retention. Tailoring
SETA to the job responsibilities of the participants is key to a successful and wellreceived program (Herold, 2011).
The sharing of IS knowledge, experience, and insights can improve organizational
performance and help to ensure the security of data (Safa & Von Solms, 2016).
Development of a formal means for ISKS can help to foster sharing of ideas, experiences,
tools, and processes to improve security and protect an organization’s information
systems assets (Flores et al., 2014). Making users aware of the current and evolving IS
risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and their severities, the speed with which the threats

22
propagate, and the potential impact to the organization is crucial to ISP compliance (Guo
et al., 2011; Safa et al., 2016; Siponen et al., 2014). Dang-Pham et al. (2017) found that
security awareness also improved the diffusion of IS practices (knowledge sharing)
throughout the organization. Safa and Van Solms (2016) found that ISKS benefitted
business, increased employee IS CA-SE, and improved ISP compliance.
The development of an ISKS culture is an important goal for any organization
that has critical information systems assets (Flores et al., 2014; Razmerita et al, 2016;
Safa & Van Solms, 2016). End-user education is important and developing knowledge
sharing processes that include the IS team and UXA is crucial to any organization that has
UNIX servers hosting business critical data (Bauer et al., 2017). It is beneficial to build
both formal and informal knowledge sharing networks within organizations as they have
been found to be significant contributors to awareness and mitigation of IS risks (DangPham et al., 2017; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Yoo et al., 2018). Encouraging relationships
between employees across team boundaries is also helpful to developing and enabling an
effective social network that fosters knowledge sharing (Bauer et al., 2017; Ifinedo, 2014;
Oparaocha, 2016). Connelly and Zweig (2015) found that distrust was a predictor of
knowledge hiding behaviors, which are detrimental to effective knowledge sharing in
organizations. Consequently, it is important to encourage trusting relationships between
the IS team and the UXA for an effective ISKS culture (Dey & Mukhopadhyay, 2018;
Rutten et al., 2016).
Posey et al. (2015) found that SETA programs were positively correlated with
both perceived threat severity and CA-RE indicating that they are an effective way of
encouraging IS behavior and ISP compliance. SETA programs should be updated due to
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the dynamic nature of IS threats and vulnerabilities (Posey et al., 2015). Yoo et al. (2018)
found that the psychological flow factors including feedback, immersion, challenge,
autonomy, and social interaction significantly improved psychological ownership and
SETA program effectiveness. Yoo et al. (2018) suggested using relatable security
scenarios that challenged employees could improve ownership and ISP compliance.
Bauer et al. (2017), in a study of ISP compliance at banks, found that developing
a comprehensive, multi-modal IS awareness program was key to successfully
establishing an IS culture in an organization. The goal of their research was to define
specific propositions that could be used by IS management in banks to establish and
maintain an effective IS awareness (ISA) program (Bauer et al., 2017). Also, Bauer et al.
(2017) sought to develop an understanding of how users’ perceptions of the ISA program
influence their ISP compliance. The three banks studied had implemented ISA programs
but with very different processes and procedures (Bauer et al., 2017). The most
successful bank, in terms of IS awareness and employee engagement, conducted regular
ISA campaigns using different modalities, which encouraged high levels of interaction
and dissemination of critical security knowledge (Bauer et al., 2017). Bauer et al. (2017)
found that some individuals used different neutralizing behaviors to justify ISP noncompliance. The third bank Bauer et al. (2017) studied had just begun an ISA program
and provided little insight into SETA effectiveness. Two primary areas of design for ISA
were proposed by Bauer et al. (2017): structural design and communicational design.
Recommendations relevant to this study include customizing the ISA programs toward
the recipients and driving for two-way discussions about IS (Bauer et al., 2017). Bauer et
al. (2017) demonstrated the need for collaborative education using multiple formats to
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help improve security awareness and compliance. This is relevant to the present study as
it builds the foundation for the workshop, ISC, and security update emails. The study
conducted by Bauer et al. (2017) evaluated the effectiveness of SETA on a general user
population. The present research evaluated multimodal SETA on UXA.
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) developed and tested IS workshops where
security personnel acted as facilitators for end-users to discuss relevant security
scenarios. This small group atmosphere lead to collaborative, two-way dialogs and
fostered participation and collective reflection to gain insights from one another
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010). Safa et al. (2016) found that knowledge sharing,
collaboration, intervention, experience, commitment, and personal norms were all
correlated to attitude toward compliance with ISP. Sedighi et al. (2016) found reputation,
reciprocity, altruism, and knowledge CA-SE were all positively related to quantity and
quality of knowledge sharing while effort and time were negatively related to both. Each
of these studies demonstrated the need not only to develop customized SETA aimed at
improving awareness but also to build relationships amongst participants and the
organization (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2011; Safa et al., 2016; Sedighi et al., 2016).
Organizations spend significant capital on SETA programs in the hopes of
increasing employee ISP compliance and engagement, but employees continue to cause
significant security breaches due to their failure to comply with ISP (Yoo et al., 2018).
Managers need to understand what psychological antecedents may improve the
effectiveness of SETA programs and increase employee compliance (Yoo et al., 2018).
Yoo et al. (2018) sought to identify the factors that influence psychological flow and how
they impact SETA effectiveness and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. The
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components of flow (feedback, immersion, challenge, autonomy, and social interaction)
all significantly influenced psychological ownership and SETA effectiveness (Yoo et al.,
2018). An important detail found by Yoo et al. (2018) was that training must be at an
appropriate level to challenge but not overwhelm the participant to support engagement.
Psychological ownership and SETA effectiveness significantly influenced security
behavioral intention (Yoo et al., 2018). Yoo et al. (2018) suggested using relatable
scenarios to help in connecting employees to the SETA content. Yoo et al. (2018) brought
the concept of flow into the knowledge management realm in terms of the impact that
flow has on SETA. The present research integrated relevant, real-world information into
the workshop, ISC, and security update emails to assess the impact on UXA compliance
behavior.
Dang-Pham et al. (2017) noted that employee IS failures could lead to security
breaches causing substantial financial loss for organizations. SETA programs are
effective in reducing the cost of breaches but cannot eliminate the problem of employees
not following ISP due to negligence or malicious intent (Dang-Pham et al., 2017).
Developing a security knowledge sharing culture may help employees gain the IS
knowledge, develop an informal knowledge sharing network, and further reduce breaches
caused by human error (Dang-Pham et al., 2017). Encouraging regular interactions
between employees is important as some ISKS occurs during those informal dialogs
(Dang-Pham et al., 2017). Also, developing trusting relationships with individuals
increased formal and informal sharing between employees (Dang-Pham et al., 2017).
Educating users regarding the benefits of ISP compliance, rather than just how to comply
with the policy, was more effective in supporting CA-SE and inter-employee sharing
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(Dang-Pham et al., 2017).
Ifinedo (2014) also studied ISP compliance and found that socialization, personal
norms, social norms, CA-SE, and group dynamics positively influenced ISP compliance
intention (Ifinedo, 2014). These results suggest that managers should encourage both
formal and informal socialization of employees to increase trust and establish
relationships that influence positive behaviors and discourage negative or malicious
behaviors (Ifinedo, 2014). Developing a better understanding of the organizational and
social factors that influence ISP compliance allows organizations to prepare for and
encourage appropriate behavior to safeguard security. By adequately managing the IS
knowledge and social norms of the organization managers can better control the
antecedents of positive behavior while applying social pressure to curtail negative
behavior.
Chen et al. (2018) developed a model of ISP compliance based on an AwarenessMotivation-Capacity perspective. The significant influencers of ISP compliance intention
included IS awareness (awareness of the ISP and potential threats), capability to comply
(CA-SE and controllability), and motivation to comply (penalty and reward) (Chen et al.,
2018). Educating employees about the importance of IS can be achieved through SETA
programs (Chen et al., 2018; Dang-Pham et al., 2017). These same programs can also
inform employees about the organizational ISP and introduce them to the potential
security threats facing the organization (Chen et al., 2018).
Development of interpersonal relationships and social networks are significant
contributors to knowledge sharing within an organization (Oparaocha, 2016). SETA
programs and communities of practice can help in both formal and informal sharing of
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knowledge, the development of collaborative relationships, and the building of trust
(Dang-Pham et al., 2017; Oparaocha, 2016). Supportive social networks can also improve
relationships and encourage fostering of both cognitive-based and affective-based trust
(Dey & Mukhopadhyay, 2018; Rutten et al., 2016). Trust is key for knowledge sharing
relationships and the development of those relationships through an effective SETA
program can be beneficial to the organization and encourage IS engagement and
compliance (Dang-Pham et al., 2016; Safa & Von Solms, 2016).
The benefits of developing SETA programs that are tailored specifically to the
audience were demonstrated to improve both security awareness and ISP compliance
(Bauer et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Bauer et al. (2017)
emphasized the effectiveness of multiple training modalities on the success of SETA. The
present research focused on a UXA oriented SETA workshop, ISC, and security update
emails to evaluate their effectiveness in improving UXA ISP compliance behavior.
Cognitive Heuristics and Biases
Kahneman (2011) referred to the two cognitive systems of decision making as
System One and System Two. System One is the intuitive, implicit, involuntary, and
nonverbal cognitive system (Kahneman, 2003). According to Kahneman (2003), intuitive
judgments may harken to evolutionary history and occur “between the automatic
operations of perception and the deliberate operations of reasoning” (p. 697). The
intuitions provided by System One come to mind quickly with little reflection—they are
automatic once a stimulus occurs (West et al., 2012). Intuitions, which rely on similarity
and accessibility rather than true logic or probabilities, can be flawed due to the use of
cognitive heuristics (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are
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mental short cuts used to make inferences about situations, and they require a minimal
amount of cognitive processing power (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013; Marsh et al., 2004;
Roberts, 2004). As opposed to cognitively taxing, analytic means of solving a problem,
heuristics, by their nature, do not guarantee a correct answer (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013;
Roberts, 2004). Heuristics provide a means of finding an adequate solution to a problem
without having to consider all possible causally relevant information (Marsh et al., 2004).
Heuristics, however, help to reduce constrained working memory (Kahneman, 2011;
Toplak et al., 2011). Examples of heuristics that influence decision making include
anchoring, availability, illusion of pattern, subjective confidence, the law of small
numbers, prediction by representativeness, and the illusion of understanding (Kahneman,
2011).
System Two, the reasoning and analytical system, is where deliberate thought
occurs (Kahneman, 2011). System Two is activated whenever a problem presents itself to
which System One cannot provide a fast and reasonable answer (Kahneman, 2011).
Unfortunately, System One frequently will answer a difficult or challenging question with
an associated question (heuristic) that is easier to draw from memory (Kahneman, 2003).
Attribute substitution can allow System One to answer a question that was not asked
resulting in faulty decision making (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013). One of System Two’s
responsibilities is to monitor System One to ensure correct decisions are made
(Kahneman, 2003). To reduce cognitive load, however, System Two may accept faulty
System One responses due to what Kahneman (2011) terms lazy monitoring. If System
Two is engaged it may reject potentially biased System One intuitions, but that activation
is cognitively taxing (Kahneman, 2003). Importantly, Kahneman (2003) found that

29
individuals made aware of their use of heuristics were able to correct their intuitive
judgments. Education and practice can improve the reliability of System One’s intuitions
(Kahneman, 2003). An example of learned intuition can be found in chess masters who
can quickly evaluate a chess board, analyze possible outcomes, and make moves
seemingly instantaneously (Kahneman, 2003). Kahneman (2003) demonstrated that
training improved intuition. This demonstrated the potential for improving the intuitive
responses of UXA through an effective and engaging SETA workshop and ISC.
Epstein (2014), in the field of cognitive psychology, defined the two cognitive
systems as the experiential system and the rational system. The experiential system
functions outside of an individual’s awareness and influences interpretation of feelings,
behaviors, and events (Epstein, 2014). The experiential system is non-verbal, and
activation requires minimal cognitive demand (Epstein, 2014). A key feature of the
experiential system relevant to the current research is that it has the potential to learn
from experience (Epstein, 2014). The rational system reflects an individual’s personal
understanding of logic and is uniquely human (Epstein, 2014). It represents conscious
reasoning, verbal thought, tends to be affect free, considers cause and effect, is slower
processing, and requires higher cognitive load (Epstein, 2014).
Toplak et al. (2011) analyzed the use of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to
assess cognitive performance. They found that the CRT predicted an individual’s
propensity toward cognitive errors (Toplak et al., 2011). Toplak et al. (2011) studied
intelligence and working memory and found both were moderately predictive of rational
thinking skills and cognitive performance. The conclusion was that the quick acceptance
of the System One data was primarily due to cognitive load and the miserly cognitive
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processing of System Two (Toplak et al., 2011). These findings are in line with
Kahneman’s (2011) lazy monitoring performed by System Two. Toplak et al. (2011)
warned that while the intuitive processing of System One may be useful it can also be
dangerous due to the propensity to oversimplify problems and underestimate risk.
Ferreira et al. (2006) investigated heuristic problem-solving skills to understand
what actions might encourage System Two engagement. Using modified versions of
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) heuristic problem set, Ferreira et al. (2006) found that
providing priming instructions to participants helped them to resist System One intuitions
and engage System Two reasoning. Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2010) defined priming as an
unconscious process that occurs when a current stimulus increases the availability (recall)
of past associations. Increased use of System Two resulted in significantly improved
performance on the heuristic problems (Ferreira et al., 2006).
OB can result in dangerous neglect of risks (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Rhee et al.,
2012). OB leads one to assess situations in self-serving ways (Rhee et al., 2012). This
fundamental underestimate of risk can enhance perceived invulnerability to negative
events and lead to inappropriately low levels of safeguarding behaviors related to IS
(Rhee et al., 2012). OB is a protective measure to protect the self, and reduce both
anxiety and stress (Rhee et al., 2012). In a study of IS perceptions of technology
executives, Rhee et al. (2012) found that they perceived security risks, but that OB
allowed them to conclude that their organizations were at a much lower risk of security
breach than other organizations. Rhee et al. (2012) suggested IS training is key to
reducing OB and improving security practices within organizations. OB can also cause
individuals to discount future consequences (Kahneman, 2011; Rhee et al., 2012). For
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example, one may believe they are not at risk of intrusion and therefore not adequately
protect personal privacy (Acquisti, 2004). In the present research, OB was studied to
evaluate if it could be blinding UXA to the true threats facing their servers. Pfleeger and
Caputo (2012) suggested OB reduces ISP compliance behavior but can be minimized by
making SETA personally relevant to the learner.
CB and OB are closely related and can significantly influence decision making
(Kahneman, 2011). With CB, one gives greater validity to information that supports
rather than contradicts one’s beliefs (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Sternberg, 2004). Tsohou
et al. (2015) found that CB may lead individuals to believe that hackers are not
sophisticated or inappropriately assess the security threats caused by nation states and
organized crime. Kahneman (2011) identified CB as a System One heuristic and it is
therefore easily activated when making decisions. System Two must be engaged to
override CB but in most situations, individuals do not devote the cognitive energy to
disprove their strongly held beliefs (Kahneman, 2011). The exaggeration of events in the
news can reinforce CB and result in faulty assumption of risks-discounting risks with
higher probabilities over risks that are more easily recalled (Kahneman, 2011). The
prevalence of news related to Windows server breaches and vulnerabilities may
erroneously confirm for the UXA that their servers are not at risk and they may discount
any evidence to the contrary. Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) suggested that providing “an
arsenal of evidence” may be necessary to counter confirmation biased thinking (p. 606).
To judge the frequency or probability of an event an individual may assess the
availability of associations related to the event (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Rather than taking the time to consider an actual probability it is easier
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to estimate a probability based on the ease that one recalls occurrences of a similar event,
termed the AH (Kahneman, 2011; Kliger & Kudryavtsev, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). In assessing how the AH influenced individual’s judgment of risks, Pachur et al.
(2012) found that the AH significantly influenced perceived risk. Since a question about
frequency is difficult to answer, an easier question is substituted (i.e., how easily can
examples of the event be recalled) (Kahneman, 2011). If examples come to mind easily,
the frequency is estimated to be high and if examples are difficult to imagine the
frequency is assumed to be low (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). System One does not
typically have the means to properly apply probability theory and the reliance on
availability as an assessment of actual probability can lead individuals to faulty
evaluations of risk (Kahneman, 2011). If UXA employed the AH they may be incorrectly
assessing a lower security risk to their servers because they more easily recall data
breaches, security alerts, or reported fixes associated with Windows servers. Without a
correct assessment of potential risks, the UXA may not have perceived the true threat
severity or threat vulnerabilities to their servers. This bias can potentially result in
insufficiently secured servers, leaving them at higher risk of breach. Pfleeger and Caputo
(2012) suggested that developing SETA that is vivid and provides personally relatable
examples of breaches may improve ISP compliance behavior.
Kahneman’s (2011) work has had significant influence on the finance industry in
researching investment decisions, but using his concepts in the IS area, has been limited.
Heuristics and biases associated with the dual-process theory are applicable to the IS
realm given that they may influence UXA decisions. System One’s automatic and
intuitive assessments can be prone to error (Kahneman, 2011). Associative processing
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System One tends to best-guess answers to questions with available data even when that
data is not completely relevant to the posed question (Pennycook et al., 2013; West et al.,
2012). Kahneman (2011) referred to this as the shotgun effect. Another potential area of
concern is the way that System One deals with ambiguities and competitive hypotheses
eliminating options before cognitive awareness (Kahneman, 2003). When System Two is
not actively monitoring System One, to assess the validity of the decisions, errors may
occur (Kahneman, 2011; Toplak et al., 2011). Building on Kahneman’s (2011) heuristics
and biases work in assessing risk, this study investigated how cognitive heuristics and
biases influenced UXA decisions regarding security threat appraisal, coping appraisal,
CA-SE, and CA-RE. Security risks and threat vectors in IS continue to evolve (Caballero,
2013). It is crucial to have competent and engaged UXAs that acknowledge the security
threats and work diligently to mitigate the risks to their servers (Caballero, 2013).
Based on the prior research noted above, simple unconscious acceptance of
System One responses may cause UXA to underestimate risks and vulnerabilities facing
their servers. By better understanding what heuristics impact how decisions are made,
what biases may result, and learning how to encourage System Two processing,
organizations may be better prepared to manage their administrators and reduce security
risks (Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook et al., 2013; West et al., 2012).
Protection Motivation Theory
PMT is frequently used to understand compliance with ISPs and security
procedures (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Safa et al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2014). PMT was
initially proposed by Rogers (1975) to help understand how health behaviors were
influenced by fear appeals. Rogers (1975) theorized that relevant sources of information
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that influenced behavioral change include environmental data (verbal persuasion and
observational learning) and intrapersonal data (personality and prior experience). These
sources are evaluated through a cognitive mediation process that assesses the threat and
coping potential which leads to adaptive or maladaptive coping behaviors (Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Threat appraisal includes the positive factors of extrinsic and
intrinsic rewards offset by negative factors of the TA-PS and TA-PV to potential threats
(Posey et al., 2015; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Vance et al., 2012). Coping appraisal
is an assessment of how the individual can cope with, adapt to, and change behavior to
avoid the danger (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Vance et al., 2012). The factors related
to coping appraisal include an individual’s CA-SE and CA-RE (Posey et al., 2015). CARE is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed behavior to reduce the
probability of the negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Vance et al., 2012).
CA-SE is the belief that one is capable of the adaptation necessary to mitigate the
negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). TA-PS is an evaluation of the potential
physical, psychological, social, or economic harm an individual expects may occur
(Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). TA-PV is an assessment of probability a negative event
will occur if no changes are made to the individual’s behavior (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn,
1997; Vance et al., 2012). Fear influences the evaluation of severity and vulnerability and
indirectly influences behavioral intention (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Siponen et al.
(2014) found TA-PS of threat and TA-PV to be positively correlated with ISP compliance
intention. Appropriate threat appraisal can be manifest through increased knowledge and
awareness of IS risks, vulnerabilities, and organizational policies and procedures
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Guo et al., 2011; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Siponen et al.,
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2014). Coping appraisal can be also be positively influenced by ISKS and awareness
(Safa et al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2010). Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1997) noted that
there are numerous cognitive heuristics and biases that can influence both appraisal
processes in the PMT model. Cognitive heuristics can lead to cognitive biases and
influence daily decision-making without our awareness (Kahneman, 2011). As such, it is
important to understand how heuristics and biases influenced the threat appraisal of UXA
and design awareness and training programs that encourage System Two processing. If
threats are perceived as “Windows problems” the precognitive choice to resist ISP
implementation on UNIX servers may put the organization at considerable risk.
In a study of home computer users, Hanus and Wu (2016) evaluated how
awareness, a potential antecedent of desktop security behavior, influenced user’s security
actions. Hanus and Wu (2016) extended PMT by defining the multi-dimensional
construct of awareness (threat awareness and countermeasure awareness) to understand
how awareness may influence desktop security behaviors. The goal of this study was to
determine if threat awareness and countermeasure awareness, as antecedents of PMT,
influence desktop security behavior (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Hanus and Wu (2016)
demonstrated that research into the antecedents of PMT can provide a clearer picture into
security behavior. Hanus and Wu (2016) identified both threat awareness and
countermeasure awareness as key points for training to improve desktop security
behavior. Hanus and Wu (2016) acknowledged that there may be a hidden variable that
influences the relationship between threat awareness and TA-PV that has not been
discovered through existing research. Hanus and Wu (2016) demonstrated how PMT can
be extended by including awareness. Awareness can be facilitated through effective
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training and knowledge management within an organization (Bauer et al., 2017; DangPham et al., 2017).
Bélanger et al. (2017) in a study of early adopter password compliance, found that
perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability were positively related to
attitude toward ISP change. Organizational triggers and ISP awareness had a positive
correlation with attitude and intention to comply (Bélanger et al., 2017). Interestingly,
Bélanger et al. (2017) found that subjective norm and CA-SE did not significantly
influence intention to conform to ISP for early adopters. The inclusion of perceived threat
severity and perceived threat vulnerability from PMT was crucial to understanding the
antecedents to attitude and intention (Bélanger et al., 2017).
Posey et al. (2015), investigated the impact of SETA programs on PMT.
Specifically, Posey et al. (2015), evaluated constructs frequently unused when applying
PMT to IS contexts, including response costs, intrinsic and extrinsic maladaptive
behaviors, and fear. The goal of the research by Posey et al. (2015) was to fully test PMT
in an IS context adding SETA as an antecedent and organizational commitment as a
moderating variable to better understand IS behavior. SETA was positively correlated
with both perceived threat severity and perceived CA-RE indicating that SETA programs
are an effective way of encouraging IS behavior (Posey et al., 2015). Appropriately
designed SETA programs can help reduce the human IS risk to organizational assets (Van
Vuuren, 2016; Whitman & Mattord, 2012).
Safa et al. (2015) conducted research to identify the factors that influence user’s
IS conscious behavior with antecedent factors of IS awareness, organizational policy,
experience, and involvement. Security conscious behavior by users can help to mitigate
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IS risk (Safa et al., 2015). The study found that by increasing a user’s awareness of risks
and vulnerabilities, improvements in attitude and IS conscious behavior can be achieved
(Safa et al., 2015). Additionally, engaging users in the process of securing their systems,
and educating them regarding potential threats improves threat appraisal and CA-SE and
positively influences IS conscious behavior (Safa et al., 2015). Knowledge sharing and
collaboration are key components of this model in terms of IS awareness, organizational
policy (and communication), involvement, engagement, and behavior (Safa et al., 2015).
Vance et al. (2012) suggested that developing SETA programs that make participants
aware of cybersecurity threats, the importance of ISP compliance, and the role that
employees play in maintaining the security and integrity of organizational data will help
to improve proper threat appraisal, coping appraisal, CA-SE, and CA-RE. Accordingly,
the present research developed a SETA workshop, an ISC, and six security update emails
that make UXA aware of threats and risks to encourage proper evaluation of CA-SE and
threat appraisal.
One of the challenges in ISP compliance studies that use PMT noted by Boss et al.
(2015) is the focus on intention rather than actual behavior. Boss et al. (2015) found few
studies had been conducted that evaluated actual secure behaviors (Boss et al., 2015).
Intention frequently differed from actual implementation of security controls (Boss et al.,
2015). Boss et al. (2015) conducted four field experiments to evaluate PMT in the context
of IS and found that the strength of the fear appeal significantly influenced compliance
intention and behavior. The present research used security scans and other tools to verify
actual security measures implemented by the UXA to evaluate compliance.

38
Information Security Policy Compliance
Although organizations spend considerable money on IS technology, users are
still a major source of failures that result in IS breaches costing organizations substantial
financial loss (Safa et al., 2016). ISPs elucidate the required security processes employees
must follow to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational IT
resources (D’Arcy & Lowry, 2019; Van Vuuren, 2016). ISPs include formalized
procedures, guidelines, and technical controls that employees must follow to meet
organizational security requirements (Cram et al., 2017; Lowry & Moody, 2015). The
human aspects of IS must be understood to reduce the risk of IS breaches (Van Vuuren,
2016). Users’ ignorance, apathy, resistance, or mischievous nature may result in human
error and allow IS breaches to occur (Bélanger et al., 2017; Safa et al., 2016).
Compliance with ISP can help to mitigate IS risk (Ifinedo, 2014). Employee
noncompliance with ISP remains as a threat to organizational IS (Siponen et al., 2014).
Given the critical nature of organizational data and the significance of human behavior in
protecting data, developing an understanding of what factors encourage and discourage
ISP compliance may help to protect organizations (Bélanger et al., 2017; Carlton & Levy,
2015; Van Vuuren, 2016).
Researchers have developed many theoretical models to understand ISP
compliance. Siponen et al. (2014) combined PMT, the Theory of Reasoned Action
(TRA), and Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) to develop an integrated theory that
better explains end user ISP compliance intention. They found that awareness of security
vulnerabilities and risks improved ISP compliance intention (Siponen et al., 2014).
Compliance intention, however, has not been found to consistently indicate AC behavior
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in the IS context (Blythe et al., 2015; Crossler et al., 2013).
Safa et al. (2016) sought to identify the factors that influence ISP attitude toward
compliance and found that ISKS, collaboration, intervention, commitment, and personal
norms all significantly influenced attitude toward compliance and behavioral intention
(Safa et al., 2016). Like Siponen et al. (2014), a key limitation of the study conducted by
Safa et al. (2016) was that they only evaluated behavioral intention not actual IS
compliance behavior.
Many studies have assessed ISP compliance intention using surveys (Dang-Pham
et al., 2017; Ifinedo, 2014; Safa et al., 2016; Yoo et al. 2018). Using this method to assess
actual ISP compliance behavior is suspect due to the potential for social desirability
biased self-reporting (Crossler et al., 2013; Redmiles et al., 2017). Crossler et al. (2013)
suggested several potential techniques to minimize this risk including scenarios,
hypothetical situations, longitudinal studies, and field experiments. Assessing compliance
intention using a subjective, self-reported survey, while easier for the researcher, does not
afford a true assessment of compliance behavior (Blythe et al., 2015). An objective
measure of compliance is more challenging but can afford a better understanding of
actual ISP compliance (Blythe et al., 2015). Given these risks, it is preferred to study
actual IS behavior rather than relying on self-reported intention to comply to develop
valid and reliable behavioral models (Crossler et al., 2013). The present study
operationalized the UXA’s actual security compliance behavior via quantifiable measures
that were determined via Tenable Nessus dashboard data, Splunk data, or
programmatically via script.
Vulnerability scans and penetration testing are effective means of identifying
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server vulnerabilities (Fashoto et al., 2018; Haber & Hibbert, 2018). Vulnerability scans
can identify weaknesses in systems and applications so that systems administrators can
eliminate or mitigate them thereby reducing risk of breaches (Fashoto et al., 2018;
Samtani et al., 2016). The types of information gathered by scans include errors in
design, implementation, coding, or configuration that can be exploited by threat actors
(Haber & Hibbert, 2018). Passive scans can be used to listen to network traffic and intuit
conclusions about systems actively communicating on the network (Haber & Hibbert,
2018). These external scans, however, are limited in the amount of data they can collect
about servers and can provide erroneous results (Brotherston & Berlin, 2017; Tenable,
2019). Active scans can be credentialed or uncredentialed and actively access the target to
assess potential vulnerabilities (Asadoorian, 2010; Helms et al., 2017; Jetty & Rahalkar,
2019; Meyers & Jernigan, 2018). Uncredentialed scans mimic what attackers may see as
exploitable vulnerabilities, but they identify significantly less of an asset’s true
vulnerabilities (Brotherston & Berlin, 2018; Haber & Hibbert, 2018). A credentialed
vulnerability scan uses valid user credentials to authenticate to a server and preform
commands to gather detailed information about the server (Asadoorian, 2010;
Brotherston & Berlin, 2017; Helms et al., 2017). Credentialed scans allow for detailed
server and application patch analysis, as well as a thorough evaluation of user, password,
and directory settings (Asadoorian, 2010). Credentialed scans can also assess
configuration settings, identify local software exposures, detect malware, and perform
database testing (Meyers & Jernigan, 2018; Tenable, 2019). In a study comparing
credentialed and uncredentialed scans Fashoto et al. (2018) found credentialed scans
found 634 vulnerabilities while the uncredentialed scans found only 163. Credentialed
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scans provide a more complete picture of the vulnerabilities and the attack surface of the
target servers (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019). Additionally, credentialed scans can perform
more tests and provide more accurate results (Tenable, 2019). Haber and Hibbert (2018)
suggested that vulnerability scanning should be performed on all servers within an
organization due to the risk an attacker can breach one server and move laterally
throughout an enterprise’s network.
Tenable Nessus is one of the most popular enterprise vulnerability assessment
tools available (Helms et al., 2017; Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019; Meyers & Jernigan, 2018;
Samtani et al., 2016). Nessus can perform safe scans, intrusive scans, policy compliance
tests, detailed patch audits, client-side software vulnerability testing, service discovery,
port discovery, password checking, database authentication testing, and provide
remediation information (Asadoorian, 2010; Tenable, 2019). Nessus has 80,000+ plugins,
written in Nessus Attack Scripting Language, that can analyze server configurations and
identify vulnerabilities (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019; Samtani et al., 2016). Each plugin
contains information on the specific vulnerability, remediation actions, and an algorithm
for testing for the vulnerability (Tenable, 2019).
Nessus can classify vulnerabilities using the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS), which includes a base score, temporal metric, and exploitability metric
(Haber & Hibbert, 2018; Tenable, 2019). CVSS is a common severity rating system for
classifying IS threats (Brotherston & Berlin, 2017). The CVSS base score includes
ratings of vulnerabilities based on access complexity, access vector, privileges required,
and authentication method (Haber & Hibbert, 2018). CVSS temporal metrics include the
complexity of the exploit, remediation level, and confidence (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019).
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The CVSS exploitability metric indicates the maturity of the vulnerability and indicates if
it is unproven, proof of concept, functional, or high (Haber & Hibbert, 2018; Jetty &
Rahalkar, 2019). The resulting CVSS rating is a score from one to 10 indicating the risk
the vulnerability presents (Haber & Hibbert, 2018; Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019). Quantitative
CVSS scores can be translated into standardized qualitative severity ratings (First.org,
n.d.). A CVSS score from 0.1 to 3.9 represents a low severity rating, from 4.0 to 6.9
represents a medium, 7.0 to 8.9 represents a high, and 9.0-10.0 is critical (First.org, n.d.).
By performing credentialed vulnerability assessments, Tenable Nessus can
identify the security vulnerabilities on target servers (Tenable, 2019). Creating a baseline
assessment of a server can help to delineate server and configuration changes made by
administrators between the successive scans (Jetty & Rahalkar, 2019). In the present
study, Tenable scans, Splunk scans, and scripts were run prior to the SETA workshop,
ISC, and security update emails to establish a baseline on key elements that were
presented during the training. Three months following completion of the workshop, ISC,
and security update emails another round of scanning was run to assess actual security
changes implemented on participant’s servers.
Summary
Based on a review of the literature, there are several notable gaps that this study
investigated. First, research on ISP compliance has focused primarily on end-user
compliance intention (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Dang-Pham et al., 2017; Hanus &
Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Safa et al., 2016). It was crucial, however, to understand the
determinants of server administrator ISP compliance behavior to better ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII and PHI data contained on their servers.

43
Second, this study focused on formal knowledge sharing arrangements from the security
knowledge-sharing framework developed by Flores et al. (2014). Specifically, this
research investigated how a SETA workshop, designed specifically for UXA, affects
ISKS, use of heuristics and biases, and ISP compliance behavior. Concentrating on this
specific user group for education was unique and helped to evaluate the effectiveness of a
workshop that encouraged collaboration, knowledge sharing, and use UXA related
scenarios. Third, cognitive heuristics can lead to biased decision making and biased
evaluation of IS threats and risks (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Rhee et al.,
2012; Toplak et al., 2011; Tsohou et al., 2015). The inappropriate use of heuristics may
prevent UXA from correctly assessing the risks to their servers, which may reduce ISP
compliance behavior. SETA programs can be an effective means of reducing bias and
improving security behaviors (Rhee et al., 2012; Wash & Cooper, 2018). It was crucial to
learn how to reduce the use of cognitive heuristics to minimize biased decisions. Fourth,
PMT has been established as an effective model for evaluating ISP compliance intention
and behavior (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 2015). SETA programs have positively
influenced threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Posey et al., 2015). They have also been
established as precursors of compliance intention and behavior (Boss et al., 2015;
Siponen et al., 2014). While Posey et al. (2015) integrated SETA and PMT, their focus
was limited to end-user behavioral intention. Also, Posey et al. (2015) did not include the
influences of heuristics, and biases on SETA effectiveness. Finally, while behavioral
intention is frequently taken as an indicator of behavior, it was noted by Crossler et al.
(2013), that actual behavior may not follow reported intention due to biased selfreporting. Boss et al. (2015) also found that intention differed significantly from actual
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implementation of security controls. Comparing baseline and post-intervention security
scans allowed the present research to analyze security measures implemented by UXA
and this afforded unique insights into the effectiveness of the training in terms of actual
implementation of security controls and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. This
research was needed as implementing mandated security and compliance with
organization ISP is key to the successful protection of healthcare organizational assets,
including patient PHI and PII (Koch, 2017; Ng et al., 2009).
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview
This chapter presents the research design, instrument development, approach,
population, sampling, data collection, and data analysis used to assess the influence of the
SETA workshop, ISC, and security update emails on UXAs use of cognitive heuristics,
biases, and ultimately ISP compliance behavior. Additionally, reliability and validity of
the instrument was addressed.
Research Design
This quantitative research was conducted in a pretest and posttest design.
Participants completed the survey (Appendix A) prior to and following the intervention
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). They participated in the new SETA workshop and an ISC
(Appendix B). Bauer et al. (2017), in a study of ISP compliance at banks, found that
developing a comprehensive, multi-modal IS awareness program was key to successfully
establishing an IS culture in an organization. Caballero (2013) also found that combining
multiple formats for SETA (i.e. computer-based training, simulators, phishing email
campaigns, face-to-face training) into highly customized, job specific job programs was
key to increasing secure behaviors.
The SETA workshop focused on increasing awareness of cyber risks,
vulnerabilities, and presented specific security recommendations for UXA’s servers
(Beuchelt, 2017a; Inshanally, 2018; US Department of Health and Human Services,
2013). The organizational Information Security and Risk Management Plan (ISRMP) was
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used to prioritize the top 12 security strategies that were relevant to server administration.
This document prioritized IS risk based on the likelihood, risk, and potential
organizational impact. Specifically, the ISRMP identified the following critical server
management areas: patch management (operating system, microcode, and third-party
apps), vulnerability analysis (extensive Tenable and Accunetix scanning), privileged
account and access management (password requirements and multifactor authentication),
centralized log management (Splunk), and developing administrator’s digital forensics
skills.
The SETA workshop was conducted online via a secure Zoom meeting and
included IS team members, and UXA within the organization. A total of 50 UXA from
multiple departments participated. Six additional individuals participated including the
CISO, the director of Engineering Services, as well as several network security team
members and two database administrators. The workshop encouraged connection,
collaboration, discussion, and ISKS between the participants (Albrechtsen & Hovden,
2010). The overarching goal of this workshop was to improve UXA ISP compliance
behavior. This was accomplished by increasing participant awareness of the current state
of cyber-attacks, the costs associated with data breaches, the growing list of software
vulnerabilities, types and motivations of perpetrators, and how to best mitigate cyber
vulnerabilities for their servers. The security workshop introduced UXA to available
reports and online resources that they can use to increase and maintain their awareness of
the current state of cyber threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. The workshop demonstrated
the need for constant monitoring of vulnerabilities and ultimately the vital need to secure
UNIX servers to mitigate risk and prevent loss. Additionally, participants were introduced
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to several penetration testing tools including nmap, Wireshark, and the Metasploit
Framework. By learning to utilize tools used by penetration testers, the workshop and
ISC provided UXAs additional resources that can be used to test and secure their servers
effectively which may increase ISP compliance behavior. The material for the workshop
was reviewed by the organization’s CISO for content. Modifications to the content were
made based on the feedback from the CISO to further align the material with the
cybersecurity goals of the organization and tailor the material to the unique role of UXAs.
The learning objectives for the SETA workshop were: By the end of this
workshop, the participants will:
1) Help maintain by:
a. Discussing the scope and impact of data breaches,
b. Learning about key websites that provide critical and timely information
about software and hardware vulnerabilities,
i. Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon, 2019),
ii. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (n.d.),
iii. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil
Rights Breach Portal,
iv. National Vulnerability Database.
c. Identifying different types of cyber attackers and their motivations,
d. Learning about cyber-attacks made against our organization,
e. Discussing the cost of a HIPAA breach,
f. Discussing our implementation of Defense in Depth
i. Firewalls/Intrusion prevention systems (IPS),
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ii. Security Event/Information Management (SIEM),
iii. Identity and rights management,
iv. Anti-phishing campaigns,
v. Advanced endpoint protection,
vi. Threat intelligence,
vii. Behavioral analytics,
viii. Penetration testing,
ix. Cyber forensics.
2) Help participants mitigate security risk for their servers by:
a. Reviewing the phases of cyber-attacks and threats typically used to exploit
servers,
i. Reconnaissance,
ii. Intrusion,
iii. Exploitation,
iv. Escalate privilege,
v. Lateral movement,
vi. Anti-forensics,
vii. Denial of service,
viii. Data exfiltration.
b. Discussing the types of cyber attackers
i. Cyber criminals – identity theft and financial fraud with goal of
monetary gain,
ii. Script kiddies – minimal skills, use available exploit kits,
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iii. Brokers – uncover vulnerabilities in software or systems and sell
the information,
iv. Insiders – employees, partners, and contractors motivated by
perceived wrong,
v. Competitors – individuals and organizations seeking to gain
competitive advantage,
vi. Cyberterrorists – disable and disrupt network or computing
infrastructure,
vii. Organized crime – highly funded, high-level of skill, seek financial
gain,
viii. Hacktivists – political, social, or principle-based agenda,
ix. State-sponsored attackers / nation state – highly funded and skilled,
intelligence gathering or service disruption, focus is government
interests.
c. Identifying the top threats and risks facing our organization’s servers,
i. Key threats and vulnerabilities
1. Compromised credentials and privilege escalation,
2. Web service exploitation,
3. Server vulnerabilities that permit remote code execution,
4. Cryptography weaknesses,
5. Deserialization,
6. Scripting,
7. Malware, fileless malware, and rootkits.
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ii. Key exploits facing servers
1. Buffer and stack overflows,
2. Memory corruption,
3. Race conditions,
4. SQL injection.
d. Identifying 12 activities, settings, and tools participants can use to improve
the safety and security of their servers,
i. Minimize services / disable unwanted services / limit open ports to
reduce vulnerabilities and attack vectors,
ii. Remove unnecessary software to reduce the number of
vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors,
iii. Keep Linux/UNIX kernel and other software as up to date as
possible,
iv. Ensure strong password policies and account management,
v. Kernel hardening to protect against attacks,
vi. Configure the server’s local firewall,
vii. Disk security – file integrity checking, file system encryption,
viii. Configure SSH security settings,
ix. Implement Security Enhanced Linux,
x. Configure centralized log management,
xi. Perform monthly vulnerability scans on servers,
xii. Run Malware detection software to detect worms, viruses, and
rootkits.
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e. Learning about available enterprise tools and other locally administered
tools participants can use for vulnerability analysis and security
monitoring.
3) See how to perform basic penetration testing and server analysis using common
tools by:
a. Using nmap for enumeration, scanning, and vulnerability analysis on
servers,
i. Ping scan,
ii. Version scan,
iii. Vulnerability scan.
b. Using Wireshark for network traffic analysis for security monitoring and
problem resolution,
i. Search and filter options,
ii. Protocol inspection,
iii. Live network traffic capture,
iv. Offline network traffic analysis
c. Using the Metasploit Framework in action and its utility to identify,
enumerate, and exploit a server
i. Reconnaissance & Scanning/Enumeration,
ii. Exploitation demo:
1. VSFTPD,
2. Ssh,
3. Mysql,
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4. Samba.
4) Access a cloud-based Cyber lab to:
a. Get hands-on experience using nmap and the Metasploit Framework
(MSF) in a secure, cloud-based virtual environment,
b. Identify, enumerate, breach, and exploit a Linux VM using MSF tools,
c. Compete to find the most flags on the Linux target machine.
5) Connect with other UNIX administrators to increase knowledge sharing and
collaboration:
a. Joining a new Microsoft Team’s Team for UXA in the organization.
The ISC immediately followed the workshop provided hands on experience using
security tools in an environment that was both remote and secure. The module utilized
Linux VMs and consisted of challenges associated with locating, enumerating, and
exploiting a server. EDURange (2019) provides cloud-based resources for security
education of students and researchers. A new EDURange scenario was developed as part
of this study and provided a secure, remote, cloud-based environment where the UXA
performed penetration testing. Providing hands-on security experience has been found to
increase participant engagement, improve retention, and encourage ISP compliance
behavior (Bauer et al., 2017; Caballero, 2013).
For the ISC module, two Linux VMs were instantiated for every 10 participants: a
participant VM (meta_nat) and a target metasploitable3 server (metasploitable) (Figure
2). The private IP addresses for these servers were 10.0.37.6, and 10.0.20.4 respectively.
The public IP address, which is the gateway into the environment, varied and was defined
when each scenario was instantiated. The day of the workshop participants received an
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email with the login information needed to access the ISC. This included the public
network address, as well as a unique user id and password. Additionally, participants
received an instruction sheet (Appendix C) that provided some materials from the
workshop as well as hints and tips to be successful with the ISC.
Figure 2
ISC Virtual Layout

The learning objectives for the ISC module are: By the end of the ISC, the
participants will:
1) be able to perform network reconnaissance, server enumeration, port and service
enumeration using nmap to identify a vulnerable Linux server on an isolated
network,
2) be able to use the Metasploit framework on a Linux VM,
3) be able to identify a relevant exploit to use to gain command line access to a
Linux server,
4) be able to locate, download, and hash Capture the Flag (CTF) target files.
For this module, participants scanned the network segment using nmap to perform
a ping sweep and identify the target server. Participants then used a nmap version scan to
identify the ports, services, and software running on the target Linux VM
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(metasploitable). Next, participants used the Metasploit framework to search for and
identify potential exploits for the target VM. Finally, participants exploited a vulnerability
and breached the Metasploitable VM. Once participants gained access to the VM they
located, downloaded, decoded, and hashed CTF target files.
Following the workshop, every three weeks, UNIX security update emails were
sent to each participant (Appendix D). A total of four UNIX security update emails were
sent to participants during the study. These emails provided an update regarding recently
identified vulnerabilities, relevant CERT alerts, recent breach announcements, as well as
an invitation to join the new Microsoft Teams group set up for collaboration. In August,
two additional emails were sent to provide UXAs additional information about Tripwire
and Rootkit Hunter applications. These emails included installation, configuration, and
testing information to expose the UXAs to these tools that were presented during the
workshop. The goals of the security update emails were to maintain current cybersecurity
awareness, increase security knowledge sharing, and reinforce security recommendations
made during the workshop.
Finally, three months after the workshop, an email was sent to the participants to
complete the online survey. Additionally, the participants servers were reanalyzed to
quantify the changes made by the UXA during the study and evaluate the effectiveness of
the workshop, ISC, and UNIX security update emails.
Instrument Development and Validation
The survey instrument was developed based on prior research and augmented
with researcher-developed questions for the AH, CB, and OB. Questions for CA-SE, CARE, TA-PV, TA-PS, OB, and ISKS were adapted from previously validated instruments
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used by Safa and Von Solms (2016), Moqbel and Bartelt (2015), Ifinedo (2012, 2014),
Hanus and Wu (2016), Rhee et al. (2012), Siponen et al. (2014), and Safa et al.(2016). As
a courtesy, a request was sent to each of the researcher teams asking permission to
modify and use their questions in the present research. All acknowledged the request and
provided their permission to modify and use their questions in the present research survey
(Appendix E).
The survey was pilot tested (Appendix F) with sixteen individuals who evaluated
the flow of the survey, the wording of the questions, as well as the reliability and validity
of the instrument. The experts consisted of four professors with doctoral degrees, nine
doctoral student researchers, and four IS field experts. The reviewers’ backgrounds
included the fields of IS, information systems, IT, decision science, UNIX administration,
and information assurance. Participant reviewers used Qualtrics to analyze the survey and
provide feedback. Based on their responses, several modifications were made. Regarding
survey flow, the number of survey blocks was reduced, a progress bar was added, and the
back button was removed. Regarding the CB questions, the instruction was modified, the
time for responses was increased, and the format of the choices was changed. Regarding
content, several questions were removed, and several questions were modified for clarity
as well as consistency. Finally, one additional question was added for TA-PV. The final
survey consisted of 25 questions and was administered to participants online using the
Qualtrics Survey tool. Questions 1-23 used a seven-point Likert scale: strongly disagree
(1), disagree (2), somewhat disagree (3), neither agree nor disagree (4), somewhat agree
(5), agree (6), strongly agree (7). The selection of a seven-point Likert with a central
point was based on Hair et al. (2017) suggestions that symmetric Likert scales can be
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used in SEM as an approximation of an interval measurement. Table 1 provides a detailed
listing of the constructs used in the research model, the indicators used in the survey, the
question numbers associated to each indicator in the survey, and the sources of the survey
items. The demographic question related to age was based on Super’s career stages ages
of exploration, establishment, mid-career, late-career, and decline (Gothard et al., 2001).
Table 1
Constructs and Sources
1st Order
Construct

Indicators
SE1
SE2
SE3
RE1
RE2
RE3
PV1
PV2
PV3
PV4
PS1
PS2
PS3
ISKS1
ISKS2
ISKS3
OB1
OB2
OB3
AH1
AH2
AH3
AH4

Question
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

CB

CB1

24

Demographic

AGE

25

CA-SE

CA-RE

TA-PV

TA-PS

ISKS
OB

AH

Source
Ifinedo (2014)
Ifinedo (2014)
Ifinedo (2014)
Ifinedo (2012)
Ifinedo (2012)
Ifinedo (2012)
Hanus and Wu (2016)
Siponen et al. (2014)
Ifinedo (2012)
Based on reviewer feedback
Siponen et al. (2014)
Hanus and Wu (2016)
Siponen et al. (2014)
Safa et al. (2016)
Safa et al. (2016)
Safa et al. (2016)
Rhee et al. (2012)
Rhee et al. (2012)
Rhee et al. (2012)
Researcher developed
Researcher developed
Researcher developed
Researcher developed
Researcher developed, based on Fischer et al.
(2011).

In the questions derived from Ifinedo (2014), Hanus and Wu (2016), and Siponen
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et al. (2014), references to “computer” were changed to “servers” to reflect the focus on
UXAs servers. The AH and conformation bias questions were time-limited to encourage
use of Kahneman’s (2011) System One processing and limit use of System Two’s more
thorough analysis. These techniques are similar to the ones used by Finucane et al. (2000)
as well as Gertner et al. (2016). Confirmatory bias was tested using a fictional scenario,
like the technique of Fischer et al. (2011). Table 2 identifies the constructs of the model,
the survey questions, Qualtrics survey number, and the hypotheses tested for each. The
difference in the Qualtrics survey number is due to text dialogs, design flow, and timing
questions which do not appear to the participant.
Table 2
Constructs and Hypotheses
Construct

Survey questions

Hypothesis

CA-SE
CA-RE

1-3
4-6

H8a
H8b

TA-PV
TA-PS
ISKS
OB
AH
CB
Actual UXA Compliance
Age

7-10
11-13
14-16
17-19
20-23
24
n/a
25

H7b
H7a
H1, H2, H3
H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d
H4a, H4b
H6a, H6b, H6c, H6d
H7a, H7b, H8a, H8b

Reliability and Validity
Ifinedo (2012) evaluated composite reliability, convergent validity, and
discriminant validity for the instrument questions. Composite reliability for all items
exceeded the recommended statistical measure of 0.7 (Ifinedo, 2012). Convergent
validity was tested by Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and all items exceeded the 0.5
standard statistical cutoff (Ifinedo, 2012). Discriminant validity was tested by AVE and
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square root of AVE being greater than the cross correlations (Ifinedo, 2012). Again, all
items were found to meet this requirement.
Siponen et al. (2014) tested convergent validity, internal consistency, and
composite reliability. For convergent reliability they evaluated factor loading and all
items exceeded 0.69 (Siponen et al., 2014). All items scored greater than the statistical
cutoff of 0.5 for variance extracted (Siponen et al., 2014). To test internal consistency,
Cronbach’s α was used, and all items exceeded 0.6 (Siponen et al., 2014). For composite
reliability, all items exceeded the cutoff of 0.7 (Siponen et al., 2014). Finally,
discriminant validity was tested via inter-item correlations and all were below the
statistical cutoff of 0.9 (Siponen et al., 2014).
Hanus and Wu (2016) tested the reliability of their items using Cronbach’s α and
all measured greater than 0.7. Convergent validity was tested using AVE and all items
exceeded the 0.5 statistical requirement (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Discriminant validity was
tested using cross loadings and Fornell-Larcker criterion and all exceeded the statistical
requirements for inclusion (Hanus & Wu, 2016).
Safa et al. (2016) evaluated convergent validity, internal consistency, and
discriminant validity for their model’s items. Factor loading was used to evaluate
convergent validity and all items above the 0.5 statistical cutoff were included (Safa et
al., 2016). Internal consistency was tested with Cronbach’s α and all items exceeded 0.7
(Safa et al., 2016). Discriminant validity was tested using inter-item correlations and all
were below the 0.9 statistical cutoff (Safa et al., 2016). Additionally, all variances
exceeded the recommendation of 0.5 (Safa et al., 2016). Finally, the square root of the
AVE exceeded all correlations further indicating the discriminant validity (Safa et al.,
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2016).
Rhee et al. (2012) tested their instrument for reliability, convergent validity, and
discriminant validity. Reliability was assessed by identifying the composite reliability
(0.908) and AVE (0.925) both of which exceeded the standard cutoff of 0.7 and 0.5
respectively (Rhee et al., 2012). Convergent validity was tested by evaluating all item
loadings, which all exceeded 0.73 (Rhee et al., 2012). Finally, discriminant validity was
verified by using the square root of all AVEs and comparing them to the correlations
between factors (Rhee et al., 2012). Again, all items met the criteria for discriminant
validity.
Variables
Threat Appraisal
Threat appraisal is an evaluation of the UXA TA-PS and TA-PV to IS threats
(Posey et al., 2015; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). TA-PV and TA-PS may be
influenced by cognitive heuristics, which may be influenced by an increased knowledge
and awareness of IS risks and vulnerabilities (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Guo et al.,
2011; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Siponen et al., 2014). TA-PS and TA-PV were assessed
via three survey questions each adapted from Ifinedo (2014) and Hanus and Wu (2016).
Coping Appraisal
Coping appraisal is an assessment of how the UXA perceives that they can cope
with, adapt to, or mitigate the IS risk (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Coping appraisal
considers the UXA’s IS CA-SE and IS CA-RE (Posey et al., 2015). CA-RE is an
assessment of how effective the proposed behavior can reduce the probability of the
negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). CA-SE is the belief that one can make
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the changes needed to mitigate the risk (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). CA-SE and CARE were assessed by three questions each that were adapted from Ifinedo (2014) and
Hanus and Wu (2016).
Cognitive Heuristics
The cognitive heuristics that were evaluated included the AH, OB, and CB. The
use of these heuristics can influence UXA estimation of risk and vulnerability associated
with their UNIX servers (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Additionally, OB, and CB may influence UXA coping appraisal. The AH was
measured by four questions that ask participants to evaluate vulnerability and
exploitability of UNIX and Windows servers (Kahneman, 2011; Kliger & Kudryavtsev,
2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). OB was assessed using three questions from Rhee et
al. (2012). Confirmatory bias was tested using a fictional scenario, similar to the
technique of Fischer et al. (2011) where participants are presented a scenario, asked to
make an initial decision, then provided six confirming and six disconfirming bits of
additional information they can choose to review, and then asked to choose again. The
level of CB was determined by subtracting the number of disconfirming choices selected
from the confirming choices selected (Fischer et al., 2011; Gertner et al., 2016).
ISP Compliance Behavior
UXA ISP compliance behavior was assessed by analyzing six percentages for
specific security implementations for all the UNIX servers managed by each UXA.
Percentages are frequently used for analyzing and presenting security metrics as they are
easily interpretable and can clearly indicate positive or negative change (Brotby &
Hinson, 2013; Hayden, 2010; Hubbard & Seirsen, 2016; Jaquith, 2007). Table 3 identifies
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the data points collected and the associated PLS-SEM coding.
Table 3
ISP Behavioral Data Points
Data point
Percentage of administrator's servers sending data to centralized
log management system.
Percentage of administrator's servers with centrally recorded
Tenable Nessus data.
Percentage of administrator's servers blocking telnet/ftp ports
(TCP/UDP 21, 23) and remote services ports (TCP/UDP 512-514).
Percentage of an administrator's servers using multi-factor
authentication.
Percentage of an administrator's servers that have had recent
software updates.

PLS-SEM Code
COMPL1
COMPL2
COMPL3
COMPL4
COMPL5

The percentage of administrator's servers sending data to centralized log
management system (COMPL1) was determined from a report provided by the IS team’s
Splunk administrator. This report identified all servers, UXAs, on-call groups, and
projects for all servers sending data to the Splunk log management servers. Servers were
associated with the specific UXA and percentages were determined based on CMDB
data. The percentage of administrator's servers with centrally recorded Tenable Nessus
data (COMPL2) was determined by using the organization’s Tenable Splunk dashboard
filtered by each UXA. The dashboard provides a listing of the Tenable hosts and hosts not
in a scan group for each administrator. Counts were input into an Excel spreadsheet and
percentages computed for each UXA. The percentage of administrator's servers blocking
telnet, ftp, and remote services ports (COMPL3) was determined by running a script that
programmatically performed nmap scans on the specific ports for each server identified
in the CMDB for each UXA. The script indicated the servers that were processed, as well
as an indication of whether the ports were open, closed, or filtered. Ports that identified as
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filtered indicate the presence of a firewall or other filter securing the port (NMAP.ORG,
2019). This script was run in batches of 100 servers to minimize the network impact.
Again, servers were associated with the appropriate UXA based on the CMDB. The
percentage of an administrator's servers using multi-factor authentication (COMPL4) was
determined by identifying all UNIX servers registered with PAM RADIUS secrets in the
organization’s multifactor authentication database. These data, made available by the IS
team, indicated server, IP address, managing group, as well as the associated PAM
RADIUS secrets. Server hostnames were matched to the corresponding UXA to tally a
total and determine the percentage. The percentage of an administrator's servers that have
had recent software updates (COMPL5) was determined using two methods. For all
Linux servers, the organization’s Splunk Linux Inventory Dashboard was modified to
provide a listing of kernel packages installed on the Linux servers. This database was
queried prior to the workshop as a baseline and then again 90 days after the workshop.
For IBM AIX servers a script was developed which queried the server’s installed
software and determined dates for all installed software packages. Servers were
associated with specific UXAs and percentages were calculated for each UXA. Data
points were collected for each UXA prior to and 90 days following the workshop and
recorded in an Excel spreadsheet. Using security scans, security reports, and
authenticated scripts to identify the security measures implemented by UXA following
the SETA workshop afforded unique insights into the effectiveness of the training in
terms of actual implementation of security controls and ISP compliance behavior.
Population and Sampling
After IRB approvals (Appendix G), the IS team identified the subject pool made
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up of all UXA in the organization. Email invitations were sent to all potential participants
inviting them to participate in the workshop (Appendix H). Reminder emails were sent to
individuals that had not responded (accepted or declined) the invitation. Individuals that
chose to participate received an email link for informed consent (Appendix I). Once
informed consent was received a link to the Qualtrics survey was emailed to participants.
Reminder emails were sent to individuals to complete the survey. The 60 individuals
participated in the SETA workshop via a secure Zoom meeting. The workshop lasted 2.5
hours and focused on increasing cybersecurity awareness and cyber skills related to
UNIX servers in a healthcare organization.
The day of the workshop, individual emails were sent to each participant
providing them login information and for the ISC (Appendix J). After completion of the
workshop, participants were introduced to the EDURange environment, instructed how to
access it, and were provided with login information related to the ISC. Participants began
connecting to the EDURange scenario and started the ISC, which was available for five
hours following the workshop. This scenario provided participants a hands-on experience
using tools introduced in the workshop (nmap and Metasploit) to identify, enumerate, and
exploit the vulnerable Linux VM in the EDURange platform. At the request of several
participants, the ISC was restarted and made available to the participants the following
day so that they could continue. Finally, at the request of several additional participants,
the ISC was restarted again one month after the workshop to allow participants to
continue to utilize the platform.
After the workshop, security update emails were sent to the participants to
maintain cyber awareness and reinforce the materials presented in the workshop. The
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emails were sent at week 1, 4, 7, and 10 following the workshop. The content of the
updates included information about newly identified vulnerabilities, CERT alerts,
organizational breach updates, external breach reports, InfraGard updates, relevant
security news, and an invitation to participate in the newly created Microsoft Teams
collaborative group. The focus of these updates was to continue to increase UXA
awareness of the vulnerabilities and how best to mitigate risk for their servers.
Three months after the workshop, an email was sent to all participants requesting
they complete the Qualtrics survey a second time. Reminder emails were sent to
individuals to complete the second survey. Additionally, security implementation data
were collected for all server associated with each UXA to quantify the changes made
during the study.
The population was made up of the UXA in a major university and hospital
system in the mid-Atlantic United States. The organization manages more than 1000
UNIX physical and logical servers located in four data centers in two states as well as the
District of Columbia. The UXA are responsible for the servers running enterprise wide
applications including the electronic medical record system, pathology labs, radiology,
Web services, IS servers, student information systems, precision medicine systems,
document management system, change control systems, as well as numerous
departmental systems that house PHI and PII. Presently there are 60 UXA across the
organizations.
Sampling Method
A listing of all active UXA was obtained from the IS manager within the
organization. As only 60 individuals were identified, they were all invited to participate in
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the workshop.
Study Participants
The UXA’s in the organization are made up of individuals with a wide variety of
technical experience and educational background. The workshop included sixty
participants. Thirty participants identified primarily UNIX server administrators. Some
(12) participants identified as split responsibility for both UNIX and Windows servers.
Four participants identified themselves as Windows-only server administrators; seven
workshop participants did not have any responsibility for servers; seven individuals did
not complete all the study protocols. These 18 participants were removed from the study.
A total of 42 participants completed all the study protocols. One participant was female,
and 41 participants were male (Table 4). This is not unusual given the gender imbalance
noted in IT (Gorbacheva et al., 2019). Most participants were aged 45-65 (52.4%).
Remaining ages included 35-44 (26.2%), 25-34 (16.7%), and 66+ (2.4%) (Table 5).
Regarding education attainment for the participants, 26.2% have graduate degrees, 50.0%
have bachelor’s degrees, 11.9% have associate degrees, and 11.9% have some college but
no degree (see Table 6).
Table 4
Participant Gender (N=42)
Gender
Count Percentage
Male
41
97.60%
Female
1
2.40%
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Table 5
Participant Age (N=42)
Age
Count
17-24
25-34
35-44
45-65
66+

Percentage
1
7
11
22
1

2.40%
16.70%
26.20%
52.40%
2.40%

Table 6
Participant Education (N=42)
Age
Count Percentage
High school
0
0%
Some college (no degree)
5
11.90%
Associates degree
5
11.90%
Bachelor’s degree
21
50.00%
Graduate degree
11
26.20%

Data Collection
Two types of data were collected. First, the survey instrument was used prior to
and 90-days following the intervention. The survey request was sent via email and was
administered online using Qualtrics. The survey consisted of 25 questions and measures
the following constructs: CA-SE, CA-RE, TA-PV, TA-PS, ISKS, AH, OB, and CB. The
second set of data points were an analysis of security controls implemented on each
UXA’s servers. Security scans and scripts were run on all UNIX servers associated with
each participant prior to and three-months following the workshop and ISC. Jaquith
(2007) recommended quarterly analysis of security metrics as they provide necessary
precision for a time series-based analysis of security implementations. Quarterly analysis
allowed for analysis of the ISP compliance by evaluating the security changes
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implemented by each UXA.
Survey results were downloaded from Qualtrics into a spreadsheet. UXA were
assigned a unique ID and all results associated with that UXA were coded with that
unique ID. These codes helped to ensure anonymity of responses while still allowing for
the connection of the ISP compliance behavior data points to the specific UXA by the
researcher. The compliance data were collected for all servers managed by each UXA and
entered into the study spreadsheet.
Data Analysis
Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) has been used
extensively to test complex models in IS (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Rhee et al.,
2012; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Safa et al., 2016). PLS-SEM has characteristics that
demonstrate its utility in the present research including acceptance of small sample sizes,
no assumption of data normality, variety of scales of measurement, and ability to handle
complex models (Hair et al., 2017). Hair et al. (2017), indicate that at a significance level
of 5% with maximum of three arrows pointing toward a construct (Threat Appraisal), a
minimum R2 of 0.25 requires a 33-participant sample size and a minimum R2 of 0.50
requires 14 participants (p. 26). PLS-SEM evaluated and inner model or structure using
path coefficients and an outer model, also termed the measurement model, with the
factors used to represent the latent variables (Hair et al., 2017). PLS-SEM allowed for the
examination of the paths of the model as well as the relationships between the variables
(Hanus & Wu, 2016; Safa & Von Solms, 2016). SmartPLS 3.2.8 was used to perform
analyses of the data. SmartPLS provided reports of the following: Cronbach’s α, average
variance explained, Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Fornell-Larcker criterion, and R2
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for testing the outer and inner models (Hair et al., 2017). Figure 3 is an illustrated initial
layout of SmartPLS for the proposed model.
The measurement model was assessed for internal consistency reliability,
indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017). The
structural model was assessed for collinearity among the constructs, relevance and
significance of the path coefficients, predictive relevance, predictive model selection, and
goodness-of-fit (Hair et al., 2017). Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with
Cronbach’s α. Values greater than 0.60 indicated internal consistency reliability for all
new constructs while established constructs should have values greater than 0.70 (Hair et
al., 2017). Composite reliability was assessed with ρ. Levels greater than 0.70 indicated
composite reliability. Indicator reliability was assessed by using the outer loadings
provided by SmartPLS. The indicators outer loading indicates the correlation between the
construct and the specific indicator. The explained variance was calculated by squaring
the outer loading and results should be larger than 0.7 to show indicator reliability (Hair
et al., 2017).
Convergent validity was assessed using the Average Variance Extracted (AVE).
The AVE is a grand mean made up of the squared loadings for all the indicators
associated with the specific construct (Hair et al., 2017). AVE was calculated for each
construct using the indicator loadings, squared, and then averaged. Hair et al. (2017)
indicated that each construct should have AVE >= 0.50. Outer loading relevance was
tested by evaluating the outer loading scores from SmartPLS. For values >= 0.70 the
indicator was retained (Hair et al., 2017). For outer loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 the
data were reanalyzed to determine the impact of the indicator deletion on the AVE and
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composite reliability (Hair et al., 2017). For outer loadings below 0.40 the reflective
indicator was removed from the model (Hair et al., 2017). Discriminant validity was
calculated to determine if the constructs are conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et
al., 2017). To assess discriminant validity of the reflective measurement models,
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) was used. Henseler et al. (2015) found HTMT to be
more effective in identifying problems with discriminant validity than the more popular
Fornell-Larcker criterion. The threshold suggested by Kline (2011) is 0.85.
To analyze the structural model, the model was evaluated for collinearity, the
significance and relevance of the relationships in the structural model were assessed, and
the predictive relevance of the model was assessed (Hair et al., 2017). Collinearity was
assessed using the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et al., 2017). VIF values was used
to determine if a critical level of collinearity occurred. VIF values below 5 or better
below 3 indicate that the level of collinearity is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017). Path
coefficients were evaluated to determine their significance and relevance (Hair et al.,
2017). The types of effects analyzed included the direct effects, indirect effects, and total
effects. Path coefficients range from -1 to 1. Significance of the effects were evaluated
using bootstrapping (Hair et al., 2017). Finally, the predictive relevance of the model was
assessed by analyzing the out-of-sample and in-sample predictions (Hair et al., 2017). Insample prediction, or explanatory power, was assessed using the entire dataset less a
holdout sample, to estimate the model and predict observations using the coefficient of
determination (R2) and effect size (Hair et al., 2017). R2 values range from 0 to 1 where
below 0.25 is weak, 0.5 is moderate, and .75 is substantial (Hair et al., 2017). The effect
size is used to determine how one construct contributes to the explaining power of
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another construct (Hair et al., 2017). An effect size value from 0.02 to 0.15 is considered
weak effect, from 0.15 to 0.35 is a moderate effect, and greater than 0.35 is considered a
strong effect (Hair et al., 2017). Out-of-sample prediction, or predictive power, was
assessed to predict observations in a holdout sample using blindfolding-based Q2 (Hair et
al., 2017). In blindfolding the model is computed iteratively while systematically
omitting some of the data points (Hair et al., 2017). Model estimates that are created
using the sample data are used to predict the omitted data (Hair et al., 2017). Predictive
relevance is determined by assessing the predictive error (Hair et al., 2017). Q2 results
from 0.02 to 0.15 indicates weak predictive power, values between 0.15 and 0.35
indicates moderate predictive power, and values greater than 0.35 indicates strong
predictive power (Hair et al., 2017).
Figure 3
SmartPLS Model Layout

Comparisons of pre-intervention and post-intervention statistics were completed
using dependent-sample t-tests. T-tests allow for comparison of means and as this is a
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before and after comparison, the samples were dependent on one another (Terrell, 2012).
Microsoft Excel’s Statistics package was used to compute the critical t values used to
determine if the compliance metrics were statistically different between the pre-workshop
analysis and the analysis performed 90-days after the workshop. Additionally, descriptive
statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) were calculated for all the
constructs.
Format for Presenting Results
Based on the results of the statistical analyses, a report was developed and
presented as chapter four of the dissertation report (Terrell, 2016). The analyses included
narrative form, diagrams, and tables related to survey administration, survey questions
and responses, demographics of participants, pre and post intervention server analyses
and results, workshop feedback/analysis, ISC feedback/results, PLS structural and
measurement model analysis, hypotheses testing results, and proposed answers to the
research question. The data included, where applicable, quantitative descriptive statistics.
The PLS-SEM structural analysis included data related to the collinearity assessment,
relevance and significance of path coefficients, predictive relevance, and goodness of fit.
The PLS-SEM measurement model data included a report of the convergent and
discriminant validity, internal consistency reliability, indicator reliability, and composite
reliability. PLS-SEM data were presented via diagram, table, and narrative to explain the
results. Other quantitative data were presented in tabular form. Finally, chapter five
provides conclusions based on the analysis, a summary of implications for UXA SETA
training, as well as recommendations for future research.
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Resources
Required resources fell into three categories: administration, people, and
technology. Administratively, the study proposal was defended, and IRB requests were
submitted to both institutions. The IRB review process at the workshop site took almost
six weeks of revisions. Support from the C-Suite for the research was already secured. In
terms of people, participation of a diverse set of UXA across the organization was
required. Technology requirements included access to Qualtrics for survey
administration, development of and access to EDURange for the ISC, SmartPLS for PLSSEM statistical analyses, participants access to networked computers, access to the
organization’s configuration management database, access to the organizations Tenable
servers, access to the Splunk dashboards, access to the MFA database, and the ability to
run scripts and scans on the UXA’s servers. A new EDURange scenario was developed, in
coordination with the EDURange team that consisted of an ISC module to provide handson SETA for UXA participants.
Summary
This quantitative study was conducted in a pretest and posttest experimental and
control group design and evaluate the effectiveness of a SETA workshop, ISC, and
periodic security update emails on the ISP compliance of UXA. The survey instrument
was developed based on prior validated instrument questions augmented with newly
designed questions related to the use of cognitive heuristics and biases. The survey was
completed by participants prior to and following the workshop and ISC. Compliance
behavior was assessed using security scans and evaluation of specific metrics directly tied
to the SETA workshop and ISC learning objectives. SmartPLS was used to analyze the
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data and evaluate the structural and measurement model proposed. Dependent t-tests
were used to analyze the behavioral data to evaluate the potential differences between
pre- and post-intervention actual UXA compliance.
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Chapter 4
Results

Overview
This chapter provides the data analyses of the pre-workshop survey and
behavioral metrics, as well as the post-workshop survey and behavioral metrics. The
survey and server analyses results were analyzed in two phases. The theorized model and
indicators were entered into SmartPLS. Once data were collected for the pre-workshop
survey and compliance metrics, they were entered into SmartPLS. Initial evaluation of
the measurement model and structural model were completed on the pre-workshop data.
After 90 days, the post-workshop survey data and compliance metrics were collected and
a second SmartPLS analysis was performed. Additionally, descriptive statistics were
performed to evaluate the changes between the pre-workshop and post-workshop
compliance metrics to determine if significant changes were made in behavior as a result
of the intervention. The results of these analyses are indicated below. Following the data
analyses, findings and a summary close out this chapter of the dissertation report.
Data Analysis
The process for performing an analysis of a new model, as outlined by Hair et al.
(2017), included the following steps: creation of the structural model, creation of the
measurement models for each construct, collection/examination of data, estimation of the
PLS path model, assessment of the (reflective) measurement model, and finally
assessment of the structural model. The model, based on prior research, was created in
SmartPLS. The data from the survey were exported from Qualtrics to a Microsoft Excel
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spreadsheet. AC security metrics were collected from scripts, Tenable Nessus, Splunk,
and organizational data. Results for these data points were aggregated and stored in a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The compliance data were merged with the survey data to
provide a single comma delimited file for input into SmartPLS. Preliminary evaluation of
the data using a consistent PLS algorithm indicated several unexpected results. A deeper
dive into the data showed that there were several individuals whose responses were
significantly different from others in the sample data. Through conversations with those
participants it was discovered that several participants were Windows server
administrators not UXAs. Since the focus of this study was on the unique UXA
cognitions, the Windows server administrators were removed from the data. The
SmartPLS analysis for data prior to the workshop and ISC is shown in Figure 4.

76
Figure 4
Pre-workshop PLS-SEM Analysis Results

The pre-workshop measurement model was assessed for internal consistency
reliability, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al.,
2017). The structural model was assessed for collinearity among the constructs, as well as
relevance and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 2017).
Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with Cronbach’s α. Values greater
than 0.60 indicated internal consistency reliability for all new constructs while
established constructs should have values greater than 0.70 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Hair et
al., 2017; Henseler et al., 2016). The pre-workshop Cronbach’s α indicated that CA-CA-
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RE, CA-SE, CB, ISKS, OB, and TA-PS achieved the required cutoffs for new constructs
and existing constructs (Table 7). The AH, and TA-PV, however, failed to meet the
Cronbach’s α cutoff. Three TA-PV survey questions were derived from Hanus and Wu
(2016), Siponen et al. (2014), and Ifinedo (2012) as well as one question that was
developed based on the recommendation of a pilot-tester. It is theorized that, while the
four questions seemed to be pertinent and collectively represent this construct for the
current study, taken individually there were inconsistencies that resulted in the lower
Cronbach’s α than had all of the survey question come from a single instrument. The AH
survey questions were developed for this study. VIF and HTMT were evaluated and all
the indicators met collinearity constraints. Clearly, however, the questions associated with
AH need to be reevaluated.
Table 7
Pre-workshop Cronbach's α (N=42)
Construct
Cronbach's α
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

0.403
0.661
0.856
1
0.683
0.691
0.867
0.419

Composite reliability of the pre-workshop data was assessed with ρ. Levels
greater than 0.70 indicated composite reliability for established constructs while values
greater than 0.60 are acceptable for exploratory research (Henseler et al., 2016; Wong,
2019). AC, AH, CA-RE, CA-SE, CB, ISKS, OB, and TA-PS met ρ significance levels
(Table 8). TA-PV, however, was well below the required cutoff point. Again, it was
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theorized that pulling single questions from different scales may have resulted in the
failure of TA-PV to meet demonstrate composite reliability.
Table 8
Pre-workshop ρ (N=42)
Construct
ρ
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

1
0.771
0.7
0.858
1
0.768
0.739
0.896
0.251

Convergent validity was assessed using the AVE. The AVE is a grand mean made
up of the squared loadings for all the indicators associated with the specific construct
(Hair et al., 2017). The AVE was calculated in SmartPLS (Table 9). Six constructs met
the AVE level of significance CA-RE (0.585), CA-SE (0.774), CB (1.00), ISKS (0.571),
OB (0.612), and TA-PS (0.79). AH and TA-PV did not meet the critical cutoff for
significance. To further assess AVE, the bootstrapped AVE was calculated for each
construct (PLS algorithm max number of iterations: 5000; bootstrapping settings:
complexity: complete bootstrapping, samples: 5000, significance: 0.05, test type: one
tailed) (Hair et al., 2017). As noted in Table 10, the bootstrapped AVEs for all constructs
were significant (p < 0.05).
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Table 9
Pre-workshop AVE (N=42)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AVE

0.442
0.585
0.774
1
0.571
0.612
0.79
0.397

Table 10
Pre-workshop Bootstrapped AVE (N=42)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

Original Sample

M
0.442
0.585
0.774
0.571
0.612
0.79
0.397

SD
0.453
0.549
0.764
0.563
0.607
0.776
0.408

t
0.065
0.118
0.085
0.108
0.062
0.086
0.067

6.818
4.968
9.052
5.274
9.812
9.139
5.924

p
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

Discriminant validity was calculated to determine if the constructs are
conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et al., 2017). To assess discriminant validity
of the reflective measurement models, Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) was used.
Henseler et al., (2015) found HTMT to be more effective in identifying problems with
discriminant validity than the more popular Fornell-Larcker criterion. The HTMT table
was evaluated to determine if the correlations within values are greater than the
correlations across the model (Henseler et al., 2015). Threshold values should be 0.85
(Kline, 2011; Wong, 2019) or a more liberal cutoff of 0.90 can be used (Gold et al.,
2001). Based on the results from SmartPLS, the HTMT values for all constructs met the
desired cutoff indicating discriminant validity (Table 11).
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Table 11
Pre-workshop HTMT (N=42)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

CARE

AH
0.49
0.452
0.489
0.354
0.623
0.265
0.409

0.837
0.103
0.773
0.539
0.487
0.563

CA-SE

0.237
0.733
0.554
0.236
0.431

CB

ISKS

0.262
0.311
0.373
0.345

0.652
0.371
0.494

OB

TA-PS

0.179
0.37

TA-PV

0.474

To analyze the pre-workshop structural model, the model was evaluated for
collinearity, as well as the significance and relevance of the relationships (Hair et al.,
2017). Collinearity was assessed using the VIF (Hair et al., 2017). Constructs with high
collinearity indicate that there is a high degree of redundancy and correlation between
two or more predictor variables (Hair et al., 2017). VIF values below five indicate that
the level of collinearity is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). Table 12 from
SmartPLS shows that all constructs met the statistical cutoff for collinearity. The highest
VIF values was for CA-RE->AC (3.099) indicating there is a degree of correlation
between the indicators but that they do not reach the level where statistical significance
was in question.

81
Table 12
Pre-workshop Inner VIF (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

1.619

1.619

1.339

1.339

1.36

1.36

3.099
-1.491
1.115

1.115

1

1
1.115

1.115

1

-1.207
-3.418

Path coefficients were evaluated to determine their significance and relevance
(Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). The types of effects analyzed included the direct effects,
indirect effects, and total effects. Path coefficients range from -1 to 1. The direct effect
was determined using the path effect between linked constructs. Path coefficients provide
an indication of how much a dependent variable will change based on an independent
variable. For a one standard deviation change of the independent variable the dependent
variable will change x (path coefficient) standard deviations (Hair et al., 2017). With
regard to AC, CA-SE had the highest positive impact (1.272), and TA-PS was also
significant (0.705) (Table 13). TA-PV (-1.073) and CA-RE (-0.784) had significant
negative effects on AC. With respect to the three evaluated cognitive heuristics and
biases, the AH had a significant negative impact on TA-PV (-1.050), while OB (0.538),
and CB (0.534) had significant positive impacts on TA-PV. This implies that the greater
the use of the AH results in a greater sense of invulnerability. Interestingly, based on the
pre-workshop results, the use of confirmation bias and OB increase TA-PV. TA-PS was
negatively influenced by CB (-0.481) and positively influenced by OB (0.292) and AH
(0.031). From a CB perspective this seemed logical as using the bias resulted in reduced
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perceived threat awareness and TA-PS. The positive path coefficient between OB and
TA-PS implies that when the bias is used, TA-PS is increased slightly. CA-RE is most
positively influenced by OB (0.608) and is negatively influenced by CB (-0.246). This
seemed logical given that the use of OB implied higher level of belief of invulnerability
and this could extend to the perception that CA-RE was high as well. The negative
relationship between CB and CA-RE (-0.246), indicated that individuals who are using
CB tend to believe their ability to respond to security risks is reduced. CA-RE is most
highly impacted by OB (0.573) and negatively impacted by CB (-0.047). Again, this
seemed appropriate since the use of OB would artificially inflate the sense of CA-SE of
the UXAs. OB was most highly positively influenced by ISKS (0.639). This evaluation
was done prior to the workshop and it seems logical that a positive sense of information
sharing results in a greater degree of optimism about the security of one’s UNIX servers.
CB was also positively influenced by ISKS (0.236). Since, when wielding CB, one is
looking for information that supports your strongly held beliefs, this scoring was not
surprising. There was only a minimal positive influence of ISKS on the AH (0.068). The
use of the AH relates to the sense of how easily one recalls information related to a
specific question. These results indicated that increased ISKS can result in minimal
increase in AH.
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Table 13
Pre-workshop Path Coefficients (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.031

-1.05

-0.481

0.534

0.292

0.538

-0.784
1.272
-0.246

-0.047

0.608

0.573

0.068

0.236

0.639

0.705
-1.073

Indirect effect was evaluated by looking at additional paths between constructs
through at least one other construct (Table 14). The most significant positive indirect
effect was on the AH on AC (1.149). The use of CB had a significant negative effect (0.778) on AC. OB had a small negative effect (-0.120) on AC. ISKS had a small negative
effect on AC but a positive effect on TA-PV, CA-SE, CA-RE, and TA-PS (in order of
effect). It seemed logical that ISKS would have a positive effect on CA-RE, CA-SE, TAPS, and TA-PV given that security education generally increases participants ability to
identify and respond to risks and vulnerabilities. The negative influence of ISKS on AC
was puzzling and was theorized to be less relevant given the ISKS intervention had not
yet occurred (the workshop).
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Table 14
Pre-workshop Indirect Effects (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

1.149

-0.778
-0.183
-0.12

0.33

0.355

0.075

0.399

Specific indirect effects were analyzed from SmartPLS (Table 15). The most
significant negative specific indirect effects on compliance included: OB->TA-PV->AC
(-0.577), CB->TA-PV->AC (-0.573), OB->CA-RE->AC (-0.476), ISKS->OB->TA-PV>AC (-0.369), CB->TA-PS->AC (-0.339), ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC (-0.305). The most
significant positive specific indirect effects on compliance included: AH->TA-PV->AC
(1.127), OB->CA-SE->AC (0.728), ISKS->OB->CA-SE->AC (0.465). In terms of other
specific indirect effects ISKS->OB->CA-RE (0.389), ISKS->OB->CA-SE (0.366), and
ISKS->OB->TA-PV (0.344) were all significant. The indirect effects indicate that CB,
OB, and AH all played a significant role in AC.
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Table 15
Pre-workshop Specific Indirect Effects (N=42)
Path
CB->CA-RE->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-RE->AC
OB->CA-RE->AC
ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC
CB->CA-SE->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-SE->AC
OB->CA-SE->AC
ISKS->OB->CA-SE->AC
AH->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->AH->TA-PS->AC
CB->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->CB->TA-PS->AC
OB->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->OB->TA-PS->AC
AH->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->AH->TA-PV->AC
CB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->CB->TA-PV->AC
OB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->OB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-RE
ISKS->OB->CA-RE
ISKS->CB->CA-SE
ISKS->OB->CA-SE
ISKS->AH->TA-PS
ISKS->CB->TA-PS
ISKS->OB->TA-PS
ISKS->AH->TA-PV
ISKS->CB->TA-PV
ISKS->OB->TA-PV

Specific Indirect Effects
0.193
0.046
-0.476
-0.305
-0.06
-0.014
0.728
0.465
0.022
0.002
-0.339
-0.08
0.206
0.131
1.127
0.076
-0.573
-0.135
-0.577
-0.369
-0.058
0.389
-0.011
0.366
0.002
-0.113
0.186
-0.071
0.126
0.344

The total effect was analyzed based on the results of the SmartPLS run (Table 16).
The most significant positive influencers on AC were CA-SE (1.272), AH (1.149), and
TA-PS (0.705). CA-SE and TA-PS are known to have a positive relationship with
compliance intention but the finding that AH is a significant influencer is novel to the
current study (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Vance et al., 2012). The most significant negative
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influencers of AC included TA-PV (-1.073), CA-RE (-0.784), CB (-0.778), ISKS (0.183), and OB (-0.120). CA-RE and CB may be explained due to the use of the bias
skewing the UXAs belief that they need to comply with security directives. TA-PV’s
strong negative relationship may be due to UXAs perceiving the threat and feeling
overwhelmed an unable to make significant changes to mitigate the threat.
Table 16
Pre-workshop Total Effects (N=42)
Construct

AC

AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

1.149
-0.784
1.272
-0.778
-0.183
-0.12
0.705
-1.073

AH

0.068

CA-RE

CA-SE

-0.246
0.33
0.608

-0.047
0.355
0.573

CB

0.236

ISKS

OB

0.639

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.031

-1.05

-0.481
0.075
0.292

0.534
0.399
0.538

OB had a significant effect on CA-RE (0.608), CA-SE (0.573), TA-PV (0.538),
and TA-PS (0.292). Since OB is an unwarranted belief that one is not in danger it seemed
logical that this bias should influence CA-RE, CA-SE, TA-PV, and TA-PS. CB had a
significant negative effect on AC (-0.778), TA-PS (-0.481), and CA-RE (-0.246). Since
CB may lead UXAs to only see information that supports their strongly held opinions it is
not surprising that increases in CB result in less compliance, less TA-PS, and less CARE. ISKS had a positive influence on OB (0.639), TA-PV (0.399), CA-SE (0.355), CARE (0.330), and CB (0.236) and a minimal positive effect on TA-PS (0.075) and AH
(0.068). These findings are in line with prior research that found that ISKS led to
increased TA-PV, CA-SE, and CA-RE (Bélanger et al., 2017; Hanus & Wu, 2016; Posey
et al., 2015). The findings related to OB and CB demonstrate the significant role each

87
plays in the model. CB had a significant positive influence on TA-PV (0.534). This may
be caused by the increased use of the bias resulting in an invalid estimate of risk and an
increase in TA-PV. CB had a negative influence on AC (-0.778), TA-PS (-0.481), CA-RE
(-0.246), and CA-SE (-0.047). This indicated that, when the use of CB increased,
compliance behavior, TA-PS, CA-RE, and CA-SE were all reduced. As noted earlier, this
bias may blind the UXA to the risks facing them. AH had a positive relationship with AC
(1.149) and TA-PS (0.031) as well as a negative influence on TA-PV (-1.050). The
negative influence on TA-PV indicates that the greater the use of the heuristic the lower
the perceived danger facing the UXA. The positive relationship between AH and AC
(1.149) may indicate that the increase in security knowledge and awareness improved AC
behavior. Clearly, based on the pre-workshop analysis, the increased use of AH resulted
in increased compliance.
The significance of the path coefficients was evaluated using SmartPLS
bootstrapping. This technique, in PLS, generates t statistics for both outer and inner
models (Wong, 2019). The statistics were evaluated to determine if the path coefficients
of the inner model were significant. The significant paths are indicated in Table 17 and
included CB->TA-PS, ISKS->OB, OB->CA-RE, and OB->CA-SE.
Table 17
Pre-workshop Bootstrapped Path Coefficients (N=42)
Path
CB->TA-PS
ISKS->OB
OB->CA-RE
OB->CA-SE

Original
Sample
-0.378
0.594
0.458
0.453

M

SD
-0.365
0.596
0.451
0.458

0.154
0.123
0.186
0.127

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

t

p
2.454
4.81
2.47
3.559

0.007**
<0.001***
0.007**
<0.001***

88
The effect size (f2) is used to determine how one construct contributes to the
explaining power of another construct (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). The effect sizes
were computed using the PLS algorithm with quality criteria set to f-square (Table 18).
An effect size value from 0.02 to 0.15 is considered weak effect, from 0.15 to 0.35 is a
moderate effect, and greater than 0.35 is considered a strong effect (Hair et al., 2017).
Strong positive effects included AH->TA-PV (2.522), CB->TA-PV (0.788), OB->TA-PV
(0.788), ISKS->OB (0.691), OB->CA-RE (0.498), and OB->CA-SE (0.428). Moderate
positive effects included CA-RE->AC (0.159), and CB->TA-PS and (0.222). Weak
positive effects included CB->CA-RE (0.082), OB->TA-PS (0.080), and ISKS->CB
(0.059). Strong negative effects included only CA-SE->AC (-0.869). Moderate negative
effects included TA-PS->AC (-0.330), and TA-PV->AC (-0.270). As this evaluation was a
baseline and done prior to the workshop and ISC it is not surprising that there were strong
negative effects for CA-SE, TA-PS, and TA-PV on AC.
Table 18
Pre-workshop Effect Size (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CARE

CASE

CB

ISKS

OB

TAPS

TAPV

0.001

2.522

0.222

0.788

0.08

0.788

0.159
-0.869
0.082

0.003

0.498

0.428

0.005

0.059

0.691

-0.33
-0.27

Blindfolding was used to test predictive relevance using the Stone-Geisser values
(Wong, 2019). Blindfolding systematically includes and omits some data points to
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evaluate the model’s ability to estimate/predict remaining points (Hair et al., 2017). To
interpret blindfolding results, the Stone-Geisser’s value (Q2) between 0.02 and 0.15
indicated weak predictive power, between 0.15 and 0.35 indicated moderate predictive
power, and greater than 0.35 indicated strong predictive power (Hair et al., 2017). CARE, CA-SE, and OB all had moderate levels of predictive power (Table 19). CB had
weak predictive power. Other constructs predictive power were below 0.02 indicating
little predictive power.
Table 19
Pre-workshop Predictive Power (N=42)
Construct
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
OB

Q²_predict
0.175
0.209
0.035
0.278

Predictive Power

Moderate
Moderate
Weak
Moderate

Following the workshop, ISC, and security update emails, the participants were
asked to complete the survey a second time and data associated with their servers were
collected. Ninety days were afforded to the UXAs to make changes to their servers in
compliance with the ISP and by the direction of material in the workshop. The same
model was used for the post-workshop analysis, but new responses were downloaded
from Qualtrics and collected via script, Tenable Nessus, Splunk, or organization
databases. Data were stored in Excel spreadsheets and aggregated together for input into
SmartPLS.
The measurement model was assessed for internal consistency reliability,
indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017). The
structural model was assessed for collinearity among the constructs, as well as relevance
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and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 2017). The results of the SmartPLS
analysis with resulting R2 and path coefficients for the post-workshop survey and data
points can be seen in Figure 5.
Figure 5

Post-workshop PLS-SEM Analysis Results

Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with Cronbach’s α. Constructs
which demonstrated internal consistency reliability by way of Cronbach’s α included AH
(0.781), CA-RE (0.760), CA-SE (0.915), ISKS (0.663), OB (0.764), and TA-PS (0.913)
(Table 20). Like the pre-workshop data analysis, the TA-PV did not meet the cutoff
criteria (0.416 versus 0.70). Again, this problem may have been due to the selection of
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single questions from three different instruments to develop the questions used in this
survey.
Table 20
Post-workshop Cronbach's α (N=42)
Construct
Cronbach's α
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

0.781
0.76
0.915
1
0.663
0.764
0.913
0.416

Composite reliability of the post-workshop data was assessed with ρ. Levels
greater than 0.70 indicated composite reliability for established constructs while values
greater than 0.6 are acceptable for exploratory research (Henseler et al., 2016; Wong,
2019). The following constructs indicated composite reliability by virtue of the ρ scores:
AC (1.0), AH (0.810), CA-RE (0.795), CA-SE (0.932), CB (1.0), ISKS (0.679), OB
(0.801), and TA-PS (0.986) (Table 21). Again, like the pre-workshop analysis, TA-PV did
not meet the minimum criteria for ρ. It was theorized that the same situation, having
pulled three questions from three different authors surveys may have contributed to this
problem.
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Table 21
Post-workshop ρ (N=42)
Construct
ρ
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

1
0.81
0.795
0.932
1
0.679
0.801
0.986
0.55

Convergent validity was assessed using the AVE. The AVE is a grand mean made
up of the squared loadings for all the indicators associated with the specific construct
(Hair et al., 2017). The AVE from the initial SmartPLS run indicated that the following
constructs met AVE requirements (> 0.5): AH (0.505), CA-RE (0.677), CA-SE (0.856),
CB (1.0), ISKS (0.602), OB (0.677), and TA-PV (0.849) (Table 22). TA-PV (0.332) was
the only construct that did not meet the AVE requirement. This may again be caused by
the indicator question selection. The bootstrapped AVE was also calculated for each
construct using SmartPLS (Table 23). All constructs were found to have significant AVEs
with p-values < 0.001 which indicates that convergent validity was achieved.
Table 22
Post-workshop AVE (N=42)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AVE
0.505
0.677
0.856
1
0.602
0.677
0.849
0.332

93
Table 23
Post-workshop Bootstrapped AVE (N=42)
Constructs

Original
Sample

M

AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

0.505
0.677
0.856
0.602
0.677
0.849
0.332

SD
0.541
0.675
0.857
0.595
0.681
0.847
0.369

0.108
0.052
0.041
0.07
0.063
0.049
0.065

t

p

4.691
13.132
20.631
8.644
10.693
17.156
5.115

<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Discriminant validity was calculated for the post-workshop data to determine if
the constructs were conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et al., 2017). To assess
discriminant validity of the reflective measurement models, HTMT was used. Threshold
values should be 0.85 (Kline, 2011) or a more liberal cutoff of 0.90 (Gold et al., 2001)
can be used. The HTMT values for all constructs met the desired cutoff indicating
discriminant validity (Table 24).
Table 24
Post-workshop HTMT (N=42)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AH
0.181
0.123
0.198
0.317
0.209
0.196
0.491

CE-RE

0.707
0.207
0.789
0.796
0.305
0.564

CA-SE

0.028
0.508
0.64
0.18
0.316

CB

0.181
0.114
0.065
0.335

ISKS

0.692
0.404
0.372

OB

0.35
0.545

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.398

To analyze the post-workshop structural model, the model was evaluated for
collinearity, and the significance and relevance of the latent variable relationships (Hair et
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al., 2017). Collinearity was assessed using the VIF (Hair et al., 2017). VIF values were
used to determine if a critical level of collinearity has occurred. VIF values below 4.0
indicate that the level of collinearity is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). For the
post-workshop structural model all constructs were below the critical value (4.0) (Table
25).
Table 25
Post-workshop VIF (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

1.059

1.059

1.038

1.038

1.039

1.039

3.72
2.05
1.012

1.012

1.012

1.012

1

1

1

1.158
2.398

Path coefficients were evaluated to determine their significance and relevance
(Hair et al., 2017). Direct effects, indirect effects, and total effects were analyzed. AH has
a negative impact on TA-PS (-0.154) and a small positive impact on TA-PV (0.008)
(Table 26). CA-RE has a positive impact on AC (0.422). Prior research has demonstrated
that CA-RE is related to behavioral intention (Vance et al., 2012). The present research,
however, demonstrated that CA-RE was associated with AC behavior. CA-SE had a
negative impact on AC (-0.363). This was unexpected since CA-SE has been found to
have a positive impact on behavioral intention (Vance et al., 2012). One possible
explanation is that the UXA with high CA-SE feel it is unnecessary to make additional
changes to their servers to prevent security breaches. CB has a small negative impact on
CA-RE (-0.109). This indicates that as the use of CB increases, the level of CA-RE is
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diminished slightly. CB also positively influences TA-PV (0.153), TA-PS (0.121), and
CA-SE (0.052). These path coefficients indicate a weak positive relationship between CB
and the TA-PV, TA-PS, and CA-SE. ISKS has a strong positive impact on OB (0.697) and
a smaller positive influence on AH (0.210). As ISKS increases, OB and AH are positively
impacted. ISKS also has a negative impact on CB (-0.172). This indicates that by
increasing ISKS there is a negative influence on the use of CB. OB has a positive
influence on CA-RE (0.794), CA-SE (0.639), and TA-PS (0.338). As OB increases, CARE, CA-SE, and TA-PS increase. OB also has a strong negative impact on TA-PV (0.751). This indicates that as OB increases the TA-PV decreases. TA-PS and TA-PV have
a negative impact on AC (-0.196 and -0.128 respectively).
Table 26
Post-workshop Path Coefficients (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

-0.154

0.008

0.121

0.153

0.338

-0.751

0.422
-0.363
-0.109

0.052

0.21

-0.172
0.794

0.639

0.697

-0.196
-0.128

Total indirect effects were evaluated to assess the impact of interim constructs.
Notably, ISKS had positive impacts on CA-RE (0.572), CA-SE (0.436), TA-PS (0.182),
and AC (0.117) (Table 27). This indicated that as ISKS increases CA-RE, CA-SE, TA-PS,
and AC behavior increase. ISKS also had a strong negative impact on TA-PV (-0.548).
Given that additional knowledge may afford the UXA new skills needed to protect their
servers, reducing TA-PV may be a reasonable response to the training. AH was
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determined to have a small positive indirect effect on AC (0.029). This may be due to
slightly larger indirect specific effect AH->TA-PS->AC (0.030) versus the smaller
negative indirect effect AH->TA-PV->AC (-0.001). CB was found to have a small
negative impact on AC (-0.108). This value is very low and indicated the weak influence
that the bias may have on compliance behavior. This may be due to the accumulation of
slight specific indirect effects CB->CA-RE->AC (-0.046), CB->CA-SE->AC (-0.019),
CB->TA-PS->AC (-0.024), and CB->TA-PV->AC (-0.02). Finally, OB was reported to
have a small positive influence on AC (0.133). It is interesting that, as the use of OB
increases there is a small increase in AC.
Table 27
Post-workshop Indirect Effects (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CARE

CASE

0.572

0.436

CB

ISKS

OB

TAPS

TA-PV

0.029

-0.108
0.117
0.133

0.182

-0.548

The most significant positive specific indirect effects included ISKS->OB->CARE (0.554), ISKS->OB->CA-SE (0.445), OB->CA-RE->AC (0.335), ISKS->OB->TAPS (0.236), and ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC (0.233) (Table 28). The most significant
negative specific indirect effects included ISKS->OB->TA-PV (-0.524), OB->CA-SE>AC (-0.232), and ISKS->OB->CA-SE->AC (-0.162).
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Table 28
Post-workshop Specific Indirect Effects (N=42)
Path
CB->CA-RE->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-RE->AC
OB->CA-RE->AC
ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC
CB->CA-SE->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-SE->AC
OB->CA-SE->AC
ISKS->OB->CA-SE->AC
AH->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->AH->TA-PS->AC
CB->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->CB->TA-PS->AC
OB->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->OB->TA-PS->AC
AH->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->AH->TA-PV->AC
CB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->CB->TA-PV->AC
OB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->OB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-RE
ISKS->OB->CA-RE
ISKS->CB->CA-SE
ISKS->OB->CA-SE
ISKS->AH->TA-PS
ISKS->CB->TA-PS
ISKS->OB->TA-PS
ISKS->AH->TA-PV
ISKS->CB->TA-PV
ISKS->OB->TA-PV

Specific Indirect Effects
-0.046
0.008
0.335
0.233
-0.019
0.003
-0.232
-0.162
0.03
0.006
-0.024
0.004
-0.066
-0.046
-0.001
0
-0.02
0.003
0.096
0.067
0.019
0.554
-0.009
0.445
-0.032
-0.021
0.236
0.002
-0.026
-0.524

Due to the presence of mediating latent variables, the total effects must be
computed. Total effects were computed using SmartPLS (Table 29). AH had a small
positive influence on AC (0.029) and TA-PV (0.008). Also, AH had a small negative
influence on TA-PS (-0.154). CA-RE had a moderate impact on AC (0.422). This result
was consistent with prior research that found that CA-RE predicted behavioral intention
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(Vance et al., 2012). CA-SE had a moderate negative effect on AC (-0.363). This result
was puzzling as prior research had found that CA-SE was associated with compliance
intention (Safa et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012). CB had small negative effects on AC (0.108) and CA-RE (-0.109). This seems logical since the use of this bias negatively
impacts compliance and CA-RE. CB had a positive effect on CA-SE (0.052), TA-PS
(0.121), and TA-PV (0.153). ISKS had strong positive effect on OB (0.697), CA-RE
(0.572), CA-SE (0.436). ISKS had a weak positive effect on AH (0.210), TA-PS (0.182),
and AC (0.117). This indicated that knowledge sharing improved TA-PS and AC. ISKS
had a strong negative effect on TA-PV (-0.751) and a weak negative effect on CB (0.172). The benefit of ISKS, in terms of CA-RE and CA-SE, is in line with prior research
(Vance et al., 2012). The negative influence of ISKS on the use of CB demonstrates the
value of training in reducing the use of CB. The significant negative effect of ISKS on
TA-PV (-0.548) indicated that the knowledge sharing helped to reduce the vulnerability
the UXA perceived. Clearly, in this situation, knowledge was power. OB had a strong
positive effect on CA-RE (0.794) and CA-SE (0.639). Additionally, OB had a moderate
positive effect on TA-PS (0.338) and a weak positive effect on AC (0.133). Given that
OB tends to make on feel invulnerable it is logical that the CA-RE and CA-SE are
positively related.
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Table 29
Post-workshop Total Effects (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH
0.029
0.422
-0.363
-0.108
0.117
0.133
-0.196
-0.128

CA-RE

0.21

-0.109
0.572
0.794

CA-SE

CB

0.052
0.436
0.639

ISKS

-0.172

OB

0.697

TA-PS

TA-PV

-0.154

0.008

0.121
0.182
0.338

0.153
-0.548
-0.751

The significance of the path coefficients was evaluated using bootstrapping in
SmartPLS. This technique, in SmartPLS, generates T-statistics for both outer and inner
models (Wong, 2019). The paths that had significant p-values included ISKS->OB
(<0.001), OB->CA-RE (<0.001), OB->CA-SE (<0.001), and OB->TA-PS (0.017) (Table
30). Based on these results it was reasonable to conclude that the workshop had a
significant influence on the use of OB and that OB significantly influenced RE, SE, and
PS.
Table 30
Post-workshop Bootstrapped Path Coefficients (N=42)
Path
ISKS->OB
OB->CA-RE
OB->CA-SE
OB->TA-PS

Original
Sample
0.511
0.638
0.549
0.326

M

SD
0.521
0.647
0.548
0.309

0.141
0.103
0.119
0.154

t

p
3.631
6.197
4.626
2.12

<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
0.017*

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
The effect size (f2) was evaluated to determine how one construct contributed to
the explaining power of other constructs (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). The effect sizes
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were computed using SmartPLS (Table 31). Strong positive effects included OB->CA-RE
(1.839), OB->TA-PV (1.412), ISKS->OB (0.945), and OB->CA-SE (0.675). Clearly, OB
was a significant influencer in the model. Weak positive effects included OB->TA-PS
(0.130), CA-SE->AC (0.076), CA-RE->AC (0.056), AH->TA-PS (0.027), CB->CA-RE
(0.035), CB->TA-PV (0.059), ISKS->AH (0.046), ISKS->CB (0.031), and TA-PS->AC
(0.039).
Table 31
Post-workshop Effect Size (N=42)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.027

0.000

0.017

0.059

0.13

1.412

0.056
0.076
0.035

0.004

0.046

0.031
1.839

0.675

0.945

0.039
0.008

Blindfolding was used to test predictive relevance using the Stone-Geisser values
(Wong, 2019). Constructs with significant predictive power are indicated in Table 32.
Constructs found to provide moderate predictive power included CA-RE (0.265), CA-SE
(0.231), and OB (0.164). TA-PS (0.044) was found to have weak predictive power in the
post-workshop model.
Table 32
Post-workshop Predictive Power (N=42)
Construct
CA-RE
CA-SE
OB
TA-PS

Q²
0.265
0.231
0.164
0.044

Predictive Power

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Weak
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The next step in the analysis of the data was to perform SmartPLS Multigroup
Analysis (PLS-MGA). Both datasets were merged, and a group identifier column was
added to differentiate before-workshop and after-workshop data. The same model was
used for the multigroup analysis. The measurement model was assessed for internal
consistency reliability, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity
(Hair et al., 2017). The structural model was assessed for collinearity among the
constructs, as well as relevance and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al.,
2017). The combined groups model with R2 and path coefficients can be found in Figure
6.
Figure 6

Combined Groups PLS-SEM Analysis Results
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Internal consistency reliability for the multigroup model was evaluated with
Cronbach’s α. Constructs which demonstrated internal consistency reliability by way of
Cronbach’s α include AH (0.631), CA-RE (0.711), CA-SE (0.881), ISKS (0.675), OB
(0.731), and TA-PS (0.883) (Table 33). Like both the pre-workshop and post-workshop
data analysis, the TA-PV did not meet the cutoff criteria (0.444 versus 0.70).
Table 33
Multigroup Cronbach's α (N=84)
Construct
Cronbach's α
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

0.631
0.711
0.881
1
0.675
0.731
0.883
0.444

Composite reliability of the post-workshop data were assessed with ρ. The
following constructs indicated composite reliability by virtue of the ρ scores AC (1.0),
AH (0.819), CA-RE (0.758), CA-SE (0.882), CB (1.0), ISKS (0.756), OB (0.775), and
TA-PS (0.924) (Table 34). Again, like the pre-workshop and post-workshop analyses, TAPV did not meet the minimum criteria for ρ.
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Table 34
Multigroup ρ (N=84)
Construct
ρ
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

1
0.819
0.758
0.882
1
0.756
0.775
0.924
0.328

Convergent validity of the multigroup model was assessed using the AVE.
Constructs that met the cutoff for AVE included AH (0.506), CA-RE (0.632), CA-SE
(0.807), ISKS (0.596), OB (0.649), and TA-PS (0.805) (Table 35). TA-PV did not meet
the cutoff for AVE potentially due to the use of individual questions from three different
surveys. The bootstrapped AVE was also calculated for each construct using SmartPLS
(Table 36). All constructs were found to have significant AVEs with p-values < 0.001
which indicates that convergent validity was achieved.
Table 35
Multigroup AVE (N=84)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AVE
0.506
0.632
0.807
0.596
0.649
0.805
0.26
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Table 36
Multigroup Bootstrapped AVE (N=84)
Construct

Original
Sample

AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

M

SD

0.506
0.632
0.807
0.596
0.649
0.805
0.26

0.495
0.628
0.808
0.59
0.647
0.783
0.296

0.056
0.052
0.045
0.059
0.043
0.105
0.036

t

p

9.071
12.191
17.759
10.126
14.919
7.636
7.143

<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Discriminant validity was calculated for the multigroup data to determine if the
constructs were conceptually and statistically distinct (Hair et al., 2017). To assess
discriminant validity of the reflective measurement models, HTMT was used. The HTMT
values for all constructs met the desired cutoff indicating discriminant validity (Table 37).
Table 37
Multigroup HTMT (N=84)
Construct
AH
CA-RE
SA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AH

CA-RE
0.261
0.269
0.515
0.33
0.222
0.212
0.58

0.776
0.191
0.768
0.676
0.386
0.315

CA-SE

0.106
0.621
0.608
0.174
0.228

CB

0.143
0.109
0.153
0.542

ISKS

0.654
0.387
0.228

OB

0.226
0.357

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.348

To analyze the multigroup structural model, the model was evaluated for
collinearity, as well as the significance and relevance of the relationships (Hair et al.,
2017). Collinearity was assessed using the VIF (Hair et al., 2017). For the post-workshop
structural model all constructs were below the critical value (4.0) (Table 38).

105
Table 38
Multigroup VIF (N=84)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

1.237

1.237

1.238

1.238

1.002

1.002

1.782
1.645
1.001

1.001

1.001

1.001

1

1

1

1.112
1.038

Path coefficients were of the multigroup model were evaluated to determine their
significance and relevance (Hair et al., 2017). The most significant influencer of AC was
TA-PV (-0.864) (Table 39). CA-SE had a positive impact on AC (0.149). CB had a
positive impact on TA-PV (0.628). As ISKS and security updates increased awareness
and it seems logical that it would increase the perceived vulnerabilities facing the UXA.
ISKS had a weak positive impact on AH (0.121), CB (0.098), and a strong positive
influence on OB (0.499). OB had a weak positive impact on TA-PS (0.196), CA-SE
(0.500), and CA-RE (0.539). Again, training and education may have increased the
UXA’s optimism about their ability to protect their servers. This would be reflected in
increased CA-RE, CA-SE, and TA-PS. The negative influence of OB on TA-PV (-0.205)
may indicate that the workshop and security emails increased awareness of the
vulnerabilities facing the UXAs. TA-PS had a weak positive influence on AC (0.049).
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Table 39
Multigroup Path Coefficients (N=84)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

-0.093

0.07

-0.12

0.628

0.196

-0.205

-0.107
0.149
-0.169

-0.085

0.121

0.098
0.539

0.5

0.499

0.049
-0.864

Total indirect effects were evaluated to assess the impact of interim constructs
(Table 40). AH had a weak negative influence on AC (-0.065). This weak influence may
be due to the increased knowledge of the significant vulnerabilities facing the UXAs and
their perception of impotence in mitigating the risks. CB had a strong negative impact on
AC (-0.543). It is logical that an increased use of CB has a substantial negative impact on
compliance behavior. ISKS had a weak positive influence on AC (0.040), TA-PS (0.074),
and a moderate influence on CA-RE (0.252), and CA-SE (0.241). The workshop and
security updates increased awareness and increased the UXAs compliance, and belief that
they can respond effectively to the risks. ISKS did have a weak negative influence on TAPV (-0.032). As noted previously, this reduced TA-PV may be due to the UXAs being
introduced to tools and actions they can do to reduce the vulnerabilities facing their
servers. Finally, OB had a moderately positive influence on AC (0.204). UXAs optimism
related to IS risk seemed to encourage compliance behavior.
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Table 40
Multigroup Indirect Effect (N=84)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

0.252

0.241

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.074

-0.032

-0.065

-0.543
0.04
0.204

The most significant positive specific indirect effects included ISKS->OB->CARE (0.269), and OB->TA-PV->AC (0.177) (Table 41). The most significant negative
specific indirect effects included CB->TA-PV->AC (-0.543), ISKS->OB->CA-SE (0.249), ISKS->OB->TA-PV (-0.102).
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Table 41
Multigroup Specific Indirect Effect (N=84)
Path
CB->CA-RE->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-RE->AC
OB->CA-RE->AC
ISKS->OB->CA-RE->AC
CB->CA-SE->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-SE->AC
OB->CA-SE->AC
ISKS->OB->CA-SE->AC
AH->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->AH->TA-PS->AC
CB->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->CB->TA-PS->AC
OB->TA-PS->AC
ISKS->OB->TA-PS->AC
AH->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->AH->TA-PV->AC
CB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->CB->TA-PV->AC
OB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->OB->TA-PV->AC
ISKS->CB->CA-SE
ISKS->OB->CA-RE
ISKS->CB->CA-SE
ISKS->OB->CA-SE
ISKS->AH->TA-PS
ISKS->CB->TA-PS
ISKS->OB->TA-PS
ISKS->AH->TA-PV
ISKS->CB->TA-PV
ISKS->OB->TA-PV

Specific Indirect Effects
0.018
0.002
-0.058
-0.029
-0.013
-0.001
0.074
0.037
-0.005
-0.001
-0.006
-0.001
0.01
0.005
-0.061
-0.007
-0.543
-0.053
0.177
0.088
-0.017
0.269
-0.008
0.249
-0.011
-0.012
0.098
0.009
0.062
-0.102

Due to the presence of mediating latent variables, the total effects were computed.
Total effects for the multigroup model were computed using SmartPLS (Table 42). AH
had a weak negative total effect on AC (-0.065) and TA-PS (-0.093) as well as a weak
positive total effect on TA-PV (0.070). These minor effects may be due to increased
availability of IS risk and vulnerabilities presented by the workshop and security update
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emails. CA-RE had a negative influence on AC (-0.107). This is contrary to other
research that found CA-RE to be a positive influencer of behavioral intention (Vance et
al., 2012). UXAs may, in believing their response effectiveness is high, decided there was
no need to implement suggested security changes. CA-SE had a positive impact on ACH
(0.149). This is in line with prior research on CA-SE and behavioral intention (Safa et al.,
2016; Vance et al., 2012). CB had a strong negative influence on AC (-0.543), a moderate
negative influence on CA-RE (-0.169), and weak negative impact on CA-SE (-0.085),
and TA-PS (-0.120). Logically, as CB increases, there may be increased resistance to the
implementation of security controls and guidelines. The moderate and weak negative
influences on CA-RE, and CA-SE imply that the bias may reduce the UXAs belief in
their ability to respond to IS risks. The negative influence of CB on TA-PS (-0.120)
indicates that as UXAs increase their use of this bias it has a negative effect on their TAPS of an IS breach. Last, the positive impact of CB on TA-PV (0.628) indicated that the
increased use of this bias may lead to increased levels of TA-PV. ISKS had a strong
positive influence on OB (0.499), moderate positive influence on CA-RE (0.252), CA-SE
(0.241), and weak positive influence on AH (0.121), TA-PS (0.074), and AC (0.040).
ISKS had a weak negative impact on TA-PV (-0.032). Each of these findings, for the
established constructs, were in line with prior research on ISKS (Posey et al., 2015). The
positive effect of ISKS on OB, AH, and CB demonstrated that the workshop and security
updates did have an impact on the participants. The strong influence of ISKS on OB may
indicate, based on the questions, that they perceive themselves as more resilient and able
to cope with the IS risks facing them. OB had strong positive total effects on CA-RE
(0.539), CA-SE (0.500), and moderate positive total effects on AC (0.204), and TA-PS
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(0.196). Finally, OB had a moderate negative effect on TA-PV (-0.205). It seemed logical
that increased optimistic bias resulted in increased CA-RE and CA-SE for the UXA. The
positive impact of OB on AC and TA-PS indicated that the increased use of the bias did
ultimately result in increased behavioral compliance. Lastly, the negative relationship
between OB and TA-PV indicated that the increased use of this bias may lead to reduced
TA-PV. TA-PS had a weak positive effect on AC (0.049). This finding is in line with prior
research that tied TA-PS to behavioral intention (Bélanger et al., 2017; Posey et al., 2015;
Siponen et al., 2014). Finally, TA-PV had a strong negative effect on AC (-0.864).
Table 42
Multigroup Total Effects (N=84)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH
-0.065
-0.107
0.149
-0.543
0.04
0.204
0.049
-0.864

0.121

CA-RE

CA-SE

-0.169
0.252
0.539

-0.085
0.241
0.5

CB

0.098

ISKS

OB

0.499

TA-PS

TA-PV

-0.093

0.07

-0.12
0.074
0.196

0.628
-0.032
-0.205

The significance of the path coefficients for the multigroup were evaluated using
bootstrapping in SmartPLS (Table 43). The paths that had significant p-values included
CB->TA-PV (<0.001), ISKS->OB (<0.001), OB->CA-RE (<0.001), OB->CA-SE
(<0.001), OB->CA-SE (<0.001), OB->TA-PS (0.047), OB->TA-PV (0.022), and TA-PV>AC (<0.001). These results indicated that ISKS and OB had significant impact on the
PMT constructs and ultimately AC behavior.
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Table 43
Multigroup Bootstrapped Path Coefficients (N=84)
Path
AH->TA-PS
AH->TA-PV
CA-RE->AC
CA-SE->AC
CB->CA-RE
CB->CA-SE
CB->TA-PS
CB->TA-PV
ISKS->AH
ISKS->CB
ISKS->OB
OB->CA-RE
OB->CA-SE
OB->TA-PS
OB->TA-PV
TA-PS->AC
TA-PV->AC

Original
Sample
-0.093
0.07
-0.107
0.149
-0.169
-0.085
-0.12
0.628
0.121
0.098
0.499
0.539
0.5
0.196
-0.205
0.049
-0.864

M

SD
-0.082
0.082
-0.1
0.152
-0.167
-0.085
-0.099
0.606
0.119
0.094
0.509
0.545
0.507
0.187
-0.201
0.028
-0.843

t

0.146
0.107
0.087
0.096
0.122
0.12
0.154
0.121
0.158
0.113
0.085
0.081
0.072
0.117
0.102
0.082
0.117

p
0.634
0.661
1.235
1.542
1.378
0.702
0.78
5.197
0.769
0.867
5.834
6.647
6.956
1.678
2.006
0.592
7.394

0.263
0.254
0.108
0.062
0.084
0.241
0.218
<0.001***
0.221
0.193
<0.001***
<0.001***
<0.001***
0.047*
0.022*
0.277
<0.001***

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
The effect size (f2) was evaluated to determine how one construct contributed to
the explaining power of other constructs (Hair et al., 2017; Wong, 2019). Strong positive
effects included TA-PV->AC (3.142), CB->TA-PV (0.602) (Table 44). Moderate positive
effects included: OB->CA-RE (0.423), OB->CA-SE (0.334), and ISKS->OB (0.331).
Weak positive effects included OB->TA-PV (0.079), CA-SE->AC (0.059), CB->CA-RE
(0.041), OB->TA-PS (0.041), and CA-RE->AC (0.028).

112
Table 44
Multigroup Effect Size (N=84)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
ISKS
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

AC

AH

CA-RE

CA-SE

CB

ISKS

OB

TA-PS

TA-PV

0.007

0.008

0.013

0.602

0.041

0.079

0.028
0.059
0.041

0.010

0.015

0.010
0.423

0.334

0.331

0.009
3.142

Blindfolding was used to test predictive relevance using the Stone-Geisser values
(Wong, 2019). AC (0.352) had strong predictive power in the model (Table 45). CA-SE
(0.185) had moderate predictive power. OB (0.146) and TA-PV (0.086) had weak
predictive power in the multigroup model.
Table 45
Multigroup Predictive Power (N=84)
Construct
AC
AH
CA-RE
CA-SE
CB
OB
TA-PS
TA-PV

Q²
0.352
0.002
0.149
0.185
-0.006
0.146
0.016
0.086

Predictive Power
Strong
Weak
Moderate
Weak
Weak

Descriptive Statistic Analysis
To assess changes in the use of AH, OB, and CB, the pre- and post-data for each
variable were aggregated and t-statistics were computed for each. For AH, the four
variables pre-workshop and post-workshop were compared with paired t-tests. For OB,
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the three variables pre-workshop and post-workshop were compared with paired t-tests.
Finally, for CB, the single variable was compared pre-workshop and post-workshop with
a paired T-Test. This process allowed for a single paired t-test to be performed for each
latent variable. The results (Table 46) indicated that AH (t=3.914, p<0.001) and CB
(t=7.723, p<0.001) had a significant change from before the workshop to after the
workshop. The mean for AH went from 4.667 to 4.155 indicating that the AH was not as
impactful post-workshop. Similarly, the CB mean changed from 2.095 to 0.333 which
indicated a significant reduction in the use of CB. OB, however, did not show a
significant change from pre-workshop to post-workshop (t=-2.353, p=0.010). Figure 7
provides a graphical representation of the before intervention and after intervention
means for the three cognitive heuristics and biases constructs.
Table 46
Cognitive Heuristics and Biases Descriptive Statistics
AH (N=168)
Before Mean
Before Variance
After Mean
After Variance
Observations
Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail

4.667
1.745
4.155
1.796
168
0.188
0
167
3.914
<0.001***
1.654

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

OB
(N=126)
5.56
1.238
5.802
1.024
126
0.415
0
125
-2.353
0.01*
1.657

CB (N=42)
2.095
2.283
0.333
0.423
42
0.265
0
41
7.723
<0.001***
1.683
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Figure 7

Cognitive heuristics and biases with M and σ
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Finally, to assess the changes in AC behavior, paired t-tests were run on all preand post-workshop compliance indicators (Table 47). All five compliance indicators
demonstrated significant change from pre- to post-workshop. It was interesting to note
that the most frequently implemented security changes were ones that the UXA had
complete control over including the following: server patching, local firewall
implementation, and MFA implementation. The two lowest scoring behavioral changes
were for security changes that required interfacing with the organization’s IS team
(Tenable Nessus and Splunk implementations). Figure 8 provides a graphical
representation of the means for each of the compliance indicators before and after the
workshop.
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Table 47
Compliance T-Test Results (N=42)
COMPL1

COMPL2

COMPL3 COMPL4 COMPL5

Before Mean
After Mean
Before Variance
After Variance
Pearson Correlation
df
t
P (T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail

23.817
70.770
1410.759
1346.618
0.423
41
7.625
<0.001***
1.683

18.668
81.081
678.934
867.276
0.239
41
11.779
<0.001***
1.683

8.149
14.575
419.159
722.818
0.824
41
2.721
0.005**
1.683

19.708
63.961
536.833
1610.410
0.462
41
7.989
<0.001***
1.683

23.462
94.697
489.736
123.446
-0.250
41
17.014
<0.001***
1.683

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Figure 8

Compliance metrics with M and SE
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Findings
For hypotheses H1-3, the paired t-statistics were used to assess significance. To
test hypotheses H4a-H8b the data from the PLS-MGA multigroup bootstrapped path
analysis results were used to assess path significance. Hypotheses that were accepted
were H1, H3, H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d, H6b, and H7b (Table 48). H2, H4a, H4b, H6a, H6c,
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H6d, H7a, H8a, and H8b were rejected. These results indicated that the workshop, ISC,
and security update emails did have a significant impact on the use of AH, and CB but
not OB.
Table 48
Hypotheses responses
Hypothesis
H1: ISKS -> AH
H2: ISKS -> OB
H3: ISKS -> CB
H4a: AH -> TA-PS
H4b: AH -> TA-PV
H5a: OB -> TA-PS
H5b: OB -> TA-PV
H5c: OB -> CA-SE
H5d: OB -> CA-RE
H6a: CB -> TA-PS
H6b: CB -> TA-PV
H6c: CB -> CA-SE
H6d: CB -> CA-RE
H7a: TA-PS -> AC
H7b: TA-PV -> AC
H8a: CA-RE -> AC
H8b: CA-SE -> AC

t
3.914
-2.353
7.723
0.634
0.661
1.678
2.006
6.956
6.647
0.78
2.006
0.702
1.378
0.592
7.394
1.235
1.542

p
<0.001***
0.01
<0.001***
0.263
0.254
0.047*
0.022*
<0.001***
<0.001***
0.218
<0.001***
0.241
0.084
0.277
<0.001***
0.108
0.062

Accept/Reject
Accepted
Rejected
Accepted
Rejected
Rejected
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Rejected
Accepted
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
Accepted
Rejected
Rejected

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Summary
The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an
ISC, and periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive
heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior. To
accomplish this, participants completed a survey prior to the intervention. Additionally,
AC behavior data points were collected from script, Tenable Nessus, Splunk, and
organizational databases. The pre-workshop data were evaluated using SmartPLS to
assess the reliability and validity of the indicators and constructs, as well as the
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significance of path coefficients in the model. Ninety days following the workshop, ISC,
and security emails, participants completed a post-workshop survey, and AC data points
were collected again. This post-workshop data were evaluated in SmartPLS. Following
those two analyses, a multigroup analysis was completed using the merged before and
after data. This analysis provided the significant path coefficients that were used to
answer hypotheses H4a-H8b. T-Tests were used to evaluate changes in AC, OB, and CB
to answer H1-H3. Based on these analyses, eight hypotheses were accepted, and nine
hypotheses were rejected.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Overview
This chapter includes conclusions that were drawn from the data analysis
followed by a discussion about the study’s limitations, strengths, and weaknesses. Next,
implications of this research on organizational security training are discussed. Finally,
recommendations for future research are identified. This chapter closes with a concise
summary of the study.
Conclusions
The goal was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an
ISC, and periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive
heuristics, biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior.
Based on the t-statistical analysis, the use of AH and CB were significantly influenced by
the security workshop, ISC, and security update emails. This finding is encouraging as it
implied that changes in IS behavior can be accomplished through IS training.
Unfortunately, OB did not meet the statistical cutoff for significance. It did, however,
have a statistically significant influence on TA-PS, TA-PV, CA-SE, and CA-RE. It is
possible that a larger sample size might have increased the significance and demonstrated
how OB was influenced by ISKS. Based on the PLS multigroup analysis, OB and CB did
have significant effects on TA-PS, TA-PV, CA-SE, and CA-RE.
In the post-group analysis, CA-SE had a negative impact on AC (-0.363). This
was unexpected since CA-SE has been found to have a positive impact on behavioral
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intention (Vance et al., 2012). One possible explanation is that the UXA with high CA-SE
feel it was unnecessary to make additional changes to their servers to prevent security
breaches. Also, in the post-group analysis, TA-PS and TA-PV had a negative impact on
AC (-0.196 and -0.128 respectively). While these values are not very strong it is curious
to note that increased TA-PS or TA-PV resulted in reduced compliance. It was possible
that this was due to the increased awareness of the potential problems that the UXA must
mitigate resulting in a sense of being overwhelmed and throwing up their hands in defeat.
Also, in the post-group analysis, it was interesting that, as the use of OB increases there is
a small increase in AC. This may be due to the substantial specific indirect effect (0.335)
from OB->CA-RE->AC. The negative relationship of OB and TA-PV (0.751) seems
appropriate since OB makes one feel invulnerable. The positive effect of OB on TA-PS
(0.338) may be due UXA feeling optimistic regarding the possibility their servers may be
breached but still understanding that a breach would be severe for the organization and
the individual.
In the multigroup analysis, the most significant influencer of AC was TA-PV (0.864). Two considerations that may have resulted in this strongly negative relationship.
First, the UXAs may have been overwhelmed by the vulnerabilities facing them which
could resulted in a failure to implement security measures. Another consideration could
be problems associated with the survey questions used. As noted earlier, Cronbach’s α
and ρ were below statistical requirements for the four TA-PV questions. AH had a small
negative influence on TA-PS (-0.093) and a small positive influence on TA-PV (0.070).
CA-RE had a negative influence on AC (-0.107). This is contrary to other research which
found that CA-RE was a positive influence on compliance intention (Siponen et al., 2014,
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Vance et al., 2012). CA-SE had a positive impact on AC (0.149). This is in line with prior
research where individual CA-SE was positive related to compliance intention (Safa et
al., 2016; Siponen et al., 2014, Vance et al., 2012). CB had a negative influence on CARE (-0.169), CA-SE (-0.085), and TA-PS (-0.120). This may be due to the education and
alerts challenging the CB and resulting in reduced CA-RE, CA-SE, and TA-PS. ISKS had
a weak positive impact on AH (0.121), CB (0.098), and a strong positive influence on OB
(0.499). The workshop and security updates may have increased participant’s alertness to
vulnerability reports in the news which may have resulted in increased availability of
incidents. The strong positive impact of ISKS on OB may indicate that the education
raised awareness of tools and methods of securing their servers. This is a positive change
as it indicates that the education does help UXAs increase awareness and improve the
security of their servers. TA-PS had a weak positive influence on AC (0.049). It seems
logical that increased TA-PS of the impact of a breach would positively influence
compliance behavior. TA-PV had a strong negative impact on AC (-0.864). As mentioned
earlier, this may be due to a sense of being overwhelmed by the number of vulnerabilities
and risks facing the UXAs and their deciding that they unable to make the changes
needed. This result may also be due to the problems related to the survey questions for
TA-PV. Finally, for the multigroup analysis, TA-PV had a strong negative effect on AC (0.864). This may be attributed to the problems associated with the questions previously
mentioned, it may be the result of UXA’s being overwhelmed by the work facing them, or
it could be related to the independent, free-thinking nature of UXA’s in resisting control
by the organization (Markowitz, 2016).
One strength of this study was the use of AC metrics rather than relying on
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reported behavioral intention. These metrics allowed for an assessment of actual security
changes made by the UXAs following the workshop, ISC, and security update emails. It
was encouraging that all the behavioral metrics analyzed showed significant change
between pre-workshop and post-workshop analysis. COMPL3 (local firewall) and
COMPL5 (patching) had the highest degree of change based on the t-statistics.
Interestingly, these two actions were actions the UXA could take on their own with no
interaction with the IS team. COMPL2 (Tenable) and COMPL4 (MFA) required minor
interaction with the IS team in that the UXA had to request their servers be registered.
This request was usually performed via an email sent to the IS team requesting the
servers be added. After that, however, no interaction with the security team was necessary
and security scans could be run and viewed by the UXA at their leisure. COMPL1
(centralized log management), demonstrated the lowest change in behavior between preand post-workshop. This metric required sending server log data to the IS team via syslog
forwarding. That means that the interaction level, effort required, and data exposure were
significantly higher than the other metrics. This level of data sharing may not have been
desirable to the UXAs outside of the central IT organization which could account for this
metric being the lowest compliance change. Additionally, changes that involved the IS
team, may have been limited by the 90-day period of the study. Although quarterly
analysis of security metrics was recommended by Jaquith (2007) that time period may
not have allowed for the significant number of requests and project load that the IS team
experienced after the security workshop. Project delays may have resulted in reduced
compliance scores. With additional time, allowing for the project implementation delays
of IS team, COMPL1, COMPL2, and COMPL4 implementation may have shown greater
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degree of change.
One of the greatest challenges facing this study was the number of participants.
UXAs across the institution tend to be very isolated within their own fiefdoms where they
maintain complete control. The workshop had 60 individuals that participated but
investigation showed that some were not UXAs, and a few were managers and directors
that did not administer any servers. This discovery dropped the total participant count to
42 UXAs. While this number still met the levels recommended by Hair et al. (2017) for a
PLS-SEM analysis, it may have limited the statistical analyses and generalizability of the
results.
It was noted in the data analysis that the four TA-PV questions did not reach
significance levels for Cronbach’s α, ρ, and AVE. The questions was pulled from work by
Hanus and Wu (2016), one question was from the work of Siponen et al. (2014), one
question was from the work of Ifinedo (2012), and a final question was developed based
on the recommendation of a pilot-tester. While the questions were deemed sufficient by
pilot testers, it appears that the four questions did not combine into reliable indicators for
the TA-PV construct. The AH survey questions were developed for this study and
reviewed by the SME pilot-testers. While VIF and HTMT evaluated all the AH indicators
as meeting collinearity constraints, the Cronbach’s α was still below the statistical
requirement. Last, several participants indicated that there was some confusion regarding
the CB question used in the survey. Due to the confusion, the description associated with
the question was clarified for the post-workshop survey. At that point, however, the
participants had already experienced the question which may have impacted the choices
they made.
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After the workshop, the ISC was instantiated and made available to participants to
allow them to use Metasploit to breach a vulnerable Linux VM. Unfortunately, only 38%
of the participants completed the server breaching exercise in the four hours following
the workshop. The following week several participants asked for the ISC to be restarted
for a few hours, but this only resulted in an additional 4% increase in participation in the
Metasploit lab. If the ISC could have remained running 24/7 for the weeks following the
workshop, UXA would have had significantly more opportunity to use the Metasploit lab.
Unfortunately, due to the cost of running the scenario in AWS, it was not deemed possible
to run the lab continuously. Finally, had the workshop been in-person as initially planned
it would have been easier to encourage participation in the ISC. Unfortunately, due to
COVID-19, the work sites had been closed and remote training was required.
Implications
This study demonstrated the influence of security training and knowledge sharing
on the use of cognitive heuristics and biases of a unique group of systems administrators.
UXA have sometimes been generalized by IS teams as cowboys and renegades. In the
institution where the study was performed the UXAs are spread out geographically and
organizationally. Many participants managed a handful of servers with minimal
interaction with the IS team. The security workshop brought together many of these
individuals from across the institution to help them become aware of the vulnerabilities
facing UNIX servers and the risks associated with not implementing security.
Additionally, the workshop introduced participants to the key actions they can implement
and the tools they can use to protect their UNIX servers. The post-workshop security
updates provided news about newly identified vulnerabilities, recent breaches, and more
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guidance on how to implement security tools discussed in the workshop. The goal of the
post-workshop security updates was to maintain security awareness and encourage the
implementation of security controls. The feedback from participants regarding the content
of the workshop and security updates was consistently positive. The interaction of the
participants in the new Microsoft Teams channel was also encouraging. Clearly, from an
organizational perspective, institutions that have UXAs need to provide security
awareness training that is relevant and provides the UXAs the knowledge and tools they
need to improve the security of UNIX servers. Additionally, there seems to be a desire for
a sense of community even among the distributed UXAs in the organization. The periodic
emails asking for other UXAs’ advice and the use of the Teams channel demonstrated that
shared knowledge helped everyone secure their servers. Last, the IS team needs to try to
approach UXAs to help them integrate into the organizations overall IS strategy. At the
organization studied, the IS team is largely focused on the threats and vulnerabilities
facing Windows servers. This lack of UNIX focus by the IS team leaves some UXAs
feeling overlooked and underappreciated and could lead to dangerous levels of noncompliance. The workshop, ISC, and security update emails demonstrated the value for
UXAs to connect with the IS team. Additionally, it helped show the importance of
embracing IS tools that protect the organization.
Recommendations
Several recommendations can be made to further this line of research. First,
increasing the number of participants would increase the statistical relevance of the study
and could potentially demonstrate the impact that OB has on actual security compliance
behavior. The challenge is that most organizations have a limited number of UXAs so
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doing this research across organizations might be necessary. This would, however,
introduce the new challenge of gathering the behavioral metrics on servers in different
organizations. It is possible that a scoring script could be developed that runs on all the
participant’s servers and they send the results to the researcher. Second, setting up the
ISC on premise would allow it to remain operational for the weeks following the
workshop potentially increasing participation. The hope in completing the ISC was to
demonstrate to the UXA how easy it was to breach a vulnerable Linux VM using
Metasploit. Unfortunately, the limited availability of the ISC seemed to reduce
participation. Third, modifying the TA-PV questions to come from a single, reliable, and
validated survey instrument may resolve the Cronbach’s α and ρ problems associated
with this study’s TA-PV indicator questions. Fourth, it might be helpful to do additional
testing of the AH questions in an attempt to improve their reliability and validity. Fifth,
performing this study as a longitudinal study over a longer period of time may allow for
additional implementation of security controls. Finally, performing this study with both
Windows administrators and UXAs might afford an opportunity to assess the differences
between the two groups in terms of their perceptions of security, vulnerability, severity,
and overall security strategy they each employ.
Summary
The implementation of security controls is crucial to the defense of computing
systems (Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). Organizations are at risk if employees
do not follow ISPs and breaches occur (HIPAA Journal, 2020; Ponemon Institute, 2019;
Yoo et al., 2018). Many organizations’ servers are Windows based, but a significant
number of larger, back-end servers are UNIX based to capitalize on increased server

126
processing power, reliability, security, and clustering technology (Bajgoric, 2006;
Beuchelt, 2017a; Hussain et al., 2015). Linux servers represent more than 70% of the web
servers used on our planet (W3Techs, 2020). While many vulnerabilities and breaches
involve Windows servers and applications, the proliferation of Linux and UNIX servers
and their use for back-end databases make them tempting targets for attackers (Newman,
2019; Shrivastava, 2018). Unfortunately, due to the open nature of Linux and UNIX
systems, they have a significant number of known vulnerabilities and must be patched
and properly secured to mitigate risk (CVE Details, 2020). The problem is that some
UXAs fail to completely implement organizational ISP due to the use of cognitive
heuristics and biases that lead them to perceive lower threat levels facing Linux and
UNIX servers (Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). This failure may leave their
servers open to systems disruption, loss of proprietary data, cause harm to organizational
reputation, and create financial loss due to litigation and fines levied against their
organizations (Donaldson et al., 2015; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). The goal of this
research was to empirically assess the effect of a focused SETA workshop, an ISC, and
periodic security update emails on UXAs’ knowledge sharing, use of cognitive heuristics,
biases, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and ISP compliance behavior.
The following research question guided the investigation: How does a focused
SETA workshop, ISC, and regular security updates, designed for UXAs, influence their
ISKS, use of cognitive heuristics and biases, and actual ISP compliance behavior? The
use of cognitive heuristics and biases can negatively impact threat appraisal and coping
appraisals (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Being unaware of the risks
facing their servers may result in insufficiently protected UNIX servers due to failure to
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comply with ISPs (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; Renaud, 2012).
While generalized SETA programs are useful in organizations for staff-wide training,
developing a focused SETA programs and ISC, aimed specifically for the job tasks of
UXA, may improve engagement and ISP compliance behavior (Chen et al., 2018; KiAries & Faily, 2017). This research helped to develop an understanding of how a SETA
programs, ISC, and periodic security update emails, influenced UXA use of the AH, OB,
and CB.
The research took place in several phases. First, the research problem was
identified, and a literature review was performed to demonstrate the need and to place
this research in the existing body of knowledge. Next, a survey instrument was
developed, based largely on prior research, and tested with a pilot group of subject matter
experts. After results were returned the survey instrument was modified. The final
instrument had 25 questions related to the following constructs: CA-SE, CA-RE, TA-PV,
TA-PS, ISKS, OB, AH, and CB. The compliance metrics were also developed during this
period. The metrics were based on materials covered during the workshop and reinforced
through the security update emails. The five data points evaluated included: the
percentage of an administrator's servers sending data to centralized log management
system, the percentage of an administrator's servers with centrally recorded Tenable
Nessus data, the percentage of an administrator's servers blocking telnet/ftp ports
(TCP/UDP 21, 23) and remote services ports (TCP/UDP 512-514), the percentage of an
administrator's servers using multi-factor authentication, and the percentage of an
administrator's servers that have had recent software updates. These data points were
collected through elevated security access to the Tenable Nessus, Splunk, and
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organization secure secret databases. Scripts were also used to collect some data points
that were unavailable through Tenable.
During this period, the security workshop was developed. The goals of the
workshop were to:
6) Help maintain cybersecurity awareness by:
a. Discussing the scope and impact of data breaches,
b. Learning about key websites that provide critical and timely information
about software and hardware vulnerabilities,
i. Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon, 2019),
ii. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (n.d.),
iii. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil
Rights Breach Portal,
iv. National Vulnerability Database.
c. Identifying different types of cyber attackers and their motivations,
d. Learning about cyber-attacks made against our organization,
e. Discussing the cost of a HIPAA breach,
f. Discussing our implementation of Defense in Depth
i. Firewalls/Intrusion prevention systems (IPS),
ii. Security Event/Information Management (SIEM),
iii. Identity and rights management,
iv. Anti-phishing campaigns,
v. Advanced endpoint protection,
vi. Threat intelligence,
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vii. Behavioral analytics,
viii. Penetration testing,
ix. Cyber forensics.
7) Help participants mitigate security risk for their servers by:
a. Reviewing the phases of cyber-attacks and threats typically used to exploit
servers,
i. Reconnaissance,
ii. Intrusion,
iii. Exploitation,
iv. Escalate privilege,
v. Lateral movement,
vi. Anti-forensics,
vii. Denial of service,
viii. Data exfiltration.
b. Discussing the types of cyber attackers
i. Cyber criminals – identity theft and financial fraud with goal of
monetary gain,
ii. Script kiddies – minimal skills, use available exploit kits,
iii. Brokers – uncover vulnerabilities in software or systems and sell
the information,
iv. Insiders – employees, partners, and contractors motivated by
perceived wrong,
v. Competitors – individuals and organizations seeking to gain
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competitive advantage,
vi. Cyberterrorists – disable and disrupt network or computing
infrastructure,
vii. Organized crime – highly funded, high-level of skill, seek financial
gain,
viii. Hacktivists – political, social, or principle-based agenda,
ix. State-sponsored attackers / nation state – highly funded and skilled,
intelligence gathering or service disruption, focus is government
interests.
c. Identifying the top threats and risks facing our organization’s servers,
i. Key threats and vulnerabilities
1. Compromised credentials and privilege escalation,
2. Web service exploitation,
3. Server vulnerabilities that permit remote code execution,
4. Cryptography weaknesses,
5. Deserialization,
6. Scripting,
7. Malware, fileless malware, and rootkits.
ii. Key exploits facing servers
1. Buffer and stack overflows,
2. Memory corruption,
3. Race conditions,
4. SQL injection.
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d. Identifying 12 activities, settings, and tools participants can use to improve
the safety and security of their servers,
i. Minimize services / disable unwanted services / limit open ports to
reduce vulnerabilities and attack vectors,
ii. Remove unnecessary software to reduce the number of
vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors,
iii. Keep Linux/UNIX kernel and other software as up to date as
possible,
iv. Ensure strong password policies and account management,
v. Kernel hardening to protect against attacks,
vi. Configure the server’s local firewall,
vii. Disk security – file integrity checking, file system encryption,
viii. Configure SSH security settings,
ix. Implement Security Enhanced Linux,
x. Configure centralized log management,
xi. Perform monthly vulnerability scans on servers,
xii. Run Malware detection software to detect worms, viruses, and
rootkits.
e. Learning about available enterprise tools and other locally administered
tools participants can use for vulnerability analysis and security
monitoring.
8) See how to perform basic penetration testing and server analysis using common
tools by:

132
a. Using nmap for enumeration, scanning, and vulnerability analysis on
servers,
i. Ping scan,
ii. Version scan,
iii. Vulnerability scan.
b. Using Wireshark for network traffic analysis for security monitoring and
problem resolution,
i. Search and filter options,
ii. Protocol inspection,
iii. Live network traffic capture,
iv. Offline network traffic analysis
c. Using the Metasploit Framework in action and its utility to identify,
enumerate, and exploit a server
i. Reconnaissance & Scanning/Enumeration,
ii. Exploitation demo:
1. VSFTPD,
2. Ssh,
3. Mysql,
4. Samba.
9) Access a cloud-based Cyber lab to:
d. Get hands-on experience using nmap and the Metasploit Framework
(MSF) in a secure, cloud-based virtual environment,
e. Identify, enumerate, breach, and exploit a Linux VM using MSF tools,
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f. Compete to find the most flags on the Linux target machine.
10) Connect with other UNIX administrators to increase knowledge sharing and
collaboration:
a. Joining a new Microsoft Team’s Team for UXA in the organization.
Also during this period, the Linux-based Metasploit scenario was designed,
created, and tested in the EDURange online AWS environment. Once IRB approval was
obtained from both organizations, the IS team provided a comprehensive listing of all
UNIX servers in the institution. This data were analyzed to identify UXAs across the
institution. All of these UXAs were invited to participate in the workshop and ISC. Fortytwo participants met the study’s requirements and completed all study protocols. In the
next phase, participants completed the Qualtrics survey.
Once all pre-workshop data were collected, the 2.5-hour workshop was scheduled
and held via secure Zoom session due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Sixty individuals
participated in the workshop but only 42 participants were UXAs and used for this study.
Immediately following the workshop the ISC was made available to the participants. Due
to the cost of running the multiple scenarios in AWS, access was only provided for the
four hours immediately following the workshop. The following week, at the request of
several participants, the ISC was restarted for one afternoon. Participation in the ISC was
limited to 42%. Over the next 90-days, six security update emails were sent to
participants. These emails provided an update regarding recently identified UNIX
vulnerabilities, relevant CERT alerts, recent breach announcements, an invitation to join
the new Microsoft Teams group set up for UXA collaboration, as well as guidance on the
implementation of the Tripwire and Rootkit Hunter applications. The goals of the security
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update emails were to maintain current cybersecurity awareness, increase security
knowledge sharing, and reinforce security recommendations made during the workshop.
Three months after the workshop, an email was sent to all participants to complete the
post-workshop survey. Additionally, the participants’ servers were reanalyzed to quantify
the changes made by the UXA during the study.
During the analysis phase of the research, the pre-workshop survey results and
behavioral data points were analyzed using SmartPLS. PLS-SEM has been used
extensively to evaluate complex models in IS (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Rhee et
al., 2012; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Safa et al., 2016). Post-workshop survey results and
behavioral data were also analyzed in SmartPLS. Finally, a multigroup analysis was done
by combining the data from pre-workshop and post-workshop and creating data groups.
Each analysis included PLS analysis, reliability and validity tests, bootstrap analysis, and
blindfolding analysis. The multigroup analysis also included PLS-MGA analysis. For
hypothesis testing of H1-3, the paired t-statistics were used to assess significance. To test
hypotheses H4a-H8b the data from the PLS-MGA multigroup bootstrapped path analysis
results were used to assess path significance. Hypotheses that were accepted were H1,
H3, H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d, H6b, and H7b. H2, H4a, H4b, H6a, H6c, H6d, H7a, H8a, and
H8b were rejected. These results indicated that the workshop, ISC, and security update
emails did have a significant impact on the use of AH, and CB but not OB.
Additionally, it was noted that all five of the behavioral data points had
statistically significant increases in IS compliance behavior. Those data points that could
be done solely by the UXA without the participation of the IS team (local firewall
implementation, patching, and MFA implementation) showed higher rates of change than
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those that required action by the IS team (integration with Tenable Nessus, and Splunk
integration).
This study demonstrated the need to consider cognitive biases and heuristics when
evaluating the most effect way to improve ISP compliance. It also demonstrated the
importance of specialized IS training in the form of a UXA-focused workshop, ISC, and
security update emails to increase awareness and improve compliance. The ISKS had a
statistically significant impact on all five of the evaluated UXAs compliance behaviors.
UXAs use of the AH and CB were influenced by the workshop, ISC, and security update
emails. While the influence of the ISKS on OB did not reach an acceptable significance
level, the bias did demonstrate significant impact to all four elements of PMT, namely
TA-PV, TA-PS, CA-RE, and CA-SE. This research adds to the body of knowledge related
to specialized SETA program development, the integration of cognitive biases and
heuristics with the PMT framework, and analysis of actual security behavior to assess
changes after the ISKS intervention.
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Appendix A
Information Security Survey Form
Welcome!
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this UNIX administrator workshop and research
project! If you are receiving this survey, it means that you have completed and returned
the informed consent form and are ready to participate in this UNIX security workshop
and cyber lab.
As a reminder, my name is John McConnell. I am an IT Technical Manager and a
doctoral candidate in Information Systems in the College of Computing and Engineering
at Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation chair is Martha Snyder, Ph.D., from
Nova Southeastern University. My research is a study on UNIX systems administrator
perceptions about information security, security training, understanding of security risks
and vulnerabilities, organizational support, and policy compliance. The Institutional
Review Board approval number for this research project is (JHH Application No.:
IRB00240988, NSU Application No.: 2020-60).
Completing this survey is an important part of this research project and we appreciate
your help in completing this survey. No identifying information will be included in the
research report and your responses will be confidential. It should take no longer than 10
minutes to answer the questions. Several questions have a time limitation on them. For
those questions please make your choices as quickly as possible in the time provided.
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact John McConnell
(jmcconn3@jhmi.edu or jm3967@mynsu.nova.edu) or 410-935-5657. You may also
contact my dissertation chair, Martha Snyder, Ph.D. at smithmt@nova.edu or 954-2622074.
For each question, please honestly rate your level of agreement from strongly disagree (1)
to strongly agree (7).
Please click the link below to begin the online survey.
Q5. I believe I have the expertise to implement preventative measures to stop
unauthorized people from getting my organization's confidential information stored on
my servers.
Q6. I believe I have the skills to implement preventative measures to stop unauthorized
people from damaging my servers.
Q7. I believe I can configure my server to provide good protection from software attacks.
Q8. Enabling security measures on my servers will prevent users from gaining
unauthorized access to important personal, financial, or patient information.
Q9. The preventative measures available to me to stop people from gaining access to my
organization's servers and data are adequate.
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Q10. Frequently applying security patches on my operating system is an effective way of
preventing hacker attacks on my servers.
Q11. My servers could be at risk of having Malware, virus, or similar infection
Q12. My organization could be subjected to a serious information security threat.
Q13. I believe that trying to protect my company's servers and information will mitigate
the risk of illegal access to organizational data.
Q14. I believe that all computer systems are potentially vulnerable to malicious activity
and compromise.
Q15. An information security breach in my organization would be cause serious
complications for my organization and me.
Q16. I believe that having my servers infected with malware, a virus, or similar infection
would cause serious complications for my organization and me.
Q17. An information security breach in my organization would cause serious
complications for my organization and me.
Q18. I frequently share my information security knowledge in my team in order to
decrease information security risk.
Q19. I think information security knowledge sharing with my team helps me to
understand the usefulness of information security policies in my organization.
Q20. I think sharing information security knowledge is a valuable practice in my
organization.
Q21. My organization has the tools in place to mitigate information security threats.
Q22. My organization executable security practices to mitigate information security
threats.
Q23. The likelihood that my servers will be disrupted due to information security
breaches in the next 12 months is low.
Q24. On the next screen you will be presented with four questions. You will be limited to
30 seconds to select your answers. The choices are the same as the previous responses 1strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-somewhat disagree, 4-neither agree nor disagree, 5somewhat agree, 6-agree, and 7-strongly agree.
Q25. <Undisplayed timing>
Q26. I believe Microsoft Windows servers have more vulnerabilities than Linux/UNIX
servers.
Q27. I believe there are more security vulnerabilities, alerts, and patches related to
Microsoft Windows servers than Linux/UNIX servers.
Q28. I believe a Microsoft Windows server containing Protected Health Information
(PHI) is likely to be breached.
Q29. I believe a Linux/UNIX server containing Protected Health Information (PHI) is
likely to be breached.
Q30. Scenario Question: Your organization plans on implementing a new web server to
provide customers’ access to HIPAA protected PHI data. In order to provide the highest
level of security, would you recommend the web server be implemented on the Microsoft
Windows or UNIX/Linux operating system? UNIX/Linux
Windows
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Q31. On the next screen you will be presented with additional information you can
choose to review that you might consider regarding your recommendation. There are 12
data points that are either pro (in favor of) or con (against) each operating system. You
must choose at least one item and may choose up to 6 items. You are limited to 20
seconds to make your selection. Once you make your selection, click the arrow to move
to the next screen. At that time you will be shown the additional information you
requested.
Q32. Please select at least one and no more than six additional pieces of information
below.
UNIX/Linux (Pro)
UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro)
Windows (Con)
UNIX/Linux (Con) UNIX/Linux (Pro)
Windows (Con)
Windows (Pro)
UNIX/Linux (Pro)
UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro)
Windows (Con)
Q33. <Undisplayed timing>
The following are displayed based on display logic. Only items selected in Q32 are
displayed.
Q34. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - UNIX/Linux servers can be configured with higher amounts
of memory and CPUs making them significantly more powerful than Windows servers.
Q35. UNIX/LINUX (Con) - Porting of applications to UNIX/Linux distributions is not
the focus of many software companies.
Q36. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - There are fewer demands on the hardware due to reduced
operating systems overhead in UNIX/Linux.
Q37. UNIX/Linux (Con) - Several professional office programs (i.e. Microsoft Windows,
Microsoft SharePoint, and Microsoft Visio) do not work with UNIX/Linux.
Q38. UNIX/Linux (Pro) - Remote function access is integrated into the native operating
system on UNIX/Linux distributions (shell and terminal).
Q39. UNIX/Linux (Con) - UNIX/Linux can be more difficult to administer due to its
command line nature.
Q40. Windows (Pro) - A Windows server is easier for new systems administrators due to
the intuitive operations of the graphical user interface.
Q41. Windows (Con) - The licensing costs for Windows can be high and can increase
with each user.
Q42. Windows (Pro) - Windows is compatible with popular Microsoft programs like
SharePoint, Visio, and Exchange.
Q43. Windows (Con) - Windows servers are very vulnerable to malware.
Q44. Windows (Pro) - There are many skilled individuals that can fill Windows systems
administrator positions.
Q45. Windows (Con) - The use of mandatory graphical user interface on Windows
servers results in significant resource utilization for basic operating systems function.
Q46. Based on the additional information you received, which operating system would
you suggest for this Web server?
UNIX/Linux
Windows
Q47. What category includes your age?
17-24
25-34
35-44
45-65
66 or over
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Q48. Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! Your responses will help us
understand how systems administrator perceive information security, security training,
security risks and vulnerabilities, and security policy compliance!
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Appendix B
UNIX Administrator Interactive Security Challenge
Course Title: UXA Interactive Security Challenge
Delivery Method: Windows or Linux computer and Internet access
Overarching Goal: The overarching goal of this security challenge is to increase
security awareness and ISP policy compliance by developing skills needed to do network
and server enumeration to facilitate exploitation of a Linux VM in a segregated, cloud
environment.
Background: UXAs have the highest privilege levels and access to the vast amount of
confidential PHI and PII stored on their servers (Beuchelt, 2017b; Kraemer & Carayon,
2007). They are responsible for operating system installation, configuration, patching,
user management, monitoring, data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster
recovery, and testing (Beuchelt, 2017b; Inshanally, 2018; Santara, 2013). SETA programs
are a means for organizations to minimize the risk of insider caused security failures
(Burns et al., 2015; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017). Users are the weakest link for information
security and SETA programs can help to reduce the potential attack surface of
organizations by improving the ability of users to identify and prevent information
security breaches (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gardner & Thomas, 2014). Developing an
understanding of the tools used to perform penetration testing may clarify the importance
of securing UNIX servers.
Target Audience: The target audience for this security workshop is organizational
UXAs.
Length of Course: 2.5 hours
Challenge Description: The goal of the UXA ISC is to develop hands-on skills in
penetration testing using tools learned during the security workshop. Learning and using
the tools of a penetration tester will encourage participants to think like the hacker so that
they develop a security mindset aware of the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities facing their
servers and organization. By learning about the common tools and how easily one can
identify and enumerate server vulnerabilities the challenge may encourage the
development of an information security culture in the UNIX team. The hands-on
workshop will demonstrate the need for constant monitoring of vulnerabilities and
ultimately the vital need to secure UNIX servers in the organization to prevent loss.
Providing an isolated, remote lab environment is an effective training method for systems
administrators (Herold, 2011).
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ISC Setup: Two Linux VMs will be instantiated for each participant: a participant VM
(meta_nat) and a target server (metasploitable). A private subnet will be created between
the two VMs. Also an Internet-accessible public subnet for logging/communicating with
EDURange. The metasploitable VM is a metasploitable3 image from Rapid7.
Module Learning Objectives: At the end of this ISC module, the participants will:
1) be able to perform network reconnaissance, server enumeration, port and service
enumeration using nmap to identify a vulnerable Linux server on an isolated
network;
2) be able to run the Metasploit framework on a Linux VM;
3) be able to identify a relevant exploit to use to gain command line access to a
Linux server.
Module Setup: For this module, participants will scan the network segment, identify the
vulnerable server (metasploitable), and enumerate potential exploits. Then participants
will breach metasploitable using as many exploits they can find. Once participants gain
access to the VM they will locate, download, decode, and hash CTF target files. Hash
values will be used in the EDURange scenario grading system to assess completion of the
module.
Learning Objective 1: Participants will be able to perform network reconnaissance,
server enumeration, port and service enumeration using nmap to identify a
vulnerable Linux server on an enclosed, cloud environment.
1) Participants will use the Linux VM (meta_nat).
2) Participants will use nmap scan to identify servers, open ports, services on ports,
and OS guesses on servers in the isolated EDURange network segment
(metasploitable).
3) Participants will identify potential targets (IP, open ports, and open services) in
the virtual network.
Learning Objective 2: Participants will learn how to perform a server attack using
the Metasploit Framework.
1) Participants will locate and start the Metasploit Framework in their VM.
2) Participants will identify an exploit in the Metasploit framework they will use on
the target Linux VM (metasploitable).
3) Using Metasploit the participants will gain login access to the Linux VM.
4) Once participants gain access to the VM they will locate, download, decode, and
hash CTF target files. Hash values will be used in the EDURange scenario
grading system to assess completion of the module.
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Appendix C
ISC Instruction Sheet
Metasploitable Exercise Guide
Description
Metasploitable poses the challenge of identifying a vulnerable server,
enumerating the services and ports, and using the Metasploit Framework to gain access to
the server. Finally, you will locate CTF target cards and provide the hashes of the image
files for scoring.
Background
Identifying servers on your network and determining their vulnerabilities is an
important skill for penetration testers and system administrators. Using tools, like nmap
and the Metasploit Framework, you can learn about the threats to your servers. The nmap
tool, or network mapper, is a comprehensive, free, open source network scanning tool. It
is used by penetration testers, network administrators, and hackers to examine a server. It
can be used on a single host or a network segment/IP range. Nmap manipulates TCP flags
to elicit information. By analyzing TCP and UDP probes and comparing them against
fingerprints of defined responses nmap can:
•

detect/discover live hosts on a network (server/host discovery),

•

identify active UDP and TCP ports (port enumeration)

•

identify software version information for open ports (service discovery)

•

identify operating system information

•

detect potential vulnerabilities and security holes.
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The Metasploit Framework is a part of Kali Linux or can be installed separately
on Windows or Linux/UNIX operating systems. It provides a platform that can be used
for penetration testing. Metasploit can help to identify, validate, and exploit known
vulnerabilities in operating systems, applications, and hardware. It can also be used to
develop new exploits.
Three key components are:
•

Exploits – the method of exploiting a vulnerability in an asset.

•

Payloads – the code that can be run on a target that has been compromised.

•

Auxiliary modules – the programs that can perform fuzzing, scanning, and
sniffing.

Learning Objectives
At the end of this scenario, the participants will:
1) be able to perform network reconnaissance, server enumeration, port and service
enumeration using nmap to identify a vulnerable Linux server on an isolated
network
2) be able to run the Metasploit framework on a Linux VM
3) be able to identify a relevant exploit to use to gain command line access to a
Linux server
4) locate and hash any of the following cards: 8 of clubs, 3 of hearts, 2 of spades, 10
of spades, king of spades, 10 of clubs, 5 of hearts, 5 of diamonds, 9 of diamonds,
6 of clubs, joker, ace of clubs, 8 of hearts, 7 of diamonds.
Instructions
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Connect to the NAT VM in EDURange (AWS) using ssh with the user id and
password you were provided. Once you have gained knowledge about your VM, you
need to look on the closed network (10.0.*) to find the other VM that is your potential
target. Use nmap to scan the network and find the available server. Once you have
identified the server you then need to gain additional information about the server
including open ports, services running on those ports, versions of software running on
those ports. Again, you can use nmap to perform all these actions. Once you have detailed
as much information about the target as possible, you can turn to the Metasploit
Framework to identify potential exploits and breach the server.
Typical process:
1) Gain info about your VM (Linux commands)
2) Identify the servers on the network segment (nmap ping scan).
3) Identify the open ports and software versions on the target (nmap version scan).
4) Search Metasploit for exploits, auxiliary modules, and payloads for the identified
services.
5) Attempt to gain access to the target server (MSF, Web/SQL Injection)
6) Identify other accounts on the system (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow).
7) Find a way to escalate privilege to gain root access.
8) Locate/find the CTF target files.
9) Perform any work needed on the CTF target files so that you can hash the file
(md5sum).
A key feature of MSF is the ability to search. Below are some examples of searches you
might perform:
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msf5> search ftp
➢ returns exploits, auxiliary modules, and payloads
msf5> search mysql
➢ returns exploits, auxiliary modules, and payloads
msf5> search ssh_login
➢ returns auxiliary modules
Other key MSF commands are:
msf5 > use auxiliary/scanner/ftp/ftp_version
➢ If successful, this would set your context to this exploit. You can see that this
happened by looking at the new prompt.
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/ftp/ftp_version) > show options
➢ Shows you the options that are available for the specific context
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/ftp/ftp_version) > back
➢ Change context back one level
msf5> set RHOSTS ip-paddress
➢ Sets the remote host to be the specific ip-address
msf5> exploit
➢ Attempts the current exploit.
msf5> quit
➢ Exits msfconsole.
You can also run some Linux commands while in the msfconsole including: pwd,
ls, cat. This can be helpful if you want to work with user id files or password files.
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Also, once you are using an exploit that gains you access to a server, you can try
to run OS commands to get additional information.
Hints
Using nmap hints:
•

nmap -sn 10.0.1-50.0-50
o performs a ping scan on all IPs in the specified range
o output indicates all IPs that respond to the ping scan and
o MAC address.

•

nmap -sV 10.0.0.1
o Output includes port, state, service, version for TCP ports, and MAC
address.

•

nmap -sT -sV -sC -v -p ports-to-scan --reason --open ip-address
o Output includes specific ports, states, services, and versions of software
for TCP ports for the specified ip-address.

Gaining access hints:
•

FTP is a great avenue for accessing the system and identifying the usernames.

•

For FTP try the payload: cmd/unix/reverse_perl. Also, to get around a permissions

issue on the server, set SITEPATH /var/www/html/. Get the user list and move on to
the ssh_login exploit.
•

Using an ssh_login scanner is a great way to attempt passwords to gain access.

•

Use a SQL injection to attack a website on the target using lynx (a text browser).

Escalation hints:
•

Gain access to the server and get a dump of the /etc/passwd file to identify users.
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•

Use the ssh_login scanner’s different options to attempt different passwords (i.e.
blank passwords, userid=password, etc.).

•

If you get access to the remote system, check to see if you can use sudo to switch
to root (sudo -s).

•

Get access to the /etc/shadow file to identify password hashes and use John to try
and hack passwords.

SQL Injection hints:
•

There are typical attacks that can be used to enumerate the users on the system.
(And other info if you are diligent!).

•

Incorrectly filtered escape characters (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL_injection):
This form of injection occurs when user input is not filtered for escape
characters and is then passed into an SQL statement. This results in the potential
manipulation of the statements performed on the database by the end-user of the
application.
The following line of code illustrates this vulnerability:
statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + userName + "';"
This SQL code is designed to pull up the records of the specified username
from its table of users. However, if the "userName" variable is crafted in a
specific way by a malicious user, the SQL statement may do more than the code
author intended. For example, setting the "userName" variable as: ' OR '1'='1
renders one of the following SQL statements by the parent language:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '' OR '1'='1';
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SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '' OR '1'='1' -- ';
If this code were to be used in an authentication procedure then this
example could be used to force the selection of every data field (*) from all users
rather than from one specific user name as the coder intended, because the
evaluation of '1'='1' is always true.
It is also possible to use the UNION SELECT to pull data from database
tables using (for example):
' OR 1=1 UNION SELECT null,null,username,password FROM users#
File work hints:
•

Files may be txt, zip, wav, pcapng. And some may be hidden inside files! Some
may be hidden in super-secret directories and not named like a card!

•

Some of the files can be hashed as is to get the answer. Some, however, require
some work.

•

Exfiltrate the files from the target VM to your NAT VM. Then exfiltrated the files
to your local computer to view the files (to verify if they are viewable without
modification or require modifications).

•

Use md5sum to get the hash of the file.

• Tools that might be helpful working on the more difficult files: exiftool, binwalk,
fcrackzip, gimp, Wireshark, base64, and mount.
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Appendix D
Security Update Emails
May UNIX/Linux Security Update
Good afternoon!
As we close out May I wanted to share some security updates with you!
Common Vulnerabilities Update
We talked about the importance of keeping up awareness about vulnerabilities and
how frequently they are identified. To that end, I thought I would share how things have
changed since our meeting on 5/19!
Date
May 19
May 20
May 21
May 22
May 23
May 24
May 25

New
Vulnerabilities
34
40
62
138
25
2
9

Updated
Vulnerabilities
23
32
29
24
43
21
11

Impacted software includes Apache, Docker, json, Python, Fedora, Ubuntu, and
many others. This information is available at: https://cve.mitre.org/cve/data_feeds.html
US-CERT-Alert (AA20-133A) Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities
Take a look at this CERT: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a.
Interestingly, the most exploited vulnerabilities from 2016-2019 were vulnerabilities that
were found in 2012 (1), 2015 (1), 2017 (5), 2018 (2), 2019 (1)! Constant vigilance &
regular patching are key to cybersecurity!
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2020 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report
The 2020 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report was just published. The
report analyzed 32,002 incidents and 3,950 confirmed data breaches.
Key updates relevant to our organization:
•

58% of breaches featured hacking (stolen credentials, backdoor, exploited
vulnerability, brute force, or buffer overflow) – up from 52%

•

Misconfiguration rose to almost 40% for top errors allowing a breach

•

819 incidents and 228 breaches impacted educational institutions

•

798 incidents and 512 breaches impacted healthcare organizations

•

Servers continue to be the top target for hackers in the educational/healthcare
segments

•

Top controls suggested for educational/healthcare institutions: implement a
security awareness program, boundary defense, data protection, and secure
configurations.
•

Implement a Security Awareness and Training Program (CSC 17) Educate users about malicious attacks and accidental breaches.

•

Boundary Defense (CSC 12) - Not just firewalls, this control includes
network monitoring, proxies, and multifactor authentication.

•

Data Protection (CSC 13) – Limit data leakage by controlling access to
sensitive information. Controls in this list include maintaining an
inventory of sensitive information, encrypting sensitive data, and
limiting/controlling access.
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•

Secure Configuration (CSC 5, CSC 11) - Ensure and verify that systems
are configured with only the services and access needed to achieve their
function.

Case of the month
The importance of disabling services, implementing server-based firewalls, and
securing ssh (implementing defense in depth) can be seen in this recent headline from the
news: https://www.cbronline.com/news/aws-servers-hacked-rootkit-in-the-cloud
Join the Dialog – Collaborate!
Join the UNIX/Linux Administrators Microsoft Team to collaborate and
share information amongst your peers in the institutions!
Enterprise Monitoring
If you are interested in implementing Tenable, Splunk, Defender ATP, or other
enterprise tools send an email to the monitoring team and they will contact you!
Stay safe!
June Security Update
Greetings!
I hope this email finds you safe and secure! This email is a follow up to the Linux/UNIX
Security workshop to give you some additional information about what's going on in the
world of Cybersecurity and the impact on us as systems administrators/engineers.
InfraGard FBI Session Info
On May 29th I attended an InfraGard FBI Session whose topic was Securing the
Health Sector: Threats to Vaccine Researchers and Manufacturers. The FBI cyber
division let us know that there has been a significant increase cyber-attacks related to
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COVID 19 research. Targets include academic institutions, biological facilities,
bioscience industries, medical facilities, university laboratories, scientific
collaborations. China is using open source information (i.e. news articles, company
announcements, published research, etc.) to identify potential targets for COVID
research data. The recommendations made by the FBI in order of priority included:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Timely patching of all systems for critical vulnerabilities
Implementing MFA
Monitor web applications for unusual activity
Perform a network baseline analysis

If you are interested in being a part of InfraGard go to this website:
https://www.infragard.org/
Server Patch Management
“In years past, Linux server patch management was often thought of in
terms of “we don’t patch our servers unless there is a reason to upgrade the
version for application compatibility.” This philosophy is no longer appropriate
today because of the downtime that can result from malicious code targeting
known vulnerabilities on unpatched systems and the concerns around governance
and regulatory compliance standards such as HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act) and SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Patch management has
now become an important buzzword in corporate IT organizations and business
offices.” From: Taking A Proactive Approach to Linux Server Patch Management,
n.d., https://www.suse.com/media/whitepaper/suse_linux_patch_management.pdf
Question: Why disable services and add a local firewall?
I was asked this question after our workshop from an experienced systems
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administrator. Honestly, I had to think about it and do a little digging. I also asked
a few “security experts” their thoughts. No security control will be 100%
effective. There is always a chance that some nefarious individual will find a way
around a control. Disabling services, like ftp and telnet, is one way to reduce the
potential attack surface. Adding a local firewall adds an additional layer of
security to the server. To some that seems like overkill, but the truth is our goal as
UNIX/Linux systems administrators is to protect our servers and data the best
way we can. With local firewalls being so easily configurable why not make that
extra effort?
New Linux Vulnerabilities
From 5/26 to 6/14 there were 1053 new vulnerability identified 648 modifications
to known vulnerabilities! Vulnerability counts: Linux 5652/137377 (103 new for
2020), RedHat 11362/137377 (81 new for 2020), Ubuntu 7837/137377 (213 new
for 2020), and AIX 352/137377 (2 new for 2020). These stats are a clear
indication of the necessity to patch regularly!
National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
10 Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities
The article, “The Top 10 Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities You Should Know” by
G. Avner (2019) provides some great information regarding Linux kernel
vulnerabilities. You can check out this article at the following website:
https://resources.whitesourcesoftware.com/blog-whitesource/top-10-linux-kernelvulnerabilities
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Join the Dialog – Collaborate!
Join the UNIX/Linux Administrators Microsoft Team to collaborate and share
information amongst your peers in the institutions!
As always, please email me if you have any questions, comments, suggestions, or
concerns related to Linux/UNIX security!
Stay safe!
July Security Update
Good morning!
I wanted to share another update on what is going on with security!
New ransomware that is targeting Windows and Linux systems
The main targets of Tycoon are organizations in the software and education industries. It
is unusual because it is written in Java and deployed as a trojanized JRE. Also it is
compiled within a Java image file effectively hiding the malicious intention. The article
continues by reaffirming the importance of applying security patches as soon as possible
as this can help to prevent ransomware attacks where hackers exploit known
vulnerabilities. Here is a link to the whole article:
https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-new-ransomware-is-targeting-windows-and-linux-pcswith-a-unique-attack/
Netgear router vulnerability
Do you have a Netgear router at home? If so, you might want to be aware of a new
vulnerability! Looks like they are hoping for a patch to be released soon. Here’s a link to
the whole article: Unpatched vulnerability identified in 79 Netgear router models:
https://www.zdnet.com/article/unpatched-vulnerability-identified-in-79-netgear-router-
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models/
40 Linux Server Hardening Security Tips
This article provides some key things that Linux/UNIX administrators can do to improve
security on their servers. Key items (that we also discussed at the security workshop)
include:
1)

Avoid Using FTP, Telnet, And Rlogin / Rsh Services

2)

Minimize Software to Minimize Vulnerability

3)

Keep Linux Kernel and Software Up to Date

4)

User Accounts and Strong Password Policy

5)

Disable Unwanted Linux Services

6)

Configure Iptables and TCPWrappers based Firewall

7)

Linux Kernel /etc/sysctl.conf Hardening

Here’s a link to the full article: https://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/linux-security.html
Running RedHat/Centos 6 or 7 or Debian 8?
The Mutagen Astronomy vulnerability has been around for a while (> 10 years). It can
allow an attacker to gain root access to the target system. Most distributions have issued
patches, but it is critical that the patch be installed to mitigate this vulnerability. Delays in
implementing patches (i.e. not keeping software up to date) provides a window for
malicious attackers to target your servers. Here is a link to the full article:
https://www.servercentral.com/blog/linux-vulnerabilities-importance-patching/
UCSF Pays $1.14M to NetWalker Hackers After Ransomware Attack
After NetWalker ransomware locked down several servers of its School of Medicine,
UCSF paid the hackers’ ransom demand to decrypt the data and restore function to the
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impacted systems. Here is a link to the full article:
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/ucsf-pays-1.14m-to-netwalker-hackers-afterransomware-attack
National Vulnerabilities Database Dashboard
Just a quick reminder about the NVD dashboard as a great place to learn about new
vulnerabilities. Here is a link to the website: https://nvd.nist.gov/general/nvd-dashboard
Since the workshop on 5/19 the following new vulnerabilities were announced: RedHat:
37, Ubuntu: 38, AIX: 2, Gentoo: 58, Apache: 18, MySQL: 7, and Cisco: 119. Again,
emphasizes the need for regular patching and updates!
SANS Webcast on Securing Containers
If you join the SANS organization, they regularly have free security related webinars.
One that I saw that I wanted to pass on was on securing containers.
https://www.sans.org/webcasts/containers-vulnerability-management-time-step-thingsup-115850
F5 Vulnerability CVSS 10
A vulnerability that allows for remote code execution was discovered in F5 BIG-IP
devices. It is unusual for a vulnerability to get a CVSS score of 10 so I thought I would
share it with you. Below is a link to the full story:
https://www.zdnet.com/google-amp/article/f5-patches-vulnerability-that-received-a-cvss10-severity-score/
Metasploit Lab Opportunity
If you are interested in getting access to the online lab that lets you try and break into a
Linux server using nmap and Metasploit let me know! If a few are interested I could fire
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up the lab again for you and leave it up for a week!
Be safe!
August Security Update
Good morning!
Below is your August security update!
Garmin hit by ransomware
On July 23rd, Garmin was hit by a huge ransomware event that resulted in customers
losing use of their personal devices as well as aviation navigation devices systems going
offline. Here is a link to one article: https://www.zdnet.com/article/garmin-services-andproduction-go-down-after-ransomware-attack/
InfraGard
On June 21st I participated in a webinar presented by the New York InfraGard team
regarding cyber threats in the time of COVID. They discussed several recent breaches
that included passive surveillance followed by sniper strikes—focused on Citrix
Netscalers and Cisco routers. They emphasized the importance of business continuity
planning in recovering from breaches and ransomware. Additionally, they said that offsite, off-line backups have helped several organizations that had their on-line backups
encrypted by the ransomware too!

InfraGard is a non-profit program by the FBI in partnership with private industry. They
periodically have web sessions, talks, and conferences that are a great opportunity to
meet folks and learn about what threats are out there. Attached are a couple of
information FAQs and brochures on the organization.
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National Cyber League
The NCL has Cyber Games several times a year. It is a great opportunity to think like a
hacker and learn to use some great tools and applications. The sections included in the
NCL include cryptography, enumeration and exploitation, log analysis, network traffic
analysis, open source intelligence, password cracking, scanning, web application
exploitation, and wireless access exploitation. Prior to the actual game event participants
are given access to the “gym” to learn about the different areas and what tools might be
useful answer each question. I have done it several times and always enjoy the challenge.
You can also get an official Score Card that can give you a picture of your increased
knowledge each game. Here’s a link to their website: https://nationalcyberleague.org/
Centralized Log Management
During the workshop we talked about the importance of centralized log management in
analyzing logs if you manage multiple servers. For the enterprise we use Splunk. There
are, however, several tools that you can use to create your own log management
environment for the servers you manage. The article below is a good introduction to Elk
Logstash should you want to create your own:
https://www.howtoforge.com/tutorial/how-to-setup-elk-logstash-as-centralized-logmanagement-server/
Number of Patient Records
According to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights
Breach Portal the number of patient records that have been lost/stolen since January 1,
2020 is a staggering 6,620,720 records! Almost 250 organizations were impacted by the
breaches.
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Stolen Logins
Business Insider reported that hackers are selling more than 15 billion stolen login
credentials on the dark web. Stolen credentials can sell for anywhere from $1 to $140,000
depending on the type of account. They continued by recommending that organizations
and individuals use password manager applications, enable two-factor authentication,
and regularly change passwords to reduce the risk of stolen credential attacks. The link
to the full article is below:
https://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-circulating-15-billion-stolen-logins-on-thedark-web-2020-7
Sharpen your skills
Did you know that there are multiple Linux OS courses, as well as other Linux Security,
Kali Linux, and Ethical Hacking classes available to employees through LinkedIn
Learning and MyLearning? I am currently taking a great class for the CompTIA Linux+
exam. It is important to keep your skills up to date as technologies change! Below are
security recommendations from the Linux+ exam course (hopefully a few sound
familiar!):
Manage Installed and Running Services
-

Uninstall any software that is not necessary

-

Disable any running services that are not necessary

-

Be diligent on OS security updates

-

Disable insecure services such as FTP, Telnet, and Finger

-

Always run a firewall

-

Use TCP Wrappers for services that provide that support

160
-

Use PAM for granular network access

-

Change default service ports

-

Restrict remote logins to trusted hosts

-

Use VPN connections

RedHat/CentOS BootHole Vulnerability Patch
You may want to hold off on RedHat and CentOS patching related to the BootHole
vulnerability. Apparently RedHat and CentOS systems are not booting after application of
the BootHole patches. The patches were for GRUB and the kernel. The article below
provides information on how to downgrade the affected packages.
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2020/07/red-hat-and-centos-systems-arent-booting-dueto-boothole-patches/
Join the Dialog – Collaborate!
Join the UNIX/Linux Administrators Microsoft Team to collaborate and share
information amongst your peers in the institutions! We have almost 40 administrators
that have joined the team!
Study Finalization
In a few weeks you will be receiving a link to complete the final study survey associated
with this research project. It is very similar to what you did in April/May.
Thanks and be safe!
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Appendix E
Permissions for Use of Survey Questions
Approval was requested from the researchers that he developed questions that
were modified and used in the present research. The articles referenced and the author’s
email responses from the authors are shown below.
Siponen, M., Mahmood, M. A., & Pahnila, S. (2014). Employees’ adherence to
informaton security policy: An exploratory field study. Information &
Management, 51(2), 217-224.
Mahmood, M. Adam <mmahmood@utep.edu>
Sat 11/9/2019 1:18 PM
John,
You have my permission to use the items you mentioned in your email for your
dissertation.
Dr. Adam Mahmood
Ifinedo, P. (2012). Understanding information systems security policy compliance:
An integration of the theory of planned behavior and the protection motivation
theory. Computers & Security, 31(1), 83-95.
Ifinedo, P. (2014). Information systems security policy compliance: An empirical study
of the effects of socialization, influence, and cognition. Information &
Management, 51(1), 69-79.
Princely Ifinedo <pifinedo@gmail.com>
Sat 11/9/2019 1:27 PM
Dear John P McConnell,
You're granted permission to items from my 2 papers for your work.
Thank you.
Dr. Ifinedo
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Hanus, B., & Wu, Y. (2016). Impact of users’ security awareness on desktop
security behavior: A protection motivation theory perspective. Information
Systems Management, 33(1), 2-16.
Bartlomiej Hanus <bartlomiejh@gmail.com>
Sat 11/9/2019 2:02 PM
John,
No problem, you are welcome to use the aforementioned items in your study. I hope they
will be helpful to you. Please let me know if you have any further questions.
Thanks,
Bart
Safa, N. S., & Von Solms, R. (2016). An information security knowledge sharing model
in organizations. Computers in Human Behavior, 57(C), 442-451.
Safa, N. S., Von Solms, R., & Furnell, S. (2016). Information security policy compliance
model in organizations. Computers & Security, 56, 70-82.
Steven Furnell <S.Furnell@plymouth.ac.uk>
Sat 11/9/2019 1:13 PM
Hi John
I’ll leave Nader to give the main authorisation on this, as he was the key author here.
However, I do not anticipate a problem.
Please give my regards to Yair.
Best regards
Steve
nader sohrabi safa <sohrabisafa@yahoo.com>
Sat 11/9/2019 9:11 PM
Dear John
you can use the questions from our two models that we published before with citation in
your work.
Best Regards
Dr Nader Sohrabi Safa
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics
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Coventry University, UK
Siponen, M., Mahmood, M. A., & Pahnila, S. (2014). Employees’ adherence to
information security policy: An exploratory field study. Information &
Management, 51(2), 217-224.
Siponen, Mikko <mikko.t.siponen@jyu.fi>
Mon 11/11/2019 2:48 AM
Hi John,
It seems to me self-evident that one can use published instrument even without asking a
permission from the original authors (assuming that one include a proper citation). For
example, if I wrote paper, and I have 200 references, it seems odd to ask everyone can I
cite them...
So, I have no problem if you cite (or use) the measures (a normal citation practice
assumed).
I hope this helps and good luck with your work.
— Mikko
Mikko Siponen
Ph.D., D.Soc.Sc.
Vice Dean for Research
Professor of Information Systems
University of Jyväskylä
Tel. +358 505588128
Rhee, H., Ryu, Y. U., & Kim, C. (2012). Unrealistic optimism on information
security management. Computers & Security, 31(2), 221-232.
Young Ryu <ryoung@utdallas.edu>
Fri 11/15/2019 12:45 PM
Dear John,
You have my permission to use the questionnaire.
Young Ryu
Cheongtag Kim <ctkim@snu.ac.kr>
Sun 11/10/2019 6:27 PM
Hello Mr. John McConnell,
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Thank you for your interest in our work. In fact, I don't think you need permission to use
items published in the academic journal. Anyway, I DO give my permission to use items
in Rhee, Ryu, and Kim (2012).
Cheongtag
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Appendix F
Information Security Survey – Pilot Form
From Qualtrics:
Dear Reviewer,
Thank you for taking the time to pilot test this survey of UNIX Administrator Cognitive
Heuristics and Biases. The goal of this instrument is to better understand how perceived
vulnerability, perceived severity, self-efficacy, response efficacy, information security
knowledge sharing, confirmation bias, optimistic bias, and the availability heuristic
influence UNIX administrator’s ISP compliance behavior. Your feedback will help
ensure the survey instructions and questions are clear and complete. Please set aside at
least 30 minutes to complete your review.
First, review the research summary provided below. Then proceed to review the survey
instructions and questions. This survey is divided into nine sections. You will be
presented the questions as the participant would see them and then you are asked to
review the questions in each section and provide your feedback. You do not have to make
selections for the participant questions.
Again, thank you for your time and participation in this important research effort.
Should you have any question, feel free to e-mail me.
Thank you!
John McConnell at jm3967@mynsu.nova.edu
Participants Welcome:
Welcome!
My name is John McConnell. I am a doctoral candidate in Information Systems in the
College of Computing and Engineering at Nova Southeastern University. I am also an IT
Technical Manager at Johns Hopkins. My dissertation chair is Martha Snyder, Ph.D.,
from Nova Southeastern University. My research is a study on systems administrator
perceptions about information security, security training, understanding of security risks
and vulnerabilities, organizational support, and policy compliance. The Institutional
Review Board approval number for this research project is (TBD).
You are receiving this survey because you have been identified as a systems
administrator working with enterprise class servers in your institution. A systems
administrator is an IT specialist that is responsible for operating system installation,
configuration, patching, user management, monitoring, data backup, implementation of
security controls, disaster recovery, and testing.
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The goal is to understand how security training that is tailored toward your day-to-day
work helps you effectively secure your servers.
We appreciate your help in completing this survey. Completing it implies your informed
consent to participating in this research study. No identifying information will be
included in the research report and your responses will be confidential. It should take no
longer than 10 to 15 minutes to answer the questions. Several questions have a time
limitation on them. For those questions please make your choices as quickly as possible
in the time provided.
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact John McConnell
(jmcconn3@jhmi.edu or jm3967@mynsu.nova.edu) or 410-935-5657. You may also
contact my dissertation chair, Martha Snyder, Ph.D. at smithmt@nova.edu (954)2622074.
For each question, please honestly rate your level of agreement from strongly disagree (1)
to strongly agree (7).
Expert Info - What feedback do you have regarding the participant's welcome?
Expert Information: Section A - Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy is the belief that one is capable of the adaptation necessary to mitigate the
negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
Q2. I believe I have the expertise to implement preventative measures to stop
unauthorized people from getting my organization's confidential information stored on
my servers.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q3. I believe I have the skills to implement preventative measures to stop unauthorized
people from damaging my servers.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q4. I believe I can configure my server to provide good protection from software attacks.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for 'Self-Efficacy'
beyond those listed above (or "N/A" if none)
Participant’s questions:
Q5. Enabling security measures on my servers will prevent users from gaining
unauthorized access to important personal, financial, or patient information.

167
Q6. The preventative measures available to me to stop people from gaining access to my
organization's servers and data are adequate.
Q7. Frequently applying security patches on my operating system is an effective way of
preventing hacker attacks on my servers.
Expert Information: Section B - Response-Efficacy
Response efficacy is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed behavior to
reduce the probability of the negative event (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
Q8. Enabling security measures on my servers will prevent users from gaining
unauthorized access to important personal, financial, or patient information.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q9. The preventative measures available to me to stop people from gaining access to my
organization's servers and data are adequate.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q10. Frequently applying security patches on my operating system is an effective way of
preventing hacker attacks on my servers.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ‘ResponseEfficacy’ beyond those listed above (or "N/A" if none)
Participant’s questions:
Q11. My servers are at risk of having Malware, virus, or similar infection
Q12. My organization could be subjected to a serious information security threat.
Q13. I believe that trying to protect my company's servers and information will mitigate
the risk of illegal access to organizational data.
Q14. I believe that all computer systems are potentially vulnerable to malicious activity
and compromise.
Expert Information: Section C - Perceived Vulnerability
Perceived vulnerability is an assessment of probability a negative event will occur if no
changes are made to the individual’s behavior (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
Q11. My servers are at risk of having Malware, virus, or similar infection
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q12. My organization could be subjected to a serious information security threat.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q13. I believe that trying to protect my company's servers and information will mitigate
the risk of illegal access to organizational data.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q14. I believe that all computer systems are potentially vulnerable to malicious activity
and compromise.
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Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ‘Perceived
Vulnerability’ beyond those listed above (or "N/A" if none)
Participant’s questions:
Q15. An information security breach in my organization would be cause serious
complications for my organization and me.
Q16. I believe that having my servers infected with malware, a virus, or similar infection
would cause serious complications for my organization and me.
Q17. An information security breach in my organization would cause serious
complications for my organization and me.
Expert Information: Section D - Perceived Severity
Perceived severity is an evaluation of the potential physical, psychological, social, or
economic harm an individual expects may occur (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
Q15. An information security breach in my organization would be cause serious
complications for my organization and me.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q16. I believe that having my servers infected with malware, a virus, or similar infection
would cause serious complications for my organization and me.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q17. An information security breach in my organization would cause serious
complications for my organization and me.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ‘Perceived
Severity’ beyond those listed above (or "N/A" if none)
Participant’s questions:
Q18. I frequently share my information security knowledge in my team in order to
decrease information security risk.
Q19. I think information security knowledge sharing with my team helps me to
understand the usefulness of information security policies in my organization.
Q20. I think sharing information security knowledge is a valuable practice in my
organization.

169
Expert Information: Section E - Information Security Knowledge Sharing
Information security knowledge sharing can help to foster sharing of ideas, experiences,
tools, and processes to improve security and protect an organization’s information
systems assets (Flores, Antonsen, & Ekstedt, 2014).
Q18. I frequently share my information security knowledge in my team in order to
decrease information security risk.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q19. I think information security knowledge sharing with my team helps me to
understand the usefulness of information security policies in my organization.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q20. I think sharing information security knowledge is a valuable practice in my
organization.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for ' Information
Security Knowledge Sharing' beyond those listed above (or "N/A" if none)
Participant’s questions:
Q21. My organization has the tools in place to mitigate information security threats.
Q22. My organization executable security practices to mitigate information security
threats.
Q23. The likelihood that my servers will be disrupted due to information security
breaches in the next 12 months is low.
Expert Information: Section F - Optimistic Bias
Optimistic bias leads one to assess situations in self-serving ways (Rhee et al., 2012).
Optimistic bias is a protective measure to protect the self, and reduce both anxiety and
stress (Rhee et al., 2012).
Q21. My organization has the tools in place to mitigate information security threats.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q22. My organization executable security practices to mitigate information security
threats.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Q23. The likelihood that my servers will be disrupted due to information security
breaches in the next 12 months is low.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
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Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for 'Optimistic Bias'
beyond those listed above (or "N/A" if none)
Participant’s questions:
Q24. On the next screen you will be presented with four questions. You will be limited to
30 seconds to select your answers. The choices are the same as the previous responses 1strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-somewhat disagree, 4-neither agree nor disagree, 5somewhat agree, 6-agree, and 7-strongly agree.
Q25. <Undisplayed timing>
Q26. I believe Microsoft servers have more vulnerabilities than Linux/UNIX servers.
Q27. I believe there are more security vulnerabilities, alerts, and patches related to
Windows servers than Linux/UNIX servers.
Q28. I believe a Windows server containing protected health information (PHI) is likely
to be breached.
Q29. I believe a Linux/UNIX server containing protected health information (PHI) is
likely to be breached.
Expert Information: Section G - Availability Heuristic
To judge the frequency or probability of an event an individual may assess the
availability of associations related to the event (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Rather than
taking the time to consider an actual probability it is easier to estimate a probability based
on the ease that one recalls occurrences of a similar event, termed the availability
heuristic (Kahneman, 2011; Kliger & Kudryavtsev, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
I believe Microsoft servers have more vulnerabilities than Linux/UNIX servers.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
I believe there are more security vulnerabilities, alerts, and patches related to Windows
servers than Linux/UNIX servers.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
I believe a Windows server containing protected health information (PHI) is likely to be
breached.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
I believe a Linux/UNIX server containing protected health information (PHI) is likely to
be breached.
Keep
Adjust
Remove
Design flow logic – If reviewer selects “2” or “3”: You selected "2. Adjust" and/or "3.
Remove" to at least one of the items above. Please provide your recommended
adjustments (or "N/A" if none)
Please provide additional questions that you see fit to be included for 'Trust' beyond those
listed above (or "N/A" if none)
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Expert information: Section H - Confirmation Bias:
Confirmatory bias will be tested using a fictional scenario, similar to the technique of
Fischer et al., 2011. Fischer et al. (2011) presented a scenario, asked participants to make
an initial decision, then provided six confirming and six disconfirming bits of additional
information they can choose to review, and then asked to choose again. The level of
confirmation bias will be determined by subtracting the number of disconfirming from
the confirming choices selected (Fischer et al., 2011).
Participant’s questions:
Q30. Scenario Question: Your organization plans on implementing a new web server to
provide customers’ access to HIPAA protected PHI data. In order to provide the highest
level of security, would you recommend the web server be implemented on the Windows
or UNIX/Linux operating system?
UNIX/Linux
Windows
Q31. On the next screen you will be presented with additional information you can
choose to review that you might consider regarding your recommendation. There are 12
data points that are either pro (in favor of) or con (against) each operating system. You
must choose at least one item and may choose up to 6 items. You are limited to 20
seconds to make your selection. Once you make your selection, click the arrow to move
to the next screen. At that time you will be shown the additional information you
requested.
Q32. Please select at least one and no more than six additional pieces of information
below.
UNIX/Linux (Pro)
UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro)
Windows (Con)
UNIX/Linux (Con) UNIX/Linux (Pro)
Windows (Con)
Windows (Pro)
UNIX/Linux (Pro)
UNIX/Linux (Con) Windows (Pro)
Windows (Con)
Q33. <Undisplayed timing>
The following are displayed based on display logic. Only items selected in Q32 are
displayed.
Q34. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - UNIX/Linux servers can be configured with higher amounts
of memory and CPUs making them significantly more powerful than Windows servers.
Q35. UNIX/LINUX (Con) - Porting of applications to UNIX/Linux distributions is not
the focus of many software companies.
Q36. UNIX/LINUX (Pro) - There are fewer demands on the hardware due to reduced
operating systems overhead in UNIX/Linux.
Q37. UNIX/Linux (Con) - Several professional office programs (i.e. Microsoft Windows,
Microsoft SharePoint, and Microsoft Visio) do not work with UNIX/Linux.
Q38. UNIX/Linux (Pro) - Remote function access is integrated into the native operating
system on UNIX/Linux distributions (shell and terminal).
Q39. UNIX/Linux (Con) - UNIX/Linux can be more difficult to administer due to its
command line nature.
Q40. Windows (Pro) - A Windows server is easier for new systems administrators due to
the intuitive operations of the graphical user interface.
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Q41. Windows (Con) - The licensing costs for Windows can be high and can increase
with each user.
Q42. Windows (Pro) - Windows is compatible with popular Microsoft programs like
SharePoint, Visio, and Exchange.
Q43. Windows (Con) - Windows servers are very vulnerable to malware.
Q44. Windows (Pro) - There are many skilled individuals that can fill Windows systems
administrator positions.
Q45. Windows (Con) - The use of mandatory graphical user interface on Windows
servers results in significant resource utilization for basic operating systems function.
Q46. Based on the additional information you received, which operating system would
you suggest for this Web server?
UNIX/Linux
Windows
Expert Information: Section I - Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias can significantly influence decision making (Kahneman, 2011). With
confirmation bias, one gives greater validity to information that supports rather than
contradicts one’s beliefs (Sternberg, 2004).
What feedback do you have related to the confirmation bias scenario and question?
Participant's questions:
Q47. What category includes your age?
□ 17-24
□ 25-34
□ 35-44
□ 45-65
□ 66 or over
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! Your responses will help us
understand how systems administrator perceive information security, security training,
security risks and vulnerabilities, organizational trust, and security policy compliance!
Expert information:
Do you have any additional feedback for this survey?
Thank you again for taking the time to provide your expert opinion on this survey
instrument! Your input is very helpful to this research project and we sincerely
appreciate it!
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Appendix G
IRB Approvals
Office of Human Subjects Research
Institutional Review Boards
1620 McElderry Street, Reed Hall, Suite B-130
Baltimore, Maryland 21205-1911
410-955-3008
410-955-4367 Fax
e-mail: jhmeirb@jhmi.edu

Date: March 2, 2020
APPLICATION APPROVAL
Review Type:
Expedited
Principal
John McConnell
Investigator:
Number:
IRB00240988
UNIX Administrator Information Security Policy Compliance: The
Title:
Influence of a Focused SETA Workshop and Interactive Security
Challenges on Heuristics and Biases
Committee
Susan Bassett
Chair:
IRB
IRB-X
Committee:

174

Date of Approval: March 2, 2020
Date of Expiration: March 1, 2023
The JHM IRB approved the above-referenced Application.
To keep the JHM IRB application current we are assigning an Expiration Date as noted
above. Prior to the expiration date, you will receive an email notification indicating that
some action is required. If the Board has determined that a Continuing Review or
Progress Report is required, you will need to submit Continuing Review or Progress
Report prior to the expiration date. If the Board has determined that No Progress Report
is required, you may run the administrative extend approval function.
IRB review included the following:
The Board determined that there is no requirement for continuing review or progress
report for this application.
This project has been assigned a 3-year expiration date. You will receive an email
notification prior to the expiration date, allowing you to extend this project by completing
an 'Extend Approval' activity.
Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to,
research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication,
cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey,
interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or
quality assurance methodologies.
Changes in Research: All proposed changes to the research must be submitted using a
Change in Research application. The changes must be approved by the JHM IRB prior to
implementation, with the following exception: changes made to eliminate apparent
immediate hazards to participants may be made immediately, and promptly reported to
the JHM IRB.
Unanticipated Problems: All unanticipated problems must be submitted using a
Protocol Event Report.
If this research has a commercial sponsor, the research may not start until the sponsor and
JHU have signed a contract.
Study documents:
Written Consent:
Only consent forms with a valid approval stamp may be presented to participants. All
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consent forms signed by subjects enrolled in the study should be retained on file. The
Office of Human Subjects Research conducts periodic compliance monitoring of protocol
records, and consent documentation is part of such monitoring.
McConnell_IRB00240988_CF_022420_JHMIRB final.docx
Recruitment Materials:
Recruitment email
Additional Supplemental Study Documents:
NSU IRB Approval Letter
Survey
Risk Tier worksheet
Authorization to be PI from department
Institutional Okay to do Study
Protocol:
IT Workshop Learning Objectives
JHM-IRB eForm
Security Challenge Lab
Johns Hopkins Study Team Members: None
The Johns Hopkins Institutions operate under multiple Federal-Wide Assurances: The
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine - FWA00005752, Johns Hopkins Health
System and Johns Hopkins Hospital - FWA00006087

Nova Southeastern University IRB Approval
MEMORANDUM
To:

John McConnell

From:

Ling Wang, Ph.D.,
Center Representative, Institutional Review Board

Date:

February 10, 2020

Re:

IRB #: 2020-60; Title, “UNIX Administrator Information Security
Policy Compliance: The Influence of a Focused SETA Workshop and
Interactive Security Challenges on Heuristics and Biases”
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I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based
on the information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further
IRB review under 45 CFR 46.101(b) (Exempt 2: Interviews, surveys, focus groups,
observations of public behavior, and other similar methodologies). You may proceed
with your study as described to the IRB. As principal investigator, you must adhere to the
following requirements:
1) CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be
obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the
process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers
from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider
their participation after they have been provided this information. The subjects
must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed
in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information. Record of
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the
conclusion of the study.
2) ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS: The principal
investigator is required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Ling
Wang, Ph.D., respectively) of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that
may develop as a result of this study. Reactions or events may include, but are not
limited to, injury, depression as a result of participation in the study, lifethreatening situation, death, or loss of confidentiality/anonymity of subject.
Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is serious.
3) AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of
subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to
implementation. Please be advised that changes in a study may require further
review depending on the nature of the change. Please contact me with any
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study.
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46)
revised June 18, 1991.
Cc:

Marti Snyder, Ph.D.
Ling Wang, Ph.D.
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Appendix H
Invitation to Participate
Hello!
I am reaching out to invite you to participate in a new UNIX/Linux security workshop
that is focused on securing servers in the Hopkins enterprise. You were identified as a
participant because you are a server administrator for Linux or UNIX servers in the
configuration management database (CMDB). My name is John McConnell and I work
in IT@JH. I am also a doctoral researcher in information security at NSU.
The goal of the workshop is to provide you with information, resources, tools, and
practical, hands-on experience to penetration test your own servers and increase security.
We will discuss the scope and impact of data breaches, cyber attackers and their
motivations, the top threats facing our servers, vulnerability management, penetration
testing, and discuss recommendations to help you mitigate risk. Many of the
recommendations introduced during the workshop are from the draft Linux/UNIX
security standard that is currently being reviewed by the ICSC. Finally, you will also be
given the opportunity to perform a penetration test/capture-the-flag challenge on a cloudbased Linux server using the tools we will cover in the workshop.
You are probably aware of some of the tools and resources we will discuss but my hope is
that you will walk away from the workshop with some new knowledge and new tools that
will help you increase both your cyber awareness and your ability to respond effectively
to mitigate security vulnerabilities.
This workshop is also part of my dissertation (Hopkins IRB: IRB00240988, NSU IRB:
2020-60) on UNIX/Linux systems administrator perceptions about information security,
security training, understanding of security risks and vulnerabilities, and organizational
support.
As this is part of an official study, along with the workshop, there are a few
administrative items that need to be completed. Your participation includes completion of
an informed consent form, completion of a short pre-workshop survey, participation in
the workshop, and an opportunity to exploit a cloud-based Linux server using the
Metasploit framework. Finally, you will receive an email to complete a short postworkshop online survey.
As the principal investigator, I will be facilitating the workshop. Darren Lacey, our Chief
Information Security Office will also be participating.
Your participation is voluntary, and your participation decision will not affect your
employment, education, or training at Johns Hopkins.
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The workshop will be held via a secure Zoom meeting Tuesday, May 19th from 9-11 AM.
The CTF challenge lab environment will be online from 11-1 PM for those that want to
try their hand at penetration testing a Linux server using Metasploit.
I hope you find this workshop to be both informative and fun. It will also introduce you,
virtually, to the other UNIX/Linux administrators in the organization. Finally, I plan to
create a new Microsoft Teams team called “Hopkins UNIX/Linux Administrators” that
you can join for future collaboration.
If you want to participate in this free learning opportunity, please simply reply to this
email and I will reserve a space for you!
I hope you will join me to learn something new and to share your experience with other
UNIX/Linux administrators!
If you have any questions, please email me.
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Appendix I
Combined Inform Consent Form
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMED CONSENT AND PRIVACY
AUTHORIZATION FORM
Protocol Title: UNIX/Linux Administrator Information Security: The Influence of a
Focused SETA Workshop and Interactive Security Challenge
JHH Application No.: IRB00240988
NSU Application No.: 2020-60
Principal Investigator: John McConnell, jmcconn3@jhmi.edu, 667-208-6303.
NSU Faculty Advisor/Dissertation Chair: Marti Snyder, Ph. D
NSU Co-Investigator(s): Yair Levy, Ph. D, Ling Wang, Ph. D.
You are being asked to join a research study. Participation in this study is
voluntary. Even if you decide to join now, you can change your mind later.

1. Research Summary:
The information in this section is intended to be an introduction to the study
only. Complete details of the study are listed in the sections below. If you are
considering participation in the study, the entire document should be discussed with
you before you make your final decision.
This research is a study on UNIX/Linux systems administrator perceptions
about information security, security training, understanding of security risks and
vulnerabilities, and organizational support. The goal is to understand how security
training that is tailored toward your day-to-day work helps you improves the security
of your servers.
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2.

Why is this research being done?
This research is being done to assess the effectiveness of a specialized security
education training and awareness workshop and hands-on labs on your ability to
protect and secure your UNIX/Linux servers. It will also assess how the workshop
influences your perception of information security and organizational support.
Who can join this study?
UNIX/Linux systems administrators working with Linux and UNIX servers at
Johns Hopkins may participate. A systems administrator is an IT specialist that is
responsible for operating system installation, configuration, patching, user
management, monitoring, data backup, implementation of security controls, disaster
recovery, and testing.

3.

What will happen if you join this study?
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to complete a short preworkshop survey, participate in a 2-hour UNIX/Linux focused security workshop,
and then execute an exploitation attack of a cloud-based Linux server using tools
demonstrated during the workshop. Finally, after the workshop, you will complete a
short post-workshop survey. Surveys will be completed via Qualtrics (online). The
workshop will be completed online via a secure Zoom meeting on 5/19/2020 from 911 AM. The optional cloud-based penetration test will be available online using
EDURange in AWS and will be available 5/19/2020 from 11 AM to 4 PM.
How long will you be in the study?
Your total time participating in this study workshop and cyber lab is two to
three hours.
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4.

What happens to data that are collected in the study?
Johns Hopkins and our research partners work to advance science and public
health. The data we collect about you are important to this effort. If you join this
study, you should understand that you will not own your research data.
How will your data be shared now and in the future?
Sharing data is part of research and may increase what we can learn from each
study. Often, data sharing is required as a condition of funding or for publishing study
results. It also is needed to allow other researchers to validate study findings and to
come up with new ideas.
No identified data will be shared. De-identified data may be shared with
research collaborators or publishers of papers.
We will do our best to protect and maintain your data in a safe way.
Generally, if we share your data without identifiers (such as your name) no further
review and approval by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) is needed. If data are
shared with identifiers, further IRB review and approval may be needed. The IRB
will determine whether additional consent is required.

5. What are the risks or discomforts of the study?
This research study involves minimal risk to you. To the best of our
knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would
have in everyday life. You may get tired or bored when we you are completing the
survey. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to answer.

6.

Are there benefits to being in the study?
We hope the information learned from this study will help increase your
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knowledge and awareness of the security threats facing our organization and how best
to test, evaluate, and secure your UNIX/Linux servers. There is no guarantee or
promise, however, that you will receive any benefit from this study.

7.

What are your options if you do not want to be in the study?
If you do not join, your employment/education at Johns Hopkins will not be
affected.

8.

Can you leave the study early?
You can agree to be in the study now and change your mind later. If you wish
to stop, please tell us right away. Leaving the study early will not affect your
employment/education. If you leave the study early, Johns Hopkins may use or share
your information that it has already collected if the information is needed for this
study or any follow-up activities.

9.

How will your privacy be maintained and how will the confidentiality of your
data be protected?
We try to make sure that everyone who sees your information keeps it
confidential, but we cannot guarantee that your information will not be shared with
others. Only the principal investigator will have access to any identifying data and
that data will not be shared with anyone in the organization.
Do you have to sign this Authorization?
You do not have to sign this Authorization, but if you do not, you may not
join the study.
How long will your information be used or shared?
Your Authorization for the collection, use, and sharing of your information
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does not expire.
What if you change your mind?
You may change your mind and cancel this Authorization at any time. If you
cancel, you must contact the Principal Investigator in writing to let them know by using
the contact information provided in this consent form. Your cancellation will not affect
information already collected in the study, or information that has already been shared
with others before you cancelled your authorization.
How will your information be protected?
Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a
confidential manner. All responses will be collected in Qualtrics and stored offline at
the conclusion of the collection period. This data will be available to the principal
investigator, and the Institutional Review Board. If we publish the results of the study
in a scientific journal or book, we will not identify you. All data will be kept for 36
months from the end of the study and destroyed after that time.

10.

What does a conflict of interest mean to you as a participant in this study?
The researcher running this study is doing this research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Information Systems.
The researcher is not, in any way, gaining financially from this research study.
If you have any questions about this financial interest, please call the Office of
Policy Coordination 410-361-8667 for more information. The Office of Policy
Coordination reviews financial interests of researchers and/or Johns Hopkins.

11.

What other things should you know about this research study?
During the study, we will tell you if we learn any new information that might
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affect whether you wish to continue to participate.
What is the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and how does it protect you?
This study has been reviewed by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), a group
of people that reviews human research studies. The IRB can help you if you have
questions about your rights as a research participant or if you have other questions,
concerns, or complaints about this research study. You may contact the IRB at 410502-2092 or jhmeirb@jhmi.edu. Please refer to JHH Application No.: IRB00240988.
The Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board can be reached toll
free at: 1-866-499-0790 or IRB@nova.edu. Please refer to NSU Application No.:
2020-60
What should you do if you have questions about the study, or are injured or ill
as a result of being in this study?
Call or email the principal investigator, John McConnell at 410-935-5657 or
jmcconn3@jhmi.edu. If you cannot reach the principal investigator or wish to talk to
someone else, call the IRB office at 410-502-2092.

12.

What does your consent mean?
Your selecting “I consent to participate in this study” means that you have
reviewed the information in this form, and you agree to join the study. You will not give
up any legal rights by signing this consent form.
I consent and will participate in this study.
I do not consent and will NOT participate in this study.
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